The United Nations, armed conflict and peacekeeping

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PID_00181760
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Introduction

The official United Nations account of peacekeeping, The Blue Helmets, defines peacekeeping as follows:

"a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict".


It is generally accepted that peacekeeping is a function of the UN, but there are occasions when it has been used by international and regional organisations other than the UN, and there are operations that can be seen as early uses of peacekeeping that predated the formation of the UN in 1945. After the First World War, for example, multinational military bodies were used to establish and administer the new frontiers of Europe agreed by peace treaties after the war. Also after the First World War, the League of Nations conducted activities that were comparable in some respects to peacekeeping. However, since 1945, peacekeeping has been the technique most frequently used by and associated with the United Nations to terminate conflicts and establish peace, so much so that the organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping activities in 1988.

Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, and peacekeeping operations are often described as falling between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the Charter. Chapter 6 refers to the techniques that the Security Council can adopt in pursuit of the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as mediation, arbitration, negotiation and fact-finding. Chapter 7 gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions, including the use of armed forces if necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 99 gives the Secretary General power to carry out 'good offices missions' including fact-finding and inquiry, to encourage hostile parties to seek a negotiated settlement. Peacekeeping is thus not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter and therefore peacekeeping operations were once described by Dag Hammarskjold as 'chapter six and a half' initiatives. Nevertheless, despite it being a relatively late invention, UN peacekeeping is now recognised globally as the standard international mechanism for helping countries to recover from armed conflict and to support peace processes.
After over sixty years of evolution, from the first observer mission deployed in the Balkans in 1947 to the widespread and complex missions of today, the UN is second only to the USA in the number of military personnel deployed. As of December 2010, there were approximately 123,000 personnel serving in 16 UN peacekeeping missions spread across four continents, with contingents drawn from 108 different countries. In addition there are nearly 14,000 international and local civilian staff supporting the missions. In total, between 1945 and 2010, sixty UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed and these have helped to secure 172 peace agreements in major armed conflicts across the world.

Peacekeeping, despite its shortcomings and flaws, is undoubtedly one of the most significant instruments available to the international community for the peaceful resolution of major armed conflict. This unit looks at the origins and historical development of UN peacekeeping, showing how it has transformed from small scale and light armed forces to complex interventions involving military, humanitarian and political support roles in some of the world's most violent conflicts. The historical evolution is organised by surveying three 'generations' of peacekeeping: The UN mandated peacekeeping operations that were deployed in the Cold War period, broadly between the deployment of UNEF I in 1956 to the deployment of UNTAG in Namibia in 1988, are usually described as traditional, classical or first generation peacekeeping. As the scale frequency and size of peacekeeping deployments increased after 1988 and in the early 1990s, attention turned to ideas for creating a stronger UN military command system and for forming either some kind of UN standing force or a stronger capacity to deploy effectively equipped forces capable of responding to civil wars and internal conflicts.

The general expansion of the use of peacekeeping since 1988 led to several attempts to redefine peacekeeping in new forms of military doctrine, often called second generation peacekeeping, which were appropriate for responding to the volatile conditions in which peacekeeping has had to operate in the civil wars of the 1990s. These attempts have generally been undertaken because of the recognition that traditional, classical or first generation peacekeeping, designed for use in the Cold War period, was used in the 1990s in situations for which it was not designed (that is, in internal wars or complex political emergencies).

When these second-generation peacekeeping missions were tested in the most severe civil wars of the 1990's, in the Balkans, in Somalia and in Rwanda especially, they proved to be too weak to protect civilians from the predations of warlords and militias. The UN came under severe condemnation for example for the failure of its peacekeeping forces to prevent genocide in both Bosnia and Rwanda. In response to such challenges, the search for a doctrine for a more robust or muscular model of third-generation peacekeeping began during the middle and later part of the 1990s.
These three generations of peacekeeping are surveyed in sections 1-3 of this module. The UN also launched a commission to examine the failures of peacekeeping in the 1990s and its report was published as the Brahimi Report in 2000. Its recommendations form the conclusion to section 3 and the fourth and final section looks at the current debate about the nature of peacekeeping. Through case studies and analyses of the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the importance of cultural and gender issues, the contemporary performance of peacekeeping is analysed in the module with conclusions offered on how peacekeeping can be further reformed and developed to be an even more effective instrument for conflict resolution in 21st century conflicts.

