ARTICLE

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and the Conceptualisation of Peace Using Adjectives

Ubong Essien Umoh
Idara Godwin Udoh

Abstract

The importance of peace to human civilisation has raised peace to a somewhat universally essential condition. Since peace means different things to different people, there is a void in the debate on the conceptualisation of peace. Galtung (1969, 1990) views peace as being either negative or positive and Richmond (2007) adopts a liberal standpoint, arguing that the concept of peace itself is ontologically unstable and essentially contested. The issue of conceptualisation has been met with much hesitation on the part of the research community. Explanations giving reasons for the increasing use of adjectives to qualify peace are lacking in previous research. This article contributes to filling this gap in the peace research literature by attempting to use linguistic theory to provide reasons why there are many variations in the usage of the peace concept constructed mostly through the help and use of adjectives. It is argued that the idea behind the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can assist our understanding of the reasons for this growing use of adjectives in the context of present day globalisation of the peace concept.

Keywords

peace adjectives, peace, conflict, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to conceptualise peace, scholars employ codability and rule-governed creativity to give appropriate clarity to words and expressions which capture the meaning. Because of what peace means to our globalise world, scholars in the field have difficulty finding just a single word to describe peace. Two distinct approaches are easily discernable: conceptualising peace as a condition and conceptualising peace as a process. To achieve this, the use of adjectives for peace therefore becomes not only needful but helpful. The need to rely on adjectives is due to the different understandings of the meaning of peace. Previous research has dealt with conceptualising and operationalising non-rivalry and peace using the peace scale (Klein, Goertz & Diehl, 2008), as well as providing operational definitions (Galtung, 1969, 1990, 1996; Rapoport, 1992, Boulding, 1978). In this study, we use a methodology borrowed from linguistics – the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis – that allows one to move beyond the debate over conceptual and operational styles to an explanation of the possible reasons behind the evolving use of adjectives to define peace.

The concept of peace is technical, posing a methodological challenge which calls for a multidisciplinary approach for its understanding. Language is one of those disciplines that can provide us with the tools needed to tackle this methodological challenge. The study of language has assisted us in understanding that language influences, and to an extent shapes, thought as well as concepts which are relevant to our existence. The limit of language is more or less a determinant
of the limit of thought and the perception of our world (Yule, 2006). Over the years, peace scholars have worked hard to find a prime definition, and by extension conceptualisation, of the word peace, but this has not only been tedious but also largely unsuccessful as a result of what peace means to different people. The use of adjectives to qualify peace has turned out to be the best approach, and a host of qualifying adjectives appear in the literature in an effort to use the words we possess to better conceptualise our understanding of peace. This article first explores the difficulty in the conceptualisation of peace and the need to employ adjectives. It then examines the use of some of the peace adjectives such as precarious peace (George, 2000; Nilsson, 2006), adversarial peace (Bengtson, 2000), pre-peace (Bayer, 2005), conditional peace (George, 2000), warm peace (Miller, 2001), positive peace (Bayer, 2005; Kelman, 1999; Galtung 1990, 1969), permanent peace, comprehensive peace, sustainable peace (Belin, 2006) in different peace zones. The article proceeds with the argument that the increasing usage of these peace adjectives is not an academic colouration but an application of the moderate form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which suggests that perception and thought is influenced by the availability of appropriate words and expressions defined by the cultural importance of the concept or object considered.

THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, named after the American linguist Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf, can be described as consisting of two associated principles. According to the first, linguistic determinism, our thinking is determined by language, and according to the second, linguistic relativity, people who speak different languages perceive and think about the world quite differently as there is no limit to the structural diversity of languages (Lyons, 1981). The hypothesis sometimes referred to as the Whorf hypothesis states that language is not simply a way of voicing ideas, but is the very thing which shapes those ideas. The result of this process is different world views by speakers of different languages (Romane, 1994).

