Corruption, security, stability and peace

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Recommended minimum time required: 4 hours

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Introduction

«Corruption in the form of bribery and misuse of public funds is a major obstacle to peaceful societies, to democracy and economic development».

Ulla Torens, Danish Minister for Development Cooperation

Objectives

The main objectives of this module are as follows:

1. Providing a basic understanding on the relation between corruption and security.

2. Helping students to understand the factors that allow strong relations between corruption and security.

3. Discussing that corruption is also an enabler of international crime (as well as analysing the factors and channels through which corruption facilitates international crime).

4. Providing an understanding of the relation between corruption and conflict.

5. Analyzing a number of the existing efforts to reduce corruption and increase State stability.

1. Corruption: an introduction to the concepts

Corruption involves a behaviour on the part of officeholders or employees in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully take advantage of their position to favour their private interests over those of the office or position they represent or also a behaviour that ends in an unfair enrichment in their own or others interest, or that induces others to do so, through the misuse of the offices they hold. In other words, it involves the misuse of entrusted power or responsibility in favour of themselves or others (Hope 1985, 2000).

These types of corruption can be further classified into petty (low level, small scale, administrative, or bureaucratic) or grand (high level, elite, or usually political).

Recommended reading

See, for example, Hope 1987, 2000; Hutchinson 2005; DFID 2015.

> **Petty corruption** applies to the kinds of corruption the ordinary citizen encounters or is likely to encounter in their everyday lives, such as bribery related to the implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations, or service delivery.

It is the kind of corruption that people can experience more or less in a daily basis, in their interaction with the public administration and services such as hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, the police, and tax authorities, for example, and may complement and underline high-level corruption and undermine efforts to establish and maintain an honest and well-run state (Hope 1987; Byrne 2009; Holmes 2015; Rose-Ackerman and Lagunes 2015).

Grand corruption (which is usually synonymous to political corruption) refers to corruption at a high or elite level.

It is not so much about the amount of money involved but about the level at which it takes place —at high-ranking levels of the public sphere, where policies and rules are formulated in the first place, such that higher-ranking government officials and elected officials profit from opportunities that are presented through government work, for example, politicians adopting a legislation that favours a group that has bribed them, or senior officials granting major public contracts to specific firms or embezzling funds from the treasury (Byrne 2009; Graycar and Prenzler 2013; DFID 2015; Holmes 2015).

It is important to note that corruption in the healthcare sector is often a reflection of the overall corruption situation in the country.

Simply put, in countries where corruption is more prevalent and non-compliance of the rule of law is extended, it is expected that the healthcare sector would likewise be prone to corruption.

As an example, we present the overall 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the countries where UNDP is a Principal Recipient (PR) of the Global Fund resources. Of the 21 countries examined, perceived corruption was highest in South Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan. The countries which performed well were Cuba, Sao Tome and Principe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite a positive performance from these latter countries, none scored better than high income countries in the rest of the world, which, on average, obtained a CPI score of 67. Further, when examining average CPI scores in countries where the UNDP acts as a PR of funds on behalf of the Global Fund as compared to the rest of the world, it is clear that these countries perform worse than the average of low income countries, which are susceptible to corruption. It is, therefore, expected that corruption would exist in various sectors in these countries (for example, education, health, business practices).

Table 1. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2017 where UNDP is a principal recipient of Global Fund funds

Country	2017 CPI Score	Corruption ranking
South Sudan	12	179
Syria	14	178
Afghanistan	15	177
Guinea-Bissau	17	171
Iraq	18	169
Turkmenistan	19	167
Chad	20	165
Haiti	22	157
Uzbekistan	22	157
Zimbabwe	22	157
Tajikistan	21	161
Kyrgyzstan	29	135
Iran	30	130
Djibouti	31	122
Mali	31	122
Bolivia	33	112
Panama	37	96
Zambia	37	97
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38	91

Country	2017 CPI Score	Corruption ranking
Sao Tome and Principe	46	64
Cuba	47	62
Average	**27**	-
By income status (rest of the world)		
Low income	30	-
Lower middle income	34	-
Upper middle income	40	-
High income	67	-

In addition to summarizing overall corruption in the countries where UNDP acts as a PR for Global Fund projects, further analysis on the relation between corruption and:

- global rule of law; and
- access to healthcare (summarized in Graphs 1 and 2 below) has also been undertaken.

In both instances we find a clear positive correlation between the two variables. In other words greater transparency is associated to higher rule of law. Also, greater transparency is associated to higher healthcare access.

Graph 1. 2017 TI Corruption Perception Index (*x* axis) and 2017 WJP Rule of Law (*y* axis)

Graph 2. 2017 TI Corruption Perception Index (*x* axis) and Global Access to Healthcare Index (*y* axis)

2. Corruption and security

> Studies show that it is no coincidence that low accountability, reduced transparency, heightened corruption and greater insecurity are occurring simultaneously in many countries (Collier, 2007).

Corruption weaves different actors who together and at different levels weaken and erode the pillars —political, military, social, economic and environmental— that sustain security:

- **Political**: The «buying» of political candidates, and of both judiciary and local police forces. These monies may come from drug traffickers, businessmen or powerful political elites and may be used to distort security-related decisions.

- **Military**: Unaccountable and questionable procurement processes by ministries or private contractors.

- **Social**: The use of bribery and power by organised crime groups to facilitate, for example, human trafficking and small arms black market.

- **Economic**: The misappropriation of public monies generated from natural resources wealth to fund paramilitary groups or insurgents.

- **Environmental**: The payment of bribes by governments and companies to dump hazardous waste and materials in marginalised communities.

In the context of addressing these insecurities, governments can be both part of the problem and the solution.

In countries such as China, Chile, Germany and Jordan, government-led efforts to combat corruption have targeted one or several of the dimensions affecting a state's security risks. In other instances, governments have systematically used corruption to fuel national, regional and global conflagrations at the expense of the security of their citizens. Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar and Sudan rank in the bottom five per cent on the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by TI. These countries' governments are also commonly named among the worst perpetrators of violence against their own citizens (Transparency International, 2018).

At the same time, corruption and insecurity may stem from relatively stable and well-governed states when there are breaches in their own accountability, transparency and integrity.

Recent scandals in the US and UK regarding opaque defence industry practices serve all too well as a reminder of the scope of corruption. US dealings in Iraq in particular have been under constant scrutiny after a series of shadowy military and oil contracts were brought to light which contravened US and Iraqi government policies (Passas, 2007).

One study by the General Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction found that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) mismanaged contracts worth US$ 88.1 million, overpaid on at least 11 projects and saw US$ 36 million in weapons gone missing. Private and public actors on both sides have been implicated in the abuse. According to the 2007 TI Global Corruption Barometer, US citizens' cynicism on their government's ability to fight this and other types of corruption have placed the US in the bottom quintile of countries —and among states such as Argentina, Albania and Russia— for their efforts to combat abuse (Transparency International, 2007).

2.1. Understanding the security fallout from corruption

The security agendas of countries —including more traditional concerns related to questions of borders and defence— have been surprisingly separated from the anti-corruption rhetoric. Yet policies made under a country's security doctrine can produce extremely distorted results when corruption enters into the equation.

> Corruption can facilitate as well as cause a rise in security risks for countries and citizens, linking political, military, social, economic and environmental concerns.

In both cases, increased insecurity can lead to higher corruption, creating a vicious cycle. Governments may use citizens' greater sense of «**insecurity**» (whether real or perceived) and the banner of «**national security**» to disguise abuses and withhold information —actions which, in turn, can contribute to elevated security threats. Such opacity is occurring as traditional security funding is soaring.

Corruption may facilitate insecurity through different channels and actors. It can:

1) Serve as an accomplice for crime and violence. Bribery has been used as the lubricant for obtaining nuclear arsenals and arms out of countries (often transitional or fragile states). A variety of former Soviet republics (for example, Belarus, Georgia and Tajikistan) and other countries such as Pakistan head the list of nations shipping these deadly materials abroad (Grier *et al.*, 2004). Security checkpoint payoffs have also been used to give a safe passage to terrorists to cross borders and carry out attacks.

2) Reduce government resources for key sectors. When corruption overshadows decision-making, the already limited resources to address the broader scope of security risks are reduced, inappropriately spent or siphoned-off for personal use.