The module is presented in the context empirical evidence that peacekeeping is an efficient and cost effective tool for resolving armed conflict. Despite all the critiques of peacekeeping related to gender aspects, concerns about cultural sensitivity and relevance, accusations that it serves to enforce the interests of the powerful states and so on, there is nevertheless a good deal of evidence that peacekeeping is an effective tool for containing armed conflict. For example Virginia Page Fortna (2008) used data that builds on the work of Doyle and Sambanis and covers sixty civil wars over the ten year period from 1989 to 1999. This data is used to address two specific questions: firstly, where peacekeepers go, and secondly whether their deployment makes peace more durable. The conclusion is that peacekeeping works, reducing the risk of a return to war from between 50% to 75% or 80%. In her analysis it works because the presence of a peacekeeping force changes

"the incentives of the parties, providing them with credible information about each other's intentions, preventing and managing accidental violations of the peace, and providing either side from hijacking the political process in the transition to peace".


This finding is backed up by a study of UN peacekeeping by the RAND Corporation in the USA, summarised in the following chart, which shows that, as the number of peacekeeping operations has increased, there has been a corresponding decline in on-going civil wars.
The number of civil wars has declined as the number of UN operations has grown

Other measures of effectiveness stress the economic benefits. The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 is approximately US 7.3 billion. This represents less than 0.5 per cent of global military spending (estimated at US 1.531 trillion in 2009).

In the four units of the module that follow the course examines the evolution of peacekeeping, showing how it has adapted to the way conflicts have evolved, and why and how it might continue to adapt in the coming years.


3) Third-generation peacekeeping 1995-2010.

4) Towards fourth-generation peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and cosmopolitanism.

1.1. The United Nations Mandate

On 26 June 1945, fifty states signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, which came into force on 24 October 1945. Successor to the League of Nations and with US government backing, the Charter took allied cooperation as the basis for the new geopolitical order emerging from the post-WWII period. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter sets down the bases for a global collective security system:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."


1.2. The birth of peace operations: Observer missions

In the context of the Cold War and the planet's division into two blocs, the role of peace operations was basically one of containment. Early United Nations peace operations dealt with minor disputes, with the aim of preventing them from escalating into out-and-out conflict between the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. These operations were also used to serve the geopolitical interests of the West. Indeed, the Soviet Union was suspicious of the organisation in the early years. The first United Nations peace mission was UNSCOB (United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans), set up in 1947 to investigate foreign support to the Greek communist guerrillas.

In June 1948, the UN Security Council set up the first United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East (UNTSO—United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) to supervise the armistice between Israel and the Arab countries. The mission was formed by groups of military observers and a UN mediator. In January 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was set up. This time, the purpose of the mission was to oversee compliance with the ceasefire in hostilities between the two countries as part of their dispute over the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. These operations gave rise to other observer missions. In 1958, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was set up; in 1963, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM);
in 1965, the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP); and, in 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).

1.3. The principles of peacekeeping operations

"Peacekeeping involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role – from confrontation to mediation. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the objective is to avoid hostilities, to improve communications between the parties and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict –political, military, and economic– as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial approach while operating within an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the protagonists, often under difficult and hostile conditions".


Peacekeeping operations were not originally envisaged in the United Nations Charter but their principles and practice are based on application of Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Chapter VII Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the Charter, respectively. In accordance with the definition of peacekeeping in the official United Nations manual The Blue Helmets:

"The United Nations conducts peacekeeping operations in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. They are composed of military personnel but do not have the capacity for peace enforcement".