Since its inception in the 1920s and 1930s, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has caused controversy and spawned research in a variety of disciplines including linguistics, psychology, philosophy, anthropology and education. To date it has not been completely disputed or defended, but has continued to intrigue researchers around the world. The moderate form of the hypothesis which incorporates linguistic relativity explains that perception is affected by the availability of appropriate words and expressions. Sapir and Whorf maintained that culturally essential objects, conditions and processes are usually defined by a plethora of words, while things that the culture perceives as unimportant are usually assigned one or two words. These differences influence the way in which humans experience the universe (Hall, 1959). According to Sapir (1929):

“No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.”

In Whorf’s words:

“We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language […] the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organised by our own minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language […]” (Whorf, 1956).

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that thoughts and behaviour are determined (or are at least partially influenced) by language. The hypothesis argues that human beings do not live in the objective world alone, or alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression in their society. To this extent, it would be unconceivable to imagine that one could adjust to social reality essentially without the use of language. The hypothesis refutes the view that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection and projects the view that the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of any given society (Kay & Kempton, 1984). One strong piece of empirical evidence used to support this hypothesis is the number of words the Inuit people have for snow. Whorf claimed that because snow is a crucial part of their everyday lives and they have many different uses for it, the Inuit people perceive snow differently than someone who lives in a less snow-dependent environment. However, other languages could transmit the same idea using phrases instead of single words.

In all, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis endorses that language reinforces as well as influences cultural patterns and social concepts, but their hypothesis was not without criticism. Franz Boaz (1940) challenged the reasoning and argued:

“It does not seem likely that there is any direct relationship between the culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in so far as the form of the language will be moulded by the state of the culture, but not in so far as a certain state of the culture is conditioned by the morphological traits of the language.”
How can one ascertain whether (if at all) language has affected thought, or if thought has affected language? Some scholars argue that the arguments of the hypothesis on Hopi character are based on Hopi language, making the argument circular. Moderate Whorfianism, when applied solely to linguistics, is a form of linguistic relativity. Opponents of the hypothesis argue that the relativity argument does not subscribe to Sapir and Whorf’s view of language as a prison, but as something that has the potential to affect and enable mind, thought and reality, allowing the possibility to adapt and evolve (Pinker, 1994). As such, moderate Whorfianism, opponents argue, has some validity in language, but is hardly of central importance. Be that as it may, it could be argued that the diversity of language is not a collection of signs and sounds, but a diversity of views of the world, and the hypothesis of Sapir and Whorf still has a valid although contested role in our understanding of this perception.

EXPLORING THE DIFFICULTY IN THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF PEACE

The study of conflict (polemology) compared to that of peace (irenology) has received greater attention from scholars and researchers in various fields. This appears to be in tandem with Howard’s view that peace, unlike conflict, is a modern invention and a relatively new idea (Howard, 2001). People tend to have more knowledge about conflict than peace because of how prevalent conflict has been in most human societies. A fact that discloses this tendency is Quincy Wright’s A Study of War which devoted five out of 1495 pages to the meaning of peace. Galtung (1990) argues that this unusual attraction is because most people are more likely to be drawn to negative deviation (such as mental illness) than positive deviation (such as creativity) when dealing with psychology.

History shows that war and peace have continuously followed each other in an endless, though irregular cycle (Gray, 2007). To this end, the study of peace has been largely dependent on the proper study of conflict (especially its most extreme form - war). In part, this involves efforts to analyse how conflict can be managed in such a way as to bring lasting peace. In Cicero’s view, war “should always be undertaken in such a way that one is seen to be aiming only at peace” (Cicero, 44 BC). Scholars in Cicero’s school of thought contend that better peace should be the sole object of victory in war. This idea formed the foundation of the bellicose Roman precept: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war). Aristotle also stressed several centuries ago that “we make war that we may live in peace”, and George Orwell coined the phrase “war is peace” in his satire Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell, 1949). The prominent military strategist and historian Liddell Hart extends the frontier of these positions to conclude that “the object in war is a better state of peace” (Hart, 1967). On the other hand, Tzabar argues against this misguided relationship and posits that the end of any conflict and consequent victory by any side does not mean peace (Tzabar, 1972).