3) Decrease government accountability. Executive and legislative privileges may be expanded beyond the powers that citizens have given, and used to evade questions regarding accountability on a government's military decisions or actions in other spheres. Under a scenario of limited accountability, arms

World military expenses

In the last 10 years, world military expenses has increased by 7 per cent, with the US accounting for over half of all current outlays (Stalenheim *et al.*, 2007).

Crime and violence

For example, Russian investigators traced the airliner attack by Chechen insurgents in 2004 to a bribe of less than US$ 180 that was paid to facilitate their on board access without proper identification.

Defence funding

For example, studies have shown that corruption is associated with the skewing of public expenditures towards defence funding and away from basic services, as measured by the share of national income dedicated to each (Delavallde, 2006).

sales and military support may be granted to countries based on unclear criteria and opaque decision-making. Private military contractors and region-wide security operations may fall into a void, without proper control or safeguards steering their actions.

4) Limit access to information. As perceptions of insecurity rise, the notion of «national security» may be perversely claimed by governments to prevent the spotlight from being shed on corrupt activities or to quell dissent. By employing the «security» veil, information may be blocked on issues such as the awarding of defence contracts. Even in times of peace, matters of state «security» have always been considered outside the public domain.

5) Promote impunity. Particularly in times of war or conflict, citizen rights and due process may be infringed in the name of preventing «terrorism» or under the claim of «national security»: with their personal safety already threatened, citizens may be discouraged from exposing cases of corruption. Legislation approved in Russia in 2006 now considers extremism to include any criticism of a public official. In countries such as China, Jordan, Nepal and the US, counter-terrorism measures have re-classified certain acts of political dissent as falling outside the scope of the law. Freedom of expression suffers most when such protections are undermined. The media may be forced to reveal sources or to not publish stories. Although 100 countries have laws protecting journalists and their sources, the US, Canada, Netherlands and Ireland are conspicuously missing from the list.

> Corruption can also be the cause of **insecurity**; most notably when systemic abuse makes governments the source of the problem.

In such cases corruption can:

1) Exacerbate security threats. While representing less than one per cent of international trade flows, arms exports are estimated to account for 50 per cent of all corrupt transactions worldwide (Pyman, 2005). Corruption allows for breakdowns in the delivery of supplies to go unaccounted for and arms smuggling to flourish. In the small arms trade alone, estimates are that black market sales may top US$ 10 billion annually (IANSA, 2010). Illegal trading and weak export controls entail that a country may find the weapons it has sent legally to partners and suppliers in the hands of its greatest security threats, as has happened in Colombia, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan. The push for a United Nations treaty to address these gaps and other issues of arms excesses has been strong, but action is currently stalled due to resistance by major exporters such as the US.

Defence expenses

For example, neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank requires countries to report on defence expenses as part of public finance rules, although transparency in government expenditures for education, health, the judiciary and a number of other sectors is expected (Gupta *et al.*, 2001).

2) Fuel conflict. The systematic embezzlement and misappropriation of state funds by corrupt governments breeds discontent and conflict among citizens, as has been evident by separatist movements in resource-rich countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria. In the past, such monies have been used to directly support insurgents (Afghanistan and Iraq), attack citizens (Sudan) and export conflicts (Liberia). Non-state actors also enter into this equation, using financing from drug, smuggling and human trafficking to fund violence.

Transparencia Colombia

For example, the TI national chapter in Colombia has analysed the relationship between drug trade, armed insurgents and the capture of the state (Transparencia Colombia, 2017).

3) Promote state capture and abuse. When corruption is dictating the rules of the game, increases in spending do not necessarily mean more effective security policies. Even in a context of increasing donor flows to military allies, the effectiveness and sustainability of expenditure are likely to be compromised if the recipient government is corrupt.

Rise in military funds

For example, a rise in military funds to kleptocracies can only serve to bolster unpopular governments and increase insecurity.

4) Destabilise regions and the international system. Countries as diverse as Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan and the Congo belong to a network of nations where domestic corruption is undermining global security and threatening international peace (World Bank. 2006).

5) Undermine peace processes. In cases where claims of corruption compromise peace processes, it can increase instability rather than alleviate it, as has happened in Haiti, Sri Lanka and East Timor (Hussman, 2007). Research in the South Caucus region has shown that peace building is often difficult to achieve when one side perceives the other to be corrupt (Mirimanova and Klein, 2006). Corruption can also complicate demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration initiatives. Former warlords may flee with a few cronies and the money, leaving their fighters without funds, but with guns.

2.2. Corruption and security: basic correlations

In order to further analyse the relation between corruption and security, a similar approach to the abovementioned is followed and we present some simple correlations between some of the widely used measures for **corruption** on one hand, and **security** on the other.

Graph 3. 2018 Corruption (TI Corruption Perception Index) and state failure (Failed States Index)

Graph 4. 2018 Political Stability (World Bank Governance Indicators) and Absence of corruption (World Justice Project)

While such simple correlations are interesting, they are not very informative about the dynamics of systemic corruption and how, specifically, they may threaten global security. **Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index** undertakes a great service by focusing world attention on the problem of corruption and mobilizing efforts for fighting it. While it was never intended to be an authoritative analytical tool, however, analysts and policymakers often use it that way —despite Transparency International's caveats (Transparency International, 2018). Based in part on attitudes of elite business communities, such indices may be distorted by some of the sophisticated forms that today's acute corruption takes, diminishing their value in helping predict security risks (Baumann, 2014). When public funds are pumped into private banks to maintain a country's capital reserves, for example, the pillage of those banks by kleptocratic elites may be invisible to external observers —as was the case when Tunisia was widely seen as an example of accountable gov-

ernment just months prior to its anticorruption revolution (Transparency International, 2009). Where pure pay-to-play arrangements are disguised as foreign direct investments in local industries, as regularly occurs in Uzbekistan's communications sector, outside perceptions of corruption may not match the reality (Transparency International, 2012).

Pinpointing a correlation between failing state and states that are seen as corrupt, moreover, proves nothing about causation. Could a reputation for chaos be translated into a reputation for corruption, muddying the analytical waters? How to determine if a state collapse is providing opportunities for corruption or if corruption is causing a state collapse?

Finally, the notion that disintegrating states pose dangers to their surroundings constitutes little more than a tautology. More difficult to discern are clues that states seen as stable —such as Tunisia, Egypt, or Mali in 2010 or Cameroon today— may represent significant threats.

To usefully build on the correlations between severe corruption and threats to international security, closer examination is needed of both the ways in which corruption is structured in a given country and the of independent risk factors with which it interacts.

2.3. Categories of systemic corruption

At issue in this context is not the garden-variety corruption, the type that exists in every country. Such public-sector criminality is never to be condoned, and it presents its own security risks. At the most basic level, such risks can be described as vulnerabilities that criminals will exploit.

Yet the situation is qualitatively different when a country harbours endemic corruption that pervades the political system, or when the critical levers of government action are captured —resulting in a veritable repurposing of the State to the material benefit of a few elite networks. That kind of severe corruption poses security risks of a different order. Such acutely corrupt countries fall into two basic categories (Johnston, 2005).

The first consists of those whose corruption is relatively structured, whose governing systems have been bent to benefit one or a very few cliques, best thought of as networks. States may have one or multiple kleptocratic networks, which often coexist only uneasily. One example of this type is former president Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, where two main networks controlled much of the economy —the military on the one hand and a crony capitalist network led by Mubarak's son Gamal on the other. Ukraine under former president Yanukovych also fits into this category.

Afghanistan, counterintuitively, is another case, for while different networks share the major revenue streams, President Hamid Karzai's mediation has remained paramount in providing access to opportunities —and in providing protection from legal repercussions. Other countries that fit this pattern include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Peru under former president Alberto Fujimori, Tunisia under former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

In this category of corrupt states, kleptocratic networks control the government functions that really matter.

A key priority is instruments of force, both formal and informal. In Algeria and Pakistan, the ruling network is co-equal with the primary instrument of force: **the army**.

The same is true in Egypt today. There, under Mubarak, Gamal's crony capitalist network acquired its own armed branch, the detested Amn al-Shurta, or auxiliary police, omnipresent throughout Egyptian life. In Ben Ali's Tunisia, the army was excluded from the workings of the kleptocracy and the police provided the ruling network with muscle. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya relies heavily on the army's elite Rapid Response Battalion (Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide).