Due to the lack of a description of peacekeeping operations, the principles on which the practice was based in those early years were developed ad hoc. The first United Nations Peacekeeping Operation was set up by the United Nations General Assembly in 1956 to resolve the dispute arising from the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and European intervention in the region. The first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) sent an armed force of 6,000 military personnel to the Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula to supervise the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The UN’s Swedish Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and the Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson set down the five guiding principles of the first United Nations peace operation:

- Consent of the disputing parties to the establishment of the peace mission
- Use of force only in self-defence
- Voluntary nature of the contingents, from small and neutral countries
- Impartiality of the mission
- Daily monitoring of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The UNEF I peace mission efficiently supervised the withdrawal of European forces and the armistice between Egypt and Israel without further troubles. The mission’s success paved the way for the development of the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations. The principles and rules introduced in Sinai laid the foundations for the planning and deployment of all subsequent peacekeeping operations. The basic functions of the early first generation peacekeeping operations (prior to 1988) were the observation and supervision of the end of hostilities and the positions of the belligerent forces in conflict. The international troops were not equipped to launch military offensives and only carried light weaponry.

In 1989, John Mackinlay wrote a pioneering study on peace operations in the Middle East. In it, Mackinlay describes the role of the Blue Helmets and the so-called hostage effect; according to his theory, if the belligerents do not cease hostilities and, as a result, kill or injure the Blue Helmets, they will attract the indignation of the countries participating in the international mission and most of the representatives of the United Nations General Assembly. However, he warns that this effect only materialises when the warring factions support the mandate of the United Nations operation. If the parties feel excluded from the peace agreements, they will probably not consider the Blue Helmets as an impartial force and will not be concerned about the hostage effect.

These operations gave rise to other observer missions. In 1958, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was set up; in 1963, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM); in 1965, the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) and in 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).

1.4. The missions in the Congo, Cyprus and the Middle East

The second UN peacekeeping operation was set up by the United Nations Security Council in July 1960 in the Congo. The operation was essential to the development of the regulatory framework for peace operations since the United Nations had to assume far-reaching powers and responsibilities in a country submerged in chaos and disorder. Two weeks after the proclamation of independence in the Congo, an international force of over 20,000 units of troops and officials was deployed in the territory with the mandate of helping the new government to carry out its task, guaranteeing the country’s security and supervising the withdrawal of Belgian troops, which had intervened days earlier. In 1961, the mandate was extended and the mission was granted powers to intervene militarily to ensure the territorial integrity of the Congo and put down the secessionist attempt backed by mercenaries and foreign agents in the Kananga Province.
The intervention in the Congo was a blow to the credibility of the United Nations as an instrument of collective security; the mission saw the death of the United Nations Secretary-General and the loss of 200 soldiers from the international forces. Many countries questioned the mandate's extension and the armed intervention of the international force in the conflict. The mission's funding also sparked major disagreements between members of the Security Council. The end result was that countries like France and the USSR withheld their United Nations dues as a sign of protest. The crisis was resolved with the establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to plan and develop guidelines for consensus in relation to peace operations.

The first two United Nations peacekeeping operations took place in African countries that had recently been decolonised by Europe's colonial powers, which nonetheless wished to maintain their economic interests and political influence in the area. Besides the tension generated by the complex processes of decolonisation, the new hegemonic powers, the USA and the USSR, sought to forestall a violent escalation of their conflict over world domination in United Nations peace operations. In 1962, the General Assembly set up the UN Security Force (UNSF) in West New Guinea as a peacekeeping mission with the mandate of setting up the first United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). This authority was to assume administrative responsibility over the territory until the complete transfer of the colony from the Netherlands to Indonesia.