The above conceptualisations reveal the defining relationship between conflict and peace, and explain why we often hear of conflict and peace being two sides of the same coin. Peace in this view is defined as the absence or opposite of conflict, a situation where there is no violence (Beilin, 2006). By logical extension, conflict then is the absence or opposite of peace (Ibeau, 2006), which led Raymond Aron (2003) to submit that “peace is said to prevail when the relations between nations do not involve the military forms of struggle”. Apart from being an attractive but inadequate way of conceptualising peace (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2008), such an approach tells us little about peace. It instead reduces the understanding of peace to, first and foremost, the understanding of conflict. Allan and Keller (2006) classified the view of peace as non-war or non-violence as Hobbesian peace and Galtung (1969, 1990) calls it negative peace. Peace and war can co-exist since war, in Clausewitz’s view, does not entail the cessation of relations, interaction or cooperation. Examples abound, contrary to the position of scholars who support and promote the approach of conceptualising peace as the absence of war or violence, to show that there can be peaceful interactions between countries that are engaged in violent conflict. For instance, the Palestinians and Israelis have been able to establish peaceful use of water resources, even as war raged between them. Also, during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), federal soldiers and Biafran soldiers at various intervals exchanged drinks, cigarettes and even had ‘light parties’ across enemy lines (Madiebo, 1980).

Collin Gray, using the relationship between Britain and Germany in 1938 and 2007 as an illustrative example, asserts that peace is a word with two principal meanings. On the one hand, it is a simple description of non-war. In its second definition, peace refers to a political relationship in which war is all but unthinkable (Gray, 2007). While Britain could be said to be at peace with Germany in both years, in 1938 there was serious strain in their relationship (caused by Germany’s post WWI militarism and aggression), a description of non-war situation, but in 2007, war between Britain and Germany had become unthinkable. Most scholars are of the opinion that few countries in the world currently enjoy a situation where war is unthinkable. These countries, mostly in the northern hemisphere, are in peace zones as opposed to those in conflict zones, mostly countries in the southern hemisphere (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993). The world’s peace zones are more stable than the conflict zones. However, it would be misleading to conclude that the conflict zones portray a perennial form of violence or, to use Hobbes’ words, a “war of all against all”.
From this, it may be argued that conceptualising peace as the absence of conflict could be very misleading since conflict could either be violent or non-violent (MØller, 2003). The non-violent expression of conflict is what Galtung calls “structural violence” (Galtung, 1990). It includes poverty, exclusion, sexual and racial discrimination, intimidation, oppression, want, fear, terrorism, marginalisation, victimisation, unemployment and other types of psychological bellicosity that challenge the realisation of people’s potential. Any society experiencing one or more of these indicators cannot be said to have attained a state of peace even though there is an absence of violent conflict. This is based on the understanding that there is more to conflict than the absence of direct violence.

A bold attempt to overcome the perceived limitation of the conceptualisation of peace as the absence of war was made by Galtung (1996, 1990, 1985, 1981, 1971, 1969, and 1964). According to Galtung (1969), positive peace is viewed as “the creation of systems (based on social justice and equality) where violence is unlikely to arise”, whereas negative peace is viewed as “the prevention of violence”, for example through arms control, crisis manipulation, and deterrence. Galtung (1990) submits that peace is the absence of direct (personal), structural and cultural violence. Put simply, peace is the elimination or absence of violence in a negative sense, while it entails cooperation among individuals and groups for goals that promote justice and freedom, in a positive sense. When peace is said to be negative, it means that the existing peace only implies the absence of direct violence, war, fear and conflict. On the other hand, when peace is said to be positive, it means that the existing peace, in addition to the qualities of negative peace, also includes the absence of unjust structures and unequal relationships. Noting that negative and positive peace are contiguous, peace can only be fully attained when the negative and the positive poles are brought together, while retaining their context and assumptions.