To ensure impunity, kleptocratic networks typically encompass the judicial function. Afghanistan's Karzai regularly calls his attorney general to influence cases or personally orders the release of suspects from pre-trial detention, invalidating the cases against them. In Cameroon, Biya himself appoints every member of the judiciary, «from the chief of the supreme court to the lowliest clerk», in the words of Christophe Fomunyoh of the National Democratic Institute (Fossungu, 2013). Judges in Mubarak's Egypt retained a significant degree of formal independence —although the rules of criminal procedure curtailed much of their discretion and cultural factors encouraged a legitimist stance. As a result, the judiciary could not constitute an effective accountability mechanism (Brown, 2014).

Control over legislative systems further guarantees corrupt networks' ability to achieve their objectives.

> Arranging technical legality for corrupt activities through a legislation that suits them is a hallmark of kleptocracies.

«They made villainous laws to circumvent law by law».

Anticorruption activist Taoufik Chamari of Ben Ali's Tunisia.

The retired administrator of an urban zone in Alexandria, Egypt, remembered how Ahmad Fathi Sorour, speaker of the parliament under Mubarak, «made laws for Gamal so he could circumvent the whole judicial system». In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev and his New Azerbaijan Party control the legislature, an arrangement that facilitates «legal corruption» in ways that cover up the criminality of elite windfalls (Coalson, 2013). Otherwise, kleptocracies give network members a (revocable) pass to ignore laws.

The financial system played a remarkable role in Ben Ali's Tunisia. Banks tendered loans to Ben Ali insiders with no expectation of recovery —except as a punishment.

«Every year there was a list of loans that were written off».

Tunis public accountant Imed Ennouri.

«Accountants would sign off on the decisions to keep getting work». Tax fraud functioned in the same manner: many were allowed to evade taxes, but audits were used as a means of coercion (Zaum, 2013). In Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, and Uzbekistan, among other countries, the civil service siphons off significant public funds into private purses through fraudulent contract procedures. Typical ruses include funding unnecessary or overpriced public works projects, substituting the costly high-quality materials stipulated in the contract by inferior materials, and making contracts with companies run by officials' family members. Civil servants are also instrumental in awarding public assets (such as land or business licenses) to network members at below-market prices.

Critical to the dynamic of this structured kleptocracy —and its impact on populations— is the significant vertical integration of the networks involved.

While elite capture of staggering rents may dominate headlines, it is far from being the sole dimension of corruption. Abusive extortion of «petty» bribes, with a percentage demanded by higher members in the chain, is also a key element, and one that adds to the population's sense of grievance. Officials purchase their positions at a hefty price and then have to make good on their investments, adding to their incentive to extort bribes. Shakedowns become a daily feature of ordinary people's lives, often inflicted with a humiliating arrogance that adds a psychological twist to the material privations victims suffer. For those living under them, these governments become a source of lacerating shame.

The second category of severely corrupt states is somewhat different. It includes those that may experience **pervasive corruption**, but without the same degree of consolidation at the top of the pyramid. Monopolies on the instru-

ments of force may be less complete, so elite networks may engage in open, violent competition to capture revenue streams —in conflicts that itself threaten international security. Competition over land, resources, and State revenues has fuelled recent electoral violence in Ivory Coast. Pervasive, but fragmented, corrupt networks have similarly driven insecurity in Colombia for years. Local government structures, more fragile than their national counterparts, are often easier to capture. Border localities in particular play an important role for trafficking networks and may be prime targets.

Also, corrupt system in these states may be considered less coordinated. A federal political infrastructure may prevent centralization, as in India, or the weakness of government institutions even at superior levels may preclude the degree of control exercised by corrupt networks in the first category of states. Further examples of this type include Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Somalia, and South Sudan. Naturally, any effort to categorize such complex phenomena will be imperfect. Some countries may fall on the cusp between these two broad categories, and their categorization or precise description may be the subject of significant debate.

Even this schematic framework, however, suggests that statements about absolute levels of corruption may be of limited value, either for predicting risk or for tailoring interventions.

As Dominik Zaum of the University of Reading points out:

> «Afghanistan and Burma (Myanmar) might have the same score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, but how corruption affects governance, economic development, and security, what its implications are, and how it is best addressed will be different for each of these countries».
>
> Dominik Zaum (2013, September). «Political Economies of Corruption in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Nuancing the Picture». U4 Brief, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center.

Popular attitudes may also differ in important details and should be investigated directly in each environment.

Similarly, emphasis on different «types» of corruption within a single country can also be misleading. When the U.S. government was developing an anticorruption policy for Afghanistan in late 2010, the underlying analysis made a sharp distinction between **«grand corruption»**, perpetrated by political leaders, **«petty corruption»**, which was seen as greasing the wheels of public administration and therefore not a concern, and **«predatory corruption»** —broadly defined as police shakedowns— which was described as most offensive to ordinary people (Entous *et al.*, 2012).

Usually, however, different types of corruption such as the aforementioned prove to be interconnected elements of a fairly unified system whose structure and vertical integration such descriptions underestimate. To entirely disaggregate them is akin to describing the steering and brakes of a car as two entirely separate machines.

2.4. Revenue streams

> The objective in both groups of countries is, of course, **wealth**.

Some sources of elite rents are so distinctive in their impact that can be identified with a special category of government malfunction. The «resource curse» describes countries blessed with natural resources whose riches do little to improve their populations' development outcomes. Hydrocarbon or mineral wealth, due to its concentration and frequent designation as government property, is particularly susceptible to be captured by kleptocratic networks. Or such apparently free riches may spawn violent competition between equally matched networks.

Nevertheless, viewed under a different perspective, natural resources represent merely one of a number of revenue streams that acutely corrupt governments seek to capture. Identifying such revenue streams on a country-by-country basis may help better understand the nature of each corrupt structure and suggest improved methods of engagement.

In resource-poor countries, public land is a source of wealth that kleptocratic networks almost universally endeavour to award to themselves. In arid countries, such as Afghanistan or Sudan, access to water and thus agricultural suitability is the key feature in determining a plot of land's value. Elsewhere, as in Morocco or Tunisia, the most important factor may be proximity to the seashore or other tourist attractions. In tiny Bahrain, land of any kind is so scarce that the government has undertaken repeated dredging operations —at public expense— to expand the island's surface area, increasing it by approximately 10 percent over several decades (Chayes and Awad, 2013). Most of the new land was awarded to regime insiders for construction purposes. Elsewhere, control over land corridors allows corrupt officials to dominate traffic in arms, drugs, and other destabilizing goods.

In Afghanistan, Colombia, and Yemen, opium, cocaine, or other narcotics may be a critical revenue stream that governing networks tap, usually with profoundly destabilising consequences. Logging or the trade in restricted wildlife products may be particularly lucrative in other countries. As two of France's most distinguished Africa analysts, Jean-François Bayart and Béatrice Hibou, along with the African Studies Center's Stephen Ellis, write:

«In Zimbabwe ivory and rhinoceros horn traffic has involved not only guerrilla movements but also the military authorities».

(Bayart *et al.*, 2014).

In Zimbabwe cash crops, too, such as cocoa, cotton, or palm oil, may be acquired in destructive ways by kleptocratic networks. International officials should not underestimate the degree to which corrupt networks structure themselves to monopolise external financial assistance. Ill-advised European Union or World Bank infrastructure loans —such as those financing the construction of an unnecessary high-speed rail line linking Rabat and Casablanca in Morocco or the $115 million the World Bank granted to Kenya in 1996 — have become another revenue stream for corrupt governments. And when these governments are overthrown, successor regimes are left to pay back the loans, prompting citizens of some post revolutionary countries to push for reductions in this «odious debt» (Center for Global Development, 2010).

Military or counterterrorism assistance provided to Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, or Yemen may provide a perverse incentive to ensure the persistence or appearance of some terrorist activity in order to keep the dollars flowing. Even the service of soldiers, such as Ghana's, as peacekeepers may become a critical revenue stream enabling kleptocratic networks.

«Government-operated non-governmental organizations», referred to as GONGOs, may also be founded, expressly in order to obtain development grants (Smith, 2017). Or governments may stridently demand foreign assistance to be channelled directly into State budgets, exploiting donor countries' sensitivity to sovereignty issues or development practitioners' desire to encourage local ownership and avoid creating parallel structures.

So-called **petty bribery**, too, when added up, proves to be not petty at all and can represent a significant revenue stream. Typical totals could make a real difference to national economies.