In March 1964, the Security Council approved the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the mandate of restoring peace to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Hostilities between the two sides had come to a head in 1963 following rising tensions generated by the Founding Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960). Again, the conflict between the two sides and the desire of the colonial power, Great Britain, to hold on to its political and military influence over the island played an important role in the escalation of tensions and the subsequent deployment of the peacekeeping forces. In 1974, the United Nations interposition forces did not put up resistance to the Turkish army's intervention. Since then, Turkish troops have controlled the north of the island and the two communities live separately. UNFICYP currently supervises the ceasefire line and a buffer zone between the zones controlled by the belligerent parties. In Cyprus, the mission incorporated a United Nations civilian police division for the first time. This civilian police division oversees observance of law and order in the buffer zone.

In 1967, the first United Nations peace operation UNEF I was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government, which had received warning reports from the Soviet Union about a surprise attack on Syria being prepared by Israel. On 5 June, the withdrawal of the interposition forces cleared the way for the Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the subsequent Yom Kippur War in October. The renewed hostilities in the Middle
East were an unmistakable sign that peacekeeping operations are a delicate instrument because they rely on the goodwill of the parties to the conflict. It also highlighted the limitations of international diplomacy, which was overly concerned with curbing violence at the expense of resolving the causes of conflicts and introducing measures to help reconcile the parties.

Interestingly, all of the new missions in the 1970s took place in the Middle East. The 1973 oil crisis, sparked by the decision of the Middle East oil producers—members of OPEC—to reduce exports to the West, undoubtedly had a decisive impact on the West’s diplomatic actions. In October 1973, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) returned to Sinai to curb the escalating violence following the Yom Kippur War. In September 1978, at the meeting held at Camp David on the initiative of the US President Carter, a final agreement was reached by the Egyptian president Sadat and the Israeli prime minister Begin on the demarcation of the border between Israel and Egypt. The mission withdrew completely in July 1979. In pursuit of a similar aim, in 1974, the United Nations Security Council set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Syrian Golan Heights. The international force was deployed across an area of separation 80 kilometres long with a variable width, to supervise the truce between Syrian and Israeli forces. In the early 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) had moved its bases from Jordan to Lebanon. In 1978, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), the Israeli army, reacted to its military operations in Israel by mounting a fully-blown military offensive on the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and invading the country from the south. In March, the Security Council set up the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the mandate of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and assisting the Lebanese government in controlling Palestinian activists in its territory. However, the PLO attacks continued in northern Israel and, in June 1982, the Israeli army conducted a second invasion called Peace for Galilee, which reached the capital, Beirut.

This time, the international contingent of the United Nations played a rather limited role by assisting and protecting the civil population. The mission failed to prevent the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which thousands of Palestinian refugees were attacked by the Christian Phalangist militias under the auspices of the Israeli army that surrounded the area. Israel's Minister of Defence, Ariel Sharon, resigned in 1983 upon hearing the verdict of the Israeli investigative commission that found him responsible for not having prevented the massacre. In 1984, Israeli forces withdrew from the Lebanon although they set up a security zone in the south of the country controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), which remained until 2000 when Israeli troops withdrew fully. In almost 20 years of operations, UNIFIL was unable to contain the violence between PLO troops and Israel. The mandate of the Security Council was ambivalent and adapted to the positions of both sides, which had conflicting ideas about the role of the peacekeeping mission in Lebanese territory. Moreover, the mission's
mandate failed to evaluate the situation realistically because it presupposed Israel’s consent to withdraw from the Lebanon and the weakened Lebanese governments to carry out the de facto control of the whole country.