This understanding provoked the need to abandon the traditional view of peace as the absence of conflict and extend our intellectual horizons to other fields and disciplines which would assist in gaining an in-depth understanding of the concept of peace. This approach is necessary since the traditional conceptualisation of peace is not only imprecise but depends on the proper conceptualisation of conflict which is still undergoing serious scholarly debate. Conflict is one of the fluid and infinitely elastic concepts which can be twisted to suit a variety of explanations, and has been described by Lederach (1997) as being dynamic and dialectical. One is the apparent confusion between war, conflict and crisis which are usually used interchangeably. Conflict should not be limited to wars and the manifestation of violent behaviour alone. War is the highest rung on the ladder of conflict. Crisis is only a step short of war and marked by a rapid succession of violent behaviour under the pressure of fast changing conditions. Differences, dispute (disagreement), opposition, antagonism, tension, crisis, and war are the various stages in the escalation dynamics of any conflict. At the same time, all these stages could be described as conflict. Whatever the stage being considered, conflict is a result of incompatibility of interests, positions, values or needs between or among actors. The ambitions, aspirations and intentions of actors differ and as such are incompatible within and across societies. It is very difficult, if not impossible, not to pursue these goals and the need to pursue these goals against all odds generates conflict. Simple as the concept of conflict might be presented, scholars in the field are still divided along lines of economic, religious, social and political operationalisations of the concept. However, while there is no agreement among conflict scholars on an embracing conceptualisation, there is no disagreement among them on its manifestation.

With this seemingly bloated nature of the concept of conflict wrapped in a tissue of unending debate, it would amount to conceptual distortion and reductionism to continue defining peace as the opposite of war or violence. Consequent with this, peace scholars like Ibeanu have tried to consider the philosophical, sociological and political definitions of peace (Ibeanu, 2006). David Francis upholds that the following six meanings of peace have been agreed upon by peace researchers:

1) Peace as the absence of war (absence of direct violence);
2) Peace as justice and development (absence of structural violence);
3) Peace as respect and tolerance between/among people;
4) Peace as ‘Gaia’ (balance in and with the cosphere);
5) Inner peace (spiritual peace); and
6) Peace as ‘wholeness’ and ‘making whole’ (being complete). (Francis, 2006).

Furthermore, the United Nations University for Peace defines peace as “a political condition that makes justice possible” (Miller, 2003). However, regardless of the position adopted by scholars in their definition of peace, it is important to stress that the state of comfort of a system and this explains why justice, freedom, security, fairness, harmony, satisfaction and development appear in the conceptualisation of peace (Akpan, 2011). They are needed for human beings, groups and states to fully actualise their goals. The plethora of definitions of peace affirms Galtung’s assertion that “ nobody has the monopoly on defining peace” (Galtung, 1969). In the final analysis, peace is the sacrifice made to make an unjust world just.

While the concept of peace continues to undergo a thorough introspection of its core assumptions, it is important to stress that the state of peace lacks a universal denotator. What may be peace to one society may not be peace to another. For example, a society fragmented and polarised by perpetual war and armed conflict will interpret peace as the
absence of war. Similarly, a political community driven by unjust structures and policies will equate peace with justice and freedom. People suffering material deprivation and poverty will inevitably perceive peace in terms of equity, development and access to existential necessities of life (Francis, 2006). Also, problems abound in operationalising peace using the themes mentioned above. What is readily perceived as justice, fairness and security to one group can be perceived by another as injustice, unfairness and insecurity. While the 9/11 attacks on the USA were readily perceived as justice on the side of the terrorists, it was perceived as injustice by the United States. Peace to the United States would be the complete eradication of global terrorism, while peace to the terrorist would be the complete destruction of the United States. Also, while Israel seeks to strengthen its security by increasing military budgets and cutting-edge weapon technology, its neighbouring Arab states, like Palestine, perceive it as a threat to their own security.