> Finally, in far too many countries that practice any degree of electoral politics, campaign financing and expenditure constitute a significant source of revenue.

The impact of daily shakedowns

In Afghanistan, the annual sum of daily shakedowns people suffer at the hands of the police, doctors, judges, or clerks processing applications for licenses, passports, or even death certificates is estimated to total between $2 billion and $4 billion (UNODC, 2014).

The sheer quantity of money in politics distorts and compromises the political process and often serves as a cover for outright bribery and payoffs.

The choice of revenue will vary in different countries, depending on geography, topography, and historical factors, and should be examined as part of a comprehensive portrait of a given kleptocratic structure. An understanding of which revenue streams serve primarily to sustain and enable abusive gov-

ernment corruption —as opposed to those that provide some benefits to the population— may help inform more constructive public- and private-sector engagements.

2.5. External enablers

In today's globalized world, no country or governing system exists in a vacuum. The ability of highly corrupt governments to monopolize their countries' resources is facilitated by external enablers —often respectable Western institutions and individuals. Perhaps the most significant enabler of this kind is the **international banking industry**. Despite real changes to banking secrecy regulations and measures to curb money laundering, this sector continues to serve as a key vector for transferring national wealth into private hands and stashing it outside the country (Global Witness, 2009). Other Western professionals, such as **prestigious attorneys** or **accounting firms**, often acting through regional subsidiaries, play a similar, if less central, role.

Careless or undifferentiated promotion of private investment by foreign ministries in the West can provide a whitewash for dubious sectors within a corrupt country, misleading Western businesses that look to their governments for signals on how to operate abroad.

In Cameroon and Ukraine, a more powerful kleptocratic network in a neighbouring country (in Nigeria and Russia, respectively) has served as a key enabler for ruling elites. The stronger network may provide cash or cut-rate natural resources, collude in customs fraud, or provide other facilities that reinforce the weaker network.

Corrupt officials also use photo opportunities with western chiefs of state, status-enhancing personal relationships, or exchanges of favours to their advantage. These officials may brandish membership in «best-practices» associations, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or other international clubs, to attract increased development funds or private investment (Shaxson, 2009).

When considering how to address dangerously acute corruption overseas, Western decision makers must be clear-sighted regarding the ways in which actors in their own communities are facilitating corrupt behaviour or contributing to incentive structures which are selected for that purpose.

2.6. Security threats

Many analysts see corruption —or «elite bargains»— as a stability factor in certain cases, as long as competing networks divide the spoils rather than fight over them. Making this argument in the context of Afghanistan and India, one analyst contends that elite corruption has been pivotal in creating political stability and promoting developmental goals.

> «Corruption, [he contends] must be accepted as an undesirable but nonetheless potentially legitimate mechanism for engaging with societies organized along different lines».
>
> Vivek Sharma (2013, November). «Give Corruption a Chance». *National Interest.*

U.S. President Barack Obama, in a 2009 BBC interview, described then Egyptian president Mubarak as a «force for stability and good in the region» (Webb, 2009).

Yet, such an analysis, in its focus on elites, underestimates the agenda of ordinary people —their perceptions of corruption (not Western assumptions of what those perceptions might be) and the increasing tendency of populations to lash out violently against governing systems they can no longer tolerate. The security implications of acute corruption, in fact, are likely to outweigh its potential advantages. They vary in type depending on the structure of corrupt networks, the levers of power they reach, and the revenue streams upon which their sights are set.

One such threat, still often underestimated, is the rage that acute —and especially structured and concentrated— corruption can ignite in its victims and the likelihood that some will express that rage in violent or destabilizing ways. Every country that harbours an extremist insurgency today suffers from **kleptocratic governance**, including such apparent outliers as the Philippines or Thailand. The motivational literature of those extremist movements is littered with references to corruption (Carter and Clark, 2010).

Every government that faced significant mass protests during the 2011 Arab uprisings, from Tunisia to Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, perpetrated acute corruption on behalf of narrow cliques that included high government officials and their close relatives. Marchers shouted anticorruption slogans, while posters displayed political leaders behind bars. Ukraine is just the most recent country on that list. And as mobile and electronic communications give citizens more access to information, levels of outrage —and mobilization— are likely to keep rising.

Where the United States or other Western countries are seen as enabling the kleptocratic practices of corrupt governments, moreover, some of the victims' rage will inevitably be directed outward, past the hated regime and toward its perceived American or allied backers.

> For Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a prominent member of al-Qaeda killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011, the main rationale for the September 11 (2001) attacks, was the U.S. role in enabling Arab kleptocracies. In 2009, he decried U.S. and Western officials for «setting up in our countries treasonous regimes loyal to them, then backing these corrupt regimes and governments against their populations». This Western support for Middle Eastern kleptocracies, according to Rahman, was "the true cause that motivated the mujahidin to carry out» the 9/11 attacks.

To the victims, in other words, the foreign governments that play an enabling role often seem no less corrupt than their own. And, exposed by ever-greater electronic media transparency, hypocritical discrepancies between stated values and actual behaviour are increasingly revealing.

But these dramatic recent examples of the security fallout from acute corruption do not exhaust its possible implications for international stability.

The loss of state legitimacy is a crucial factor in many crises. For, although transnational organized crime attracts much enforcement attention, the exploits of effective criminal networks do not violate expectations. Criminals behave nefariously by definition. But citizens have quite different presumptions of their governments, whose functions are supposed to include protection, care, and neutral regulation of social and economic activities. So when governments systematically behave criminally, their legitimacy flounders. Profound disenchantment results, and the very fabric of society begins to fray —with unpredictable consequences.

When every government function is up for sale to the highest bidder, furthermore, infringements of international as well as domestic law become the norm. Non-proliferation or international sanction regimes are regularly circumvented (AAS, 2009). Intellectual property rights are ignored.

Highly corrupt governance aids extremist organizations not only by motivating indignant citizens to join them, moreover, but also by providing a haven and logistical support for those very same groups, as officials become lax —for a fee. Nairobi residents exchange grim remarks about the «Shabab bribe» (double the normal rate) that allowed attackers from the terrorist group al-Shabab to infiltrate the Westgate Mall in a September 2013 siege that claimed over 60 lives. In the same vein, trafficking rings that have secured safe passage past corrupt officials for migrants or sex slaves may provide transit for mules carrying a dirty bomb.

In Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Montenegro, Mozambique, and Myanmar, among other highly corrupt countries, public officials have entered into profoundly destabilizing alliances, even symbiosis, with transnational criminal superpowers —drug and weapons syndicates whose activities span continents. While Western law enforcement efforts have focused increasingly on criminal networks over the past decade or two, the close interweaving of such networks with corrupt governments that helps sustain them is sometimes overlooked. In these and other cases, some rival criminal network, often posing as a «Robin Hood», may mount a violent challenge

to corrupt government networks. Such scenarios have exacted a shocking price from populations both inside and beyond national boundaries (Casas-Zamora, 2013).

In some cases, corrupt ruling elites may deliberately cultivate conflict because of the diverse opportunities for profiteering and wealth transfer that fighting affords. Persistent underdevelopment as well as the miseries related to civil strife also provide access to international assistance, which corrupt officials may be loath to give up. A perverse incentive structure can thus be created, with corruption and conflict interacting symbiotically.

The militaries in countries where public corruption is pervasive make unreliable allies. As defence funding is siphoned off into the pockets of the powerful, armies are often poorly trained and equipped, their rosters full of «ghost soldiers». Officers sell military material, even to the very enemies they are supposed to be fighting. Military professionalism and capabilities are inadequate to protect borders, leaving such countries vulnerable to attack. Kleptocratic governments cannot be expected to honour the conditions associated to the provision of military aid. Proliferation, forging of end-user certificates, and other types of fraud are likely to be the norm. And cooperation, such as Pakistan's allowing NATO to use its overland routes into Afghanistan, is often provided only for a price, which can be increased as soon as dependence is established.

Other corruption-related security threats burn on a slower fuse. Corrupt government practices contribute to severe economic distortions, threatening financial-sector stability, for example, when fraudulent banking practices prevail. Kleptocratic networks undermine the economic diversity of their countries, as they focus government energies on resource streams they can capture. Other economic sectors wither or are actively undermined by cheating on customs or other types of unfair competition. Economic opportunities dry up. Unemployment increases. And the distortions that result can have destabilizing impacts on entire economic ecosystems.