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration did not propose new peacekeeping operations in what was for many third-world countries a period of extreme violence, the period that historians have termed the second Cold War. During the Cold War, the United Nations set up thirteen peacekeeping operations; by the end of 1988, there were only 5 active operations (three in the Middle East, one in Kashmir and one in Cyprus).
2. Second-generation peacekeeping

2.1. The development of second-generation peacekeeping: From peacekeeping to peacebuilding at the end of the Cold War

In 1988, the easing of tensions between East and West as a result of the political reforms introduced by the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, opened the door to the pacification of many third-world conflicts that had been encouraged by the rivalry between the great superpowers. The USSR and its Eastern bloc allies stopped providing military and financial aid to armed movements with ideologies akin to communism and the Soviet Union's attitude towards the United Nations gradually changed to one of cooperation. The end of the Cold War sparked many hopes as to the UN's potential role in the resolution of armed conflict. Significantly, the first observer mission set up in 1988 was the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan & Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which supervised the withdrawal of 100,300 Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A few months later, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was deployed on the border between Iran and Iraq to supervise the ceasefire and begin direct negotiations after more than seven years of war. At the same time, the United Nations Secretariat focused its efforts on peace processes in Central America and South Africa (see Case study: Peace operations in Central America).

In 1966, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) began its armed struggle for independence, subsequently establishing bases in Angola and Zambia. In 1978, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 435, which requested the end of South Africa's control over Namibia, declared illegal in 1971, and the speedy proclamation of the territory's independence following elections supervised by the UN. However, more than a decade would pass before the resolution could be fully implemented.

On 22 December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed peace agreements and the warring factions and the United Nations pledged to usher in the independence of Namibia and the pacification of South-West Africa. Shortly afterwards, the Security Council set up the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) with the mandate of overseeing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The observer mission competently supervised the withdrawal of 50,000 troops and was the first United Nations peace operation to include Spanish participation. Spain sent 7 military observers in January 1989.
The Council also set up the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the first peacekeeping operation with a mandate for peacebuilding. In other words, the operation had a civilian component: it had to supervise the organisation of the first democratic elections in Namibia and the proclamation of the country’s independence. There were six parts to the civilian component: the United Nations special representative led the mission and coordinated the operations of the other sections, the South-African government and the political parties of Namibia and other local and international organisations; an independent legal expert advised the mission on the release on Namibian prisoners incarcerated by the Pretoria regime; the office of the United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR) organised the repatriation of over 40,000 Namibian refugees; the electoral commission advised the special representative on technical aspects of the electoral process and supervised the elections, which had over 800 international observers; the operations base of the administrative department was located in the country’s capital, Windhoek; 1,500 civilian police (CIVPOL) units oversaw the impartiality, professionalism and respect for human rights of the Southwest African Police (SWAPOL), the force that had to guarantee law and order in Namibia until the proclamation of independence.

The military component of the mission, with over 4,000 military personnel, was to oversee the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Spain also took part in the peace mission, with air support (transportation and reconnaissance missions) and 250 military personnel from its air force. Elections were held in November 1989 without major setbacks and the South African troops left the country on 22 November. In February 1990, Sam Nujoma, leader of the SWAPO liberation movement, was elected as the first president of the first democratic government of the Republic of Namibia. UNTAG’s success in implementing its military and political mandate was down to international support for the independence of Namibia. In the early 1980s, negotiations had been opened with the key intervention of a contact group formed by the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola and the Organisation of African Unity under the auspices of the United Nations. The easing of tensions between the two superpowers and the pressure that these exerted on their allies also contributed to the pacification of Namibia.

The success of the Namibia mission in the peacebuilding process was a milestone in the development of United Nations peace operations in the 1990s. The model of political and military intervention developed in Namibia would subsequently be standardised and put into practice—with variations—in peace operations all over the world (The UN’s post-settlement peacebuilding ‘standard operating procedure’). In his ambitious An Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, described the main functions of peacebuilding:
The United Nations, armed conflict and peacekeeping

2.2. The military dimension of second-generation peacekeeping operations

In the 1990s, the military component of peacekeeping operations was not limited to overseeing the cessation of hostilities. In many cases, peace operations were be set up in countries with internal civilian conflicts or complex humanitarian emergencies; often, the support and consent of local authorities to the presence of the international forces was partial or even non-existent, with militias and paramilitary groups operating autonomously. In this context, the missions developed a complex range of military functions. These are the main functions of 'second-generation' operations, (also known as wider peacekeeping operations):