**PEACE ADJECTIVES AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF PEACE**

As a result of the difficulty in giving an all-embracing and satisfactory definition of peace, scholars in the field have come to understand peace by working with adjectives. Scholars recognise, through adjectives, that there is a range of peaceful relationships (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2008). For easy identification and analysis, peace scholars have classified these adjectives into negative and positive peace zones (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2008).

The classification provides the positive and negative poles of the concept of peace (Goertz, 2006). Within the negative peace zones are: armed peace (Booth, 1975), negative peace (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Boulding, 1978), cruel peace, guided peace, elusive peace (Zartman, 1995), precarious peace (George, 2000), conditional peace (George, 2000), adversarial peace (Bengston, 2000), cold peace (Miller, 2001), hot peace, tenuous peace, turbulent peace (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2001), fragile peace (Coller, Eliot, Hegre, Hoefler, Reynal-Querol & Sambanis, 2003), pre-peace (Banger, 2005), partial peace (Nilsson, 2008), rentier peace (Basedau & Lay, 2009) etc. Classified within the positive peace zones are: stable peace, lasting peace (Boulding, 1978; Kacowicz & Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000; George, 2000; Vavrynen, 2000; Elstrom & Jerneck, 2000), unqualified peace (Galtung, 1990), total peace, good peace (Ray, 1995; Chan, 1997; Erik, 1998; Goenner, 2007), positive peace (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Kelman, 1999; Bayer, 2005), warm peace (Miller, 2001), virtual peace (Richmond, 2007), real or complete peace (Bakut, 2007), durable peace (Nilsson, 2008), civil peace (Fjelde and de Soysa, 2009), just peace (Beilin, 2006; Allan & Keller, 2006), active peace (Akpan, 2011, 2012), etc.

These two peace zones could be easily identified even without their classification. For negative peace, one or both actors are not satisfied with the status quo. For positive peace, both sides are satisfied with the status quo. As such, Howard’s view, that peace is artificial, intricate and highly volatile (Howard, 2001), satisfactorily captures negative peace since the relationship under negative peace is close to conflict. On the other hand, the relationship under positive peace moves away from the tendency towards conflict and hostility. Positive peace is characterised by a high level of functional interdependence and strong institutions. Countries that have established a condition of positive peace have compatible domestic institutions and norms that provide expectations for peaceful (non-violent) international conflict resolution (Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000; Miller, 2001).

A large number of peace adjectives can easily be placed on Goertz’s peace scale. Others, however, like technological peace (Lieber, 2000), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), liberal peace (Richmond, 2007; Hegre, 2000; Keshk, Reuveny & Pollins, 2010), economic peace (Lektzian & Souva, 2003; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2008), democratic peace (Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Chan, 1997, Erik, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith, 1999; Mousseau, 2000; Goenner, 2007; Harrison, 2010) etc. lack a proper placement. Technological peace is peace enforced through the effective use and manipulation of global technology; capitalist peace is achieved through global capitalism; liberal peace is peace brought about by the consolidation of liberalism; economic peace is consequent upon uninterrupted economic relations, ties and trade dependency; and democratic peace is achieved through worldwide democracy, upholding the contested view that democracies rarely go to war against each other. This set of peace adjectives projects peace as a process rather than a condition. Much more complex is the fact that, buried beneath some of these peace adjectives, there are others. For example, Richmond (2007) sees liberal peace as being composed of four strands: victor’s peace (derived from, among other things, Europe’s experiences with fascism in WWII); constitutional peace (emphasising the importance of democracy, trade and cosmopolitanism); institutional peace (derived from normative and legal frameworks of international institutions that regulate the behaviour of entities); and civil peace (which focuses on citizens and human rights as conditional for peace) (Richmond, 2007).