Acute corruption damages physical ecosystems just as indelibly. Local and national officials in these contexts do not care much about environmental degradation. Their policies —or lack of them— often exacerbate the impact of climate change, for example, and incapacitate efforts to curb it. Worsening environmental conditions, in turn, increase the suffering of populations, making them more likely to revolt (Friedman, 2012). In climate-vulnerable zones, such as Haiti or the Philippines, the impact of natural disasters is compounded by corruption.

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2.7. Interaction with other risk factors

Corruption —or any other single driver— cannot be solely blamed for such complex phenomena as **insurgency**, **revolution**, **economic depression** or **the partial capture of states by transnational criminal organizations**.

Other factors, in combination with kleptocratic governance, increase the likelihood of a **severe international security event at a given time**.

The geographic proximity of networks determined to exploit weaknesses, such as al-Qaeda franchises capitalizing on local grievances in Syria or Mali, for example, or criminal superpowers on the hunt for leaders who can be recuited, as in Mexico, is one such factor.

A **deep rift in self-identification within a population**, be it religious (as in Nigeria or Syria), ethnic and linguistic (Turkey), or **related to national identity** (Ukraine), might be another risk factor, as pre-existing separatist movements might be. Severe **economic disparities** caused by local geographic or environmental factors can also increase the likelihood of security challenges.

Such discrepancies are evident in Nigeria between the north and the comparatively rich south; in Syria, where residents of drought-stricken areas sparked off the 2011 protests; and in Tunisia, with its acute development disparity between the affluent northern coastal area and the impoverished interior.

Climate impacts or environmental damage contribute to risk factors in this category.

A consideration of the security implications of corruption in a given country should examine risk factors such as these that may be coupled with it. In many cases, security implications are exacerbated by a feedback loop between acute corruption and these other key risk factors.

3. Corruption as an enabler of international crime

3.1. Corruption as a facilitator

Corrupt officials provide information and documents which are required for criminals and terrorists to operate. Corruption at borders, ports, and in consulates, has broad security and economic implications for states. Corruption can facilitate the entry and movement of many forms of illicit trade that weakens state stability, including drugs and arms, and may facilitate the entry into the country of pernicious non-state actors who may undermine the state. Terrorists who have bribed officials can easily cross borders, and sometimes they do so along with smuggled migrants, using the services of transnational criminals.

In some cases, officials even provide key operational services.

> For example, corrupt officials at the Mumbai port allowed the entry of weapons that were then used in the terrorist attack on the city. The terrorists of the school in Beslan (in Russia's North Caucasus) resulted in numerous casualties. The terrorists were driven to the location by a corrupt police official, who provided transport in exchange for a bribe. The school became the target due to the fact that the terrorists ran out of funds to travel further, as they had no money left to pay additional bribes to the police officer.

Corrupt officials can provide visas and passports to transnational criminals and terrorists. They also can provide these to individuals who are being smuggled or trafficked by pernicious non-state actors. This facilitates both movement and revenue generation.

3.2. Corruption and de-legitimation of the state

In very acute situations, corrupt and criminal individuals deliberately join key sectors of government service to undermine their effectiveness. They particularly target the security apparatus, ministries of justice, the judiciary, law enforcement and particularly customs and border patrol. Legal provisions preventing the prosecution of legislators and state officials at national and even regional level serve as an added incentive to «**engage in government service**». Some have described this as **state capture**. Once, kings could be rescued after they were captured by their enemies. But with contemporary state capture, there is little chance of release. Few countries have managed to oust the illicit networks, once they have become entangled in governmental structures (World Development Report, 2011).

Corruption not only undermines the mission of State institutions but also has serious detrimental impact on their revenues. In many countries, customs services are the most compromised agency. Both high and low-level corruption

in customs too often allows most commodities to be imported with limited or no custom duties, undermining state capacity. Compounding state revenue loss is the theft of billions in State assets such as natural resources by corrupt leaders. Global Financial Integrity has estimated that $1 trillion exited developing and emerging countries in 2014 by these thefts alone (OECD, 2009).

When kleptocrats steal so much of their country's domestic resources, this limits foreign and domestic investment, and consequently constrains employment for the youthful population. Therefore, this large-scale corruption undermines state capacity and legitimacy, and weakens state institutions. The absence of a functioning state makes citizens prone to turn to non-state actors for employment and social services.

The proceeds of the criminal activity of pernicious non-state actors are used to ensure that the citizens do not perceive them as a negative force in the community, helping to ensure their future impunity.

> In many different regions of the world, criminal and terrorist groups such as the FARC, drug cartels, Hamas, or ISIS step in as service providers. This has been seen with the Yakuza in Japan, after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, when the criminal group provided aid in the absence of state services. In Brazil's favelas, drug traffickers furnish service to their communities (Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2009). In Colombia, the FARC, at its height, financed, schools, medical clinics and infrastructure support.

Other terrorist groups in many regions of the world have also provided services to the community, enhancing their legitimacy. Therefore, parallel institutions to the state emerge and are sustained, further undermining the government's legitimacy.

3.3. Corruption undermines state security

Corruption undermines the capacity of law enforcement to maintain social order and precludes the military to protect the members of the society, thereby undermining citizen support for their government.

Afghanistan and Mexico

Massive corruption of law enforcement and military in Afghanistan and Mexico, where many police and soldiers members serve as facilitators of the drug trade, leads to further destabilization.

States crippled by corruption also lack effective security –the personnel are compromised and military procurement programmes are undermined. A most dramatic example of this is Nigeria, where procurement fraud, as well as the siphoning off of soldiers' salaries by corrupt officials, has made the armed forces both unable and unwilling to fight Boko Haram (UNDP, 2011).

In certain states, bribes to officials result in unjustified exemptions from military service, leaving armed forces with inadequate or less competent personnel. In some countries, fictitious «ghost soldiers» are paid, allowing supervis-

ing officers to collect their salaries. Ghost soldiers drain military budgets, but also misleadingly swell the ranks of armed combatants, leaving citizens unprotected by actual personnel.

Corruption in peacekeeping missions may undermine their capacity to reduce violence and restore order —the corruption can include both deployed personnel, as well as corrupt subcontractors, who are even less accountable. Absence of training for deployed personnel as a consequences of corruption, may lead to a culture of tolerance, thereby reducing the peacekeepers' credibility with the citizenry. Unfortunately, all too often governmental intervention strategies tolerate corruption in the name of maintaining order and fighting terrorism, such as was seen in Afghanistan.

4. Corruption as a threat to stability and peace

4.1. Corruption and conflict

Prior to looking in more detail at the possible ways in which corruption might feed conflict and instability, it is worth mentioning the ways in which weak institutions and conflict can fuel corruption.

Almost all countries that are classed as highly corrupt also have weak political, administrative, and economic institutions.

As a result, there are few formal constraints on corrupt behaviour, and those institutions that are central to deterring corruption or investigating and sanctioning corrupt behaviour lack the capacity –and often the incentive and will– to do so.

Weak state institutions, however, are often a consequence of civil conflict and the physical destruction, displacement, and strengthening of informal parallel structures of power associated to it. Violent conflict creates an environment where extortion is rife and taking part in corrupt exchanges is a rational choice for individuals, if only to deal with the vagaries of daily life: those paying bribes might do so to access food, healthcare, or shelter; and for those demanding bribes, it might be one of the few income opportunities.

If trust between different groups is low, as is common in conflict-affected environments and in those with weak institutions, protecting the interest of an ethnic group, tribe or family through bribery or nepotism is clearly a rational response to the constraints faced (Philp, 2011).

4.2. The relation between corruption and stability

Corruption is said to fuel conflict and instability in three ways:

1) Corruption can fuel social and political grievances, in particular a sense of inequality and injustice, as corruption distorts government decisions and undermines the provision of public services such as education and healthcare. These grievances can be mobilised by rebels to fuel uprising against the government and to gather popular support.

Arab Spring uprisings

In the Arab Spring uprisings, corruption seems to have fuelled wider grievances, which facilitated the popular mobilization against different governments.

2) The rent-seeking opportunities that come with corruption (especially in resource-rich states) can provide incentives for violent conflict as those excluded from power and rents use violence to seek access and control over these opportunities. If corruption has transformed the state from a set of institutions providing public goods into a set of institutions to be exploited for private gain, the state becomes a prize to be fought over.

3) Corruption can undermine both the capacity and legitimacy of the state. By depriving the state of resources and by misallocating them, corruption weakens the ability of the state to provide key public services, including security. This can directly weaken the capacity of security services; for example, if soldiers remain unpaid, or their equipment is faulty or old because procurement budgets are embezzled, their ability and motivation to defend the state is likely to wane. Corruption can also reduce state legitimacy as the government fails to fulfil citizens' expectations, increasing willingness to violently challenge the existing regime.

However, there is also a belief that, in some environments –especially where formal political institutions are weak–, corrupt practices can contribute to stability at least in the short to medium term.

> Corruption is often part of the complex political realities that underpin the power structures that shape negotiated elite settlements, which are central to limiting violence and conflict in fragile states (de Waal, 2009).

The role of corruption in these agreements needs to be recognised when supporting the negotiation and implementation of any agreement (Cheng and Zaum, 2011). Corruption can support such settlements in two ways, with a prominent role for international and external actors:

1) Accepting a settlement where power is organised around corrupt relationships and opportunities for rent-seeking is often a method of literally buying support for reaching a settlement. Allowing war-time leaders to turn their military might into political power and rent-seeking opportunities has been a central element of a range of attempts to negotiate a settlement, that is, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DR Congo, or Afghanistan. However, such agreements have not provided the expected stability. In the case of Afghanistan, the 2001 Bonn agreement has been described as «an externally driven division of the spoils among a hand-picked group of stakeholders who were on the right side of the War on Terror» (Gordon and Zedra, 2010) and provided an unstable, competitive elite settlement without the wider elements of a peace agreement between belligerents. The settlement also underlined the dilemma the actors involved were facing in attempting to balance stability, security, and legitimacy.

2) Corruption can be seen as part of the **maintenance of such an elite bargain**. In societies with weak states, stability and political order is often provided, not by public institutions autonomous from sectional interests, but by the most inclusive buy-in of elites in a «neo-patrimonial marketplace». Corruption can be part of sustaining patronage ties and the elite buy-in that stabilises the settlement. The stability of the corrupt regimes in Angola or Cambodia today, and in Liberia or Zaire during the Cold War, is witness to that.

> What these regimes have in common, however, is a relatively centralized form of corruption and control over the key resources that sustain the patronage networks that supported stability in these countries.

In cases where corruption and control over the resources around which it is organized is more fragmented, as in Afghanistan or the DR of the Congo, corruption has done little to «glue» the different conflict parties together and minimize violence, especially if the settlement has excluded key parties. Moreover, they tend to both sustain the suffering of the poor and to fuel the potential for conflict in the future.

4.3. Corruption and peace operations

As this brief discussion highlights, corruption can pose a direct challenge to peace operations and their peace- and state-building activities. When corruption fuels social grievances and compromises state legitimacy, it undermines the emergence of stable and peaceful societies and risks renewed violence. When it deprives public services, especially security services, of financial resources, it weakens the ability of the state to maintain a minimal level of security without external assistance. Many peacekeeping forces also make a sound differentiation between the **general corruption** that is widespread in conflict countries on the one hand and the **corruption initiated** by for example, the absence of procurement standards or the abuse of the peacekeeping forces' power on the other hand, although links between the two need to be recognised.

Peace operations, however, can also unintentionally fuel and entrench corruption in fragile and conflict affected environments. Three ways in particular stand out through which peace operations and their activities might fuel corruption.

1) The support for particular political settlements. While inclusive elite settlements that involve as many conflict parties as possible are central to reducing the risk of renewed conflict, they can embed corruption, not least because

bringing elite individuals, whose power is maintained with the help of rent-seekers from corrupt activities, into the settlement severely limits the political commitment to anti-corruption reforms (Call, 2012).

2) Through democratic elections, supported by the presence of the international community. Democratic elections, even of contested quality (such as the 2009 Afghan presidential elections) and necessary as they are to support the implementation of democratic institutions, can insulate corrupt governments from international pressure: the democratic legitimacy of the Karzai government was one of the factors that made it difficult for the US to withdraw its support for his regime despite perennial corruption concerns (Guistozzi and Ibrahimi, 2012). Similarly, democratic legitimation isolated the Burundian government from major international pressure after 2005, as it pushed to reduce international involvement in the country and strengthened the neo-patrimonial system of government that had characterized the dynamics of the Burundian State prior to the 2002 peace agreement (Uvin and Bayer, 2012).

> Democratization processes have several other features that tend to fuel corruption. The clientelistic politics associated with democratic competition, the greater openness of democratic systems and the access this gives rent seekers to public officials, and the weak institutional checks and balances associated with processes of transition to democracy increases opportunities for corruption, while at the same time reduces the risk of getting caught (Rock, 2009).

3) Through the extensive amount of financial aid and assistance that tends to accompany peace operations. Aid can distort the economies of conflict-affected countries, especially if it exceeds the country's capacity to absorb these funds, fuelling rent-seeking and providing incentives for corruption in the process. In some conflict affected countries, such as Afghanistan or Liberia, aid and other financial contributions such as security expenditures by foreign militaries has exceeded local GDP indiscriminately. This is often exacerbated by the need to disburse funds quickly to address emergency situations or obtain highly visible «quick wins» through quick impact projects, and to proceed without robust procurement and auditing procedures.

However, systematic evidence of the impact of aid on corruption is lacking, mainly due to poor data especially in conflict-affected countries, but also due to the problems of meaningfully measuring corruption.

Of particular importance, from the perspective of peace operations, is the **effect of the way in which aid money is spent** as this affects both the scale and character of corruption (Von Billerbeck, 2011). In fragile states aid spent off-budget and bypassing the state (as many quick-impact projects implemented by peace operations are) is often found to further weaken state authority

(Ghani and Lockart, 2008). Research into the impact of aid and informal social service delivery by NGOs or communities at a local-level has shown that this often revives and reinforces the patronage power of local elites, who become the gatekeepers to aid and services (Jackson, 2005). This is one important example of the need for civil society to implement lessons learned and to work constructively with international and local government actors to ensure that aid is spent responsibly.

In conflict environments with only an informal elite settlement, where provincial and local powerbrokers compete over influence both in the provinces and with the centre, financial or other assistance spent outside the budget and at the sub-state level can fuel and entrench this competitive political order and local warlords challenging the authority of the state. An example of this has been the security-related contracting in Afghanistan.

The use of private security companies, often with close links to local powerbrokers, to protect bases and projects has further strengthened this decentralization of power and corruption (Sherman and Di Domenico, 2009). They can also be abused by organized crime and might not adhere to the same anti-corruption standards as state or public sector actors. To illustrate these dynamics, the next section contains three case studies that will further explore the character of corruption and the complex relation between corruption, conflict, and instability in different countries and regional contexts.

4.4. Peace operations and corruption

Corruption is not only a major challenge to governance, security, and development in fragile and conflict affected countries, but also for the international organizations that have a substantial presence in many of these states. Organizations such as the UN and its specialized agencies, the European Union (EU), and donors such as the World Bank are important sources of aid and technical assistance. In addition, the UN, NATO, and regional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the EU have authorized and deployed peace operations in fragile and conflict-affected countries to maintain security, and support governance reforms.

In addition to being deployed in a growing number of environments that are characterized by substantial levels of corruption, the scope of peace operation engagement (and of international organizations generally speaking), in particular with regard to reforming and strengthening institutions of governance, has substantially increased.

«[Peace operations] have found themselves involved, to an unprecedented degree, in the creation and reformation of representative political institutions, the strengthening of governmental capacity, the promotion of judicial reforms and the liberalization of economies».

Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum (eds.) (2012). *Political Economy of state building: Power after Peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.

In that context, they have often supported direct and indirect anti-corruption reforms, or in some cases engaged directly in addressing corruption not only with regard to their own programmes but also within the countries where they work.

As discussed above, both EULEX in Kosovo and NATO in Afghanistan have investigated cases of alleged corruption, and (in the case of EULEX) initiated prosecutions. In Liberia, key donors such as the World Bank and the EU established the Governance and Economic Management Programme (GEMAP), which placed international officials in key economic positions and required them to sign off on the use of donor funds in an effort to reduce corruption. It is therefore exploring in further detail how key international organizations and the peace operations which have been established have engaged in anti-corruption efforts, and how anti-corruption concerns feature in their operations planning, operational guidance, training, and their activities.