Peace as a process rests on the realisation that it is a function or an outcome of social, political, technological, religious or other forces such as trade, economic interdependence, democracy, international institutions, globalisation, etc. Wright (1964) asserted that “peace is an equilibrium among many forces”. These forces of democracy, economic interdependence through trade, and international organisations formed the cornerstones of the Kantian tripod which is a strand of the democratic peace the-
theory (Oneal & Russett, 1999; Ward, Siverson & Cao, 2007; Choi, 2010). These forces were also the basis of Russett and Oneal’s idea of triangulating peace around democracy, interdependence, and international organisations (Russett & Oneal, 2001). If peace is dependent on certain forces for its conceptualisation, it leads us to infer that changes in any of the forces can greatly alter the peace. A strain in economic ties between dyads or economic rivalry among actors could greatly alter the peace equilibrium. The 18th century events between Great Britain and the Netherlands, and those between Japan and the United States in the 1930s are clear examples. In the conceptualisation of peace, it is therefore important to sieve through the thin membrane that captures both the condition and the process. The technical demarcation of these two magnetic peace fields informs the general deplorable dilemma in the attempt to conceptualise peace. Synthesising Sen’s (1996) “development as freedom” with Galtung’s theory of peace, Barnett (2008) defines peace as “the goal and process of expanding people’s freedoms”. In his view, peace is more or less present, depending on the degree to which considerable freedom and opportunity are present separately and collectively (Barnett, 2008).

Do all these classifications of peace using adjectives really tell us what peace is or what it should be? The fact that a particular concept of peace is within the positive zone of the peace scale does not guarantee its effectiveness or success. Whatever the concept of peace one intends to consider, there is a compelling need for it to be nurtured if it is to succeed (Hampson, 1996). At this point it is important to distinguish between peace and peaceful conditions. Peace manifests itself in the form of a peaceful state, a peaceful relationship or peaceful trade, all representing different things but sharing a common quality which is peace itself. Peace itself should never involve violence, whereas, peaceful trade could become violent. On several occasions, there have been extended conflicts in the peaceful trade relations between the United States and the European Union, but they have been settled through institutional means for the non-violent management of conflicts, such as World Trade Organisation (WTO), without recourse to military means. Moreover, as noted earlier, peaceful commercial relations can contain the seeds of armed conflict, as between the British and Dutch in the 18th century and Japan and the United States in the 1930s. Peaceful relationships can also break down and become violent as happened in Nigeria and Cameroon in the 2002 conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula. Thus, the use of peace adjectives to categorise peace is only an attempt to describe the various levels of peaceful relations and not peace itself. Furthermore, the positive/negative peace conceptualisation limits thinking about peace by reducing its diverse and contingent nature to another dualism (Barnett, 2008). Since peace is a social reality as well as a social construct, reliance on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would serve as a good foundation for understanding how the concept of peace can be framed.

THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF PEACE USING ADJECTIVES

Although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be inadequate in many areas, it fits well into the picture of a globalised world. Through theories like this, we can identify ways in which a social concept like peace can be understood universally. As globalisation has helped to spread the culture of violence, it has also helped to spread the need for global peace, the more so since, in recent times, the cost of violence has exceeded the cost of peace at least in relative terms. A globalised world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected. Societies are more greatly affected by events taking place in other societies. In Baylis and Smith’s view, globalisation is a process of “increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effect on people and societies far away” (Baylis and Smith, 2001). Since the world has shrunk considerably, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis could provide an explanation why certain social concepts (like peace) have cross-cultural relevance but collective interpretations. These might not be expressed by a single word but by the use of phrases as well as adjectives.