A 2013 study by Transparency International identified five key areas of peace operations where corruption concerns regularly arise, or that are central to addressing corruption (Transparency International, 2013).

1) Political framework. Any peace agreement, and the political settlement that derivates, is frequently formed in an environment where corruption is not only endemic, but also a central feature of the political relationships and dynamics that underpin the settlement. For this reason, a peace operation's mandate in relation to the settlement is likely to have a major impact on the way in which corruption subsequently develops or is arrested. Factors that can increase corruption risk include:

- organized crime, perhaps linked to drugs or a scramble for natural resources;

- a political leadership that is prepared to put its own self-interest ahead of the national interest; and

- a lack of accountability and systemic corruption in the police, military and other national institutions.

2) Mission's own operations. Corruption may occur within the mission itself, for example in its procurement, or due to the involvement of troop contingents in illicit activities. The senior leadership of the mission has a particularly important role in addressing these areas. These risks should influence the

mission's interaction with national actors and civil society, and affect its approach to the design of post-conflict programmes. In addition, peacekeeping operations can affect corruption through their presence, and the introduction of substantial resources into fragile environments.

Without full awareness of the ways in which corruption can affect the mission's mandate, the mission leadership may risk being seen as condoning corruption or even as being an accomplice to it. Robust guidance and internal systems are required to address these types of corruption risk. The key principles are to ensure that mission staff:

- Understand that, based on experience of many international interventions, corruption is both cause and consequence of conflict.

- Take corruption risk into account when conducting assessments, planning programmes and undertaking operations.

- Include building integrity and counter-corruption measures in key programmes such as Security Sector Reform.

- Cultivate a culture of personal accountability and external, real-time oversight.

- Know how to identify and address corruption and are aware of the consequences of ignoring or delaying action against it.

3) Troop contributing countries. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries are at the heart of peacekeeping missions. However, despite recent efforts to increase training standards for peacekeeping troops, they come with very different levels of capacity, and often from countries which themselves struggle with corruption problems.

> **Rwanda and Ghana**
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> Of the 10 largest TCCs in 2013, only two (Rwanda and Ghana) had scores above 40 in the Corruption Perception Index; and only three of the 10 largest police contributing countries (Senegal, Jordan, and Rwanda) had a score above 40 (UN DPKO, 2013).

There is a range of corruption risks that can affect them, both in relation to personnel and equipment, and in terms of accounting for reimbursement paid to governments under assessed contributions. Strengthening their capacity to operate in corrupt environments would greatly improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

4) Central procurement, an issue of particular importance for the UN. Although central procurement for peacekeeping may be in a more controlled environment than in the field, it still has its inherent corruption risks.

5) Peace operations require adequate oversight and whistle-blower protection. Likewise inadequate protection for whistle-blowers and inadequate oversight can seriously undermine measures put in place to reduce corruption risk within an operation.

The Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) can be mentioned as a good practice approach to increase the awareness of and address these risks. Since 2011, the **Rule of Law Training Programme of the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)** organises conferences and expert workshops on anti-corruption, accountability and peace operations with a special focus on the transition countries of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA Region). The ZIF also seconds civilian anti-corruption experts to peace operations worldwide, for example to work as mentors of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFG) with prosecutors in the anti-corruption unit of the Office of the Attorney General.

The next section examines some of these corruption risks in further detail, through the perspective of the operations authorised or undertaken by the UN. The EU and NATO will be discussed in separate sections which will be found below. Given the substantial differences between them in the numbers of missions, their character and mandates, and resources, the objective is not to compare how they address corruption risks, but illustrate the particular challenges that different corruption risks pose and international responses to them.

4.5. UN peace operations and corruption challenges in procurement and troop selection

Since the end of the cold war, the number of peacekeeping operations has substantially increased, as well as their size and scope. In late 2013, the UN was conducting 15 peacekeeping operations (excluding the UN political mission in Afghanistan deployed alongside the ISAF). A growing number of UN peacekeeping operations have wide-ranging peace- and state-building mandates, including anti-corruption, or more general governance reforms. A recent study suggests that from 1989 to 2011, the UN had authorised 29 peace operations with state-building mandates (Berdal and Zaum, 2012). Accordingly, the cost of peacekeeping operations has substantially increased. In 2011/12, the peacekeeping budget was $7.08 billion, up from $3 billion in 1993. Furthermore, close to another $1 billion was earmarked for political missions and peacebuilding offices.

UN peace operations have been frequently deployed within highly corrupt contexts. Table 2 lists UN peace operations since 2006 that have been deployed in environments with a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score below 30. It highlights not only the scale of the UN presence in these countries but also the diversity of contexts, and the associated corruption risks. It includes countries with substantial natural wealth resources (for example, the DR of the Congo) and resource-poor countries (for example, Haiti); as well as countries with high aid dependency (such as Burundi) and countries where aid makes a marginal contribution to GDP (such as Syria). In almost all of the countries listed, UN operations had to manage ongoing or renewed violent conflicts. Practically all of the operations are in African

countries, reflecting both the greater prevalence of conflict and the recent focus of the UN on Africa. Given the fact that a substantial share of the UN's peacekeeping resources are deployed in highly corrupt environments, it is incumbent on the organisation to indoctrinate troop behaviour in varied environments as a tool to counter this risk.

Table 2. UN Peace Operations since 2006 in Highly Corrupt Environments

Country	Years	Maximum troop size	CPI
DR of the Congo	1999-2010	22,000	21
Ethiopia/Eritrea	2000-2008	4,150	33
Ivory Coast	2004-	9,994	29
Haiti	2004-	14,200	19
Burundi	2004-2006	5,665	19
Sudan	2005-2011	10,500	13
Darfur, Sudan	2007-	25,000	13
CAF/Chad	2007-2010	3,800	26
DR of the Congo	2010-	21,500	21
Sudan	2011-	4,075	13
South Sudan	2011-	7,633	314
Syria	2012-	278	26

The issue of corruption in peacekeeping environments is particularly complicated given the fact that forces have to balance a number of competing goals and objectives. In the short term, they may have no other viable option but to work with local actors involved in corruption to help stabilize a particular region. Yet they must also consider the reputational implications and the danger of further entrenching corruption and the power of corrupt actors; it is never politically easy to «accept» a given level of corruption and doing so can jeopardize the success of the force and of its mandate.

The increasing awareness of the general issue is clearly visible. In 2011 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) signed «a joint plan of action to further strengthen their cooperation in the battle against drugs and organised crime in conflict and post-conflict zones and to proactively address threats to stability and security» (UNDO, 2011). Corruption is also mentioned in the 2012 UN DPKO Planning Toolkit, although not as a primary issue (UN DPKO, 2011).

4.6. Corruption in peacekeeping procurement

The principal procurement risks in peacekeeping are **vendor influence, vendor selection, and information broking** (which involves illegally giving or selling valuable tender information or tender progress information to other vendors).

The case of Alexander Yakovlev, a former UN Procurement Officer who was found guilty of receiving nearly $1 million in bribes from numerous contractors via the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, illustrates the inherent corruption risks. The UN has significantly strengthened central procurement as a result of the Yakovlev experience. The Procurement Task Force was set up in 2006 to investigate allegations arising from this case in particular.

Following a Procurement Task Force investigation and report, measures have been put in place to provide greater oversight and monitoring of the procurement process. These new processes seem to have reduced opportunities for corruption in procurement. Peacekeeping operations are often responses to emergencies and require rapid responses.

In 2007, for example, the deterioration of the situation in Darfur required the rapid expansion of the UN mission, and led to the non-competitive award of a contract to a US private company to construct camps in Darfur in 2007. This contract drew much investigation and criticism and was portrayed by some as corruption.

The challenge of transparent, quick, and cheap procurement requires better mechanisms, such as prior certification processes.

4.7. Corruption in the selection of peacekeeping personnel

Corruption risks within peacekeeping forces are not restricted to the moment when forces are deployed on the ground in a country. The selection of peacekeepers (both police and troops) by their governments may be susceptible to corruption for a range of reasons. There is often a lack of effective quality control by the sponsoring organization over the personnel it receives. NATO's unit certification process is one way of ensuring minimum military standards and the UN has taken steps forward in this direction. However a perennial shortage of contributors and capabilities increases the difficulty of applying standards rigorously. Few other international organizations have similar systems and historically, troop contributing countries and police contributing countries have resisted certification standards. In addition, the selection process within individual member States often lacks transparency. A cursory search of the major UN troop contributing countries reveals that only Canada has made its selection and training procedures for peacekeeping transparent (RCMP, 2008).

The UN whistle-blower provisions, which have long been labeled as inadequate and came under further criticism in 2013, have led the UN Secretary-General to announce an independent review of the relevant processes and provisions.

5. The European Union's response to fragile states and corruption

The EU has been a latecomer to peace operations, deploying its first police mission in January 2003 (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and its first small military mission in March 2003 (in Macedonia). Since then, it has deployed 9 military and 21 civilian missions under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with sixteen missions ongoing as at December 2013. The ongoing military and police missions are listed in Table 3. As the table shows, their size varies greatly and only three of them have over 1,000 personnel. The mandates of the various EU missions are quite different. What is notable, however, is that most of them have anti-corruption as part of their mandate.

Table 3. Ongoing EU military and police missions

Country	Years	Maximum troop size	CPI	Anti-corruption mandate
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004-	7,000	42	No
Afghanistan	2007-2014	310	8	Yes
Somalia	2008-	1,200	8	Yes
Kosovo	2008-	1,200	34	Yes
Mali	2013-	550	28	Yes
Somalia	2010-	125	8	No

Over the past decade, the EU has devoted considerable time and resources to develop a «**security identity**» and EU missions have greatly contributed to stabilization and state-building through the deployment of security forces, the support of democratization processes, and the use of development aid to build-up state structures and capacity. In many ways, the EU has managed to develop activities which have complemented military actions carried by NATO on the one hand, and/or UN peacekeeping operations on the other, such as the EU NAVFOR mission on the Somali coast, which fights piracy and armed robbery at sea alongside NATO and other international partners, or EULEX in Kosovo, which focuses on strengthening the rule of law and complements the ongoing NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force (EU NAVFOR, 2013).

In 2003 the EU presented its «**European Security Strategy**» **(ESS)** which, together with the «**European Consensus on Development**», became the basis for its engagement in fragile states. Revisited in 2008 in light of new security developments, the ESS identifies five key security challenges for the EU:

- terrorism,
- proliferation of weapons of mass destructions,
- regional conflicts,
- state failure, and
- organized crime.

Addressing state failure was given priority as it was considered both a threat in itself and also facilitating other threats, most notably terrorism and organized crime. Therefore, there has long been a close and explicit relation between the EU's CSDP and its internal EU security concerns such as migration, smuggling, and organized crime, a relation that has been reiterated at the most recent EU summit meeting in December 2013 (EU Council, 2013). The EU has developed a set of tools (diplomatic, civilian, and military) to address those threats. Their focus has been on restoring the capacity, stability and legitimacy of national governments in fragile regions across the globe.

From the Instrument for Stability and the European Development Fund, which finances programmes and capacity building projects in several fragile countries and regions, to civilian and military missions deployed worldwide under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the EU now has a wide variety of tools at its disposal to provide support to post-conflict and fragile states. However, there remains a distinction between countries in its immediate neighbouring territories (in particular potential membership candidates such as Kosovo, and countries that are part of the neighbouring policy) and countries and regions further afar, with a wider range of instruments available for the former (Anastasakis *et al.*, 2012).

Although the fight against corruption is rarely the main focus of EU missions and is often part of a much broader governance-driven agenda, it has been increasingly recognised as one of the most important factors accounting for state fragility and collapse. Anti-corruption and organized crime have been an important aspect of EU missions mandates right from the start, and feature in a third to half of all mandates every year since the deployment of the first missions in 2003. These can range from small information or capacity building programmes (as in the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Moldova/Ukraine) to the exercise of executive authority and dedicated international police and justice personnel to investigate and prosecute instances of corruption, as in Kosovo (as discussed above).

5.1. Processes to tackle corruption: examples from the Sahel

In 2011, the EU adopted a «**Strategy for security and development in the Sahel**», which identified key threats both to the region and emanating from the region as cutting across national boundaries, such as terrorism and organized crime, in particular drug smuggling, and thus requiring a regional answer (EU strategy for development of Sahel, 2011). The inability of the governments in the Sahel to fight terrorist sanctuaries (for example, in Northern Mali) and

organized crime networks across the region have been seen as threats not only to stability in the region, but also to European States, with extremists and terrorist networks threatening to infiltrate diasporas. Moreover, instability in the Sahel has been considered as a potential threat to European strategic interests, «including the security of energy supply and the fight against human and drug trafficking» (EU Mission in Mali, 2013).

The EU's Sahel strategy has focused largely on (re)building governments' institutional capacity and security capabilities to fight terrorism and organized crime across the region (EU strategy for development of the Sahel, 2011). In its fact finding missions leading to the elaboration of the Sahel strategy, the EU identified three core countries requiring specific attention: Mauritania, Mali and Niger. They also identified corruption as a major obstacle to the fight against terrorism and to the development of an effective security sector. The fight against corruption was therefore integrated as part of the objectives of the EU's engagement in the region over a three-year plan, and is reflected in the mandates of the two major missions under such plan –the European Union Training Mission Mali, and its Capacity Building Mission Sahel (EUCAP Sahel). While originally the plan sought to balance between the short-term component of its Instrument for Stability, focused on strengthening security, and the long-term development component, it progressively evolved towards the former and shifted the focus to security driven programmes. This shift was largely a response to the changing regional situation in the aftermath of the war in Libya and the instability and later conflict in Northern Mali.

The EUCAP Sahel civilian mission in Niger, which was launched in the summer of 2012 at the request of Niger's government, constitutes an important component of the EU Sahel's strategy. Through the deployment of approximately 50 experts coming from EU Member States' security forces and justice departments, the mission aims to provide training and advice to Niger's authorities to «strengthen their framework for combating terrorism and organized crime». With a budget of € 8.7 million for its first year, the mission has trained and designed courses for over 300 members of the country's internal security forces, armed forces and judiciary. At the request of the authorities, the EU has also been deploying a military mission in Mali since February 2013, «to support the rebuilding of their armed forces in order to help them exercise fully their sovereignty over the entire country and to effectively neutralize organized crime and terrorist threats» (EU External Action Services, 2014).

Past interventions have revealed that the EU has a more positive impact when it cooperates with other international bodies. As one analyst explains, «the EU should not be ashamed to lead from behind. It should increasingly focus on helping other actors manage conflict rather than trying to deploy EU-flagged crisis management». In the Sahel, despite some initial engagement during the fact finding missions with the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), it did not have a direct policy input (Bello, 2012). It has been pointed out that the EU no longer has the resources to «in-

stil long-term stability» as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo (Gowan, 2013). In some regards, it will have to achieve more with less. Cooperating and coordinating with other actors will thus be even more central.

6. Additional reading material

Sarah Chayes. «Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security».

This is a very useful reading that provides further evidence on the relations between corruption and security by using case studies such as Nigeria, Afghanistan, Ukraine etc.

Moran John. «Crime and Corruption in New Democracies The Politics of (In)Security».

One of the dark sides to democratization may be crime and corruption. This book looks at the way in which political liberalization affects these practices in a number of ways whilst also challenging some of the alarming stories about democracy. The book also brings the politics of power back into an examination of corruption.

Keith Meyers. «Petroleum, Poverty and Security». Chatam House, AFP BP 05/01.

Whilst most of the readings have focused on either the richness with natural resources and corruption, or corruption and poverty, this article summarizes all three issues and provides a good overview of the relations between natural resources, corruption, security and poverty.

Robert Rotberg. «Corruption, global security and world order». Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

This is a good edited volume of readings that covers the basics: how corruption jeopardizes world security, and various aspects of corruption and political science concepts (power of state, human rights, etc).

Summary

In this module the relation between corruption and security from both, a theoretical and empirical perspective has been examined. It has been demonstrated that there is indeed a very firm correlation between indices of corruption and state stability. Moreover, the relation between state capture (as well as other enablers) and increased insecurity in various low and middle income countries has likewise been demonstrated. More importantly, however, the second part of the module shows how corruption is not only enabling domestic insecurity but also international crime. There are a few channels through which this happens. One is, for example, by eroding state revenues; others also include undermining state security or delegitimizing state capacity. Finally, it has likewise been demonstrated the existence of a sound relation between corruption and conflict.

Summary

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