The various adjectives for peace draw on the essential nature or the importance of peace for the global society in the 21st century. So important has the drive for peace become, that the pre-WWII strategy which was aimed at winning the war at all costs has been replaced with a post-WWII strategy aimed at securing peace at all cost. The need for peace requires terms to describe it. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can provide an understanding of such usage. According to Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, Eskimos unlike other groups of people have many words to describe snow. Snow that is falling, snow on the ground, snow in blocks, snow in wavy patterns, each explained through the use of separate words. Furthermore, the Australian aborigines have no word equivalent to sand, but several words which denote various kinds of sand (Lyons, 1981). It was hypothesised that this was because sand has the same importance in the day-to-day life of the Aborigine as snow has for the Eskimo, and creates the need for specific references to and descriptions of it, thereby generating extensive vocabulary. However, those who may be interested in the various kinds of snow or sand can add adjectives to describe it, such as powdery snow, spring snow, or quicksand or sharp sand. Studies have also revealed that Japanese lacks a general word for water. It must be specified as being either hot or cold. Also, Russians have traditionally
used two words for blue and the Hopi Indians have one word for everything that flies, including insects and planes (Hall, 1959). Applying this analysis, we could say that, since peace is a central feature in global society, adjectives offer sufficient vocabulary to specifically describe it. Peace scholars do not understand the concept of peace without it being within the two peace zones discussed earlier: peace must be specified as positive or negative for it to have any meaning. This does not necessarily have to be based on the vocabulary of a single culture or a particular society, but the cultural manifestation of a globalised world society which has come to view peace as a rule rather than an exception in international relations.

Although convincing evidence does not exist to prove whether the classification and identification of peace through adjectives stems from the culture of a particular group of people or a society (most likely Scandinavian), they have generally reflected the culture of a globalised society interested in the climate of freedom and development which peace can best provide. While the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis might not be completely true in its extreme form, it could help to explain the usage of such peace terminologies, with the peace adjectives being a type of rule-governed codability for the concept of peace.

Furthermore, if the use of these adjectives of peace requires a generic translation, it is a common, necessary practice to provide a phrase rather than a word. The use of these peace adjectives is a way to convey thought and qualify the categories of peace thoughts among scholars in the 21st century. This suggests that meaning arises in interpretation, and interpretation is shaped by socio-cultural contexts. Our contemporary globalise society forms that socio-cultural context in which a common understanding and interpretation of peace is attempted by peace scholars. Thus, the meaning of peace, if intended to attain a general or universal meaning must be understood and explained with the use and help of adjectives. This explains why the concept of peace has been burdened with the use of adjectives.

CONCLUSION

Since the shocking horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended WWII in 1945, the search for peace has been a predominant aspect of global intellectual discourse and debate. The proliferation of centres for peace research after WWII is an indicator of this development. In the globalised world of today that integrates thought and perception, peace has come to be defined, identified and categorised with the help of adjectives. Using adjectives is an attempt to find appropriate expressions for peace which increase the possibility of linguistic codability.

The difference between one kind of peace and another (e.g. negative peace and positive peace) is of great importance to the community of peace researchers in their bid to find common ground. Peace scholars lack a single definition for the word peace, and this can be better understood by leaning on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The hypothesis can be used to explain why adjectives are needed to qualify and define peace, so could form the basis for our interpretation and understanding of the expanding definition and conceptualisation of peace. By this analysis of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, we conclude that examining the discourse of peace is an excellent way to look at the limits of our thoughts, knowledge and actions.

References


---

Recommended citation


<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol2iss2-umoh_udoh/vol2iss2-umoh_udoh>

ISSN 2013-8857

This work is subject to a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivative-Works 3.0 Spain licence. It may be copied, distributed and broadcasted provided that the author and the source (*Journal of Conflictology*) are cited. Commercial use and derivative works are not permitted. The full licence can be consulted at: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/deed.en>

---

About the authors

Ubong Essien Umoh
ubongessienumoh@yahoo.com

Ubong Essien Umoh is a Lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Uyo, Uyo. His areas of research interest are Peace and Security Studies.

Idara Godwin Udoh
idaraudoh@yahoo.com

Idara Godwin Udoh is a Lecturer in the Department of English, University of Uyo, Uyo. Her area of research interest is Sociolinguistics.