- Observing and overseeing the cessation of hostilities
- Maintaining separation zones
- Demobilising belligerent parties
- Checking the positions of troops
- Preventing the infiltration of troops
- Preventing civil conflicts
- Overseeing security agreements
- Observing the quartering of troops
- Clearing and marking out minefields
- Training and reforming military units

2.3. The political dimension of second-generation operations

Politically, the second-generation or wider operations were diversified and took on peacebuilding and conflict prevention roles. In this sense, second-generation peacekeeping operations have contributed to:

- observance of law and order,
- setting up viable governments,
- protecting independence,
- negotiations with non-governmental entities,
- organising elections,
- setting up temporary authorities,
• providing security and helping to reconstruct economic life for the local population,
• mediating and arbitrating in local disputes,
• promoting confidence between the parties and
• training the security forces.

2.4. The humanitarian dimension of second-generation operations

Second-generation operations have also taken on the role of providing humanitarian aid:

• protecting humanitarian convoys;
• protecting humanitarian aid workers;
• supplying humanitarian aid;
• establishing, supporting and protecting secure areas;
• helping to repatriate refugees;
• supervising the flow of refugees; and
• providing logistical support to humanitarian projects, including transport, medical aid and technical support.

2.5. Case study: Peace operations in Central America and the protection of human rights

In 1989, the United Nations Security Council set up the first peace operation in the history of South America; the mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was to oversee compliance with the agreements made by the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua to cease government aid to irregular troops and insurrectionist movements operating outside their borders. The agreements were an initiative of the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias. His plan, known as Esquipulas II, included measures for the amnesty of political prisoners, the cessation of hostilities and support for the opposition forces of other countries, democratisation and aid for refugees and displaced persons.

Spain had the largest participation in ONUCA with a total of 57 military observers deployed across the five Central American countries. Spain was also a member of the Group of Friends of the secretary-general of the United Nations, along with the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. This group gave its support to the United Nations’ handling of negotiations between the parties and to the establishment of the peace mission.

In Nicaragua, ONUCA supervised the truce agreed between the Sandinista regime and the Contra of Nicaragua, the opposition group backed by Washington. Following the Declaration of San Isidro on 12 December 1989, the Sandinista government agreed to allow the Contra’s demobilised troops to take part in the presidential elections, finally held in February 1990. ONUCA
played an active role in the voluntary demobilisation of over 22,000 members of the Contra in Nicaragua and Honduras. ONUCA was the first peace mission with the mandate of demobilising an army and reintegrating its forces into civil life. In May 1990, the new president of Nicaragua Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the bishop of Managua and the leaders of the Contra agreed on the Managua Protocol on Disarmament, which set up development zones for the social reinsertion of the demobilised soldiers.

The presence of the Blue Helmets was clearly key to demobilisation and the social reintegration of the Contra because it helped create a feeling of trust between the parties that went as far as a ritualisation by the church authorities of the transition from military to civilian status. In September 1989, the president of El Salvador, the conservative Alfredo Cristiani Burkard and the leaders of the Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) front began negotiations to end the civil war in El Salvador that had rocked the country since 1991. War broke out in January with the FMLN Communist guerrilla offensive against government forces following the assassination of bishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, a charismatic human rights activist who had been outspoken regarding the military repression of the death squads. Hostilities did not cease completely until 1992. The defeat of the Sandinista government in the 1990 elections in Nicaragua ushered in a change of attitude in the FMLN that opened the door to new negotiations with the government under the auspices of the secretary-general of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

In July 1991, the Security Council set up the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which began to investigate the violations of human rights that had taken place during the conflict and to identify and punish the perpetrators. The mission also developed a human rights education programme and campaigns to raise awareness. The final peace treaty was not reached until January 1992, when the parties agreed to the reduction and reform of El Salvador's army, the demobilisation of the FMLN and other paramilitary organisations, the creation of a new police force and the FMLN's renouncement of Marxist-Leninist ideology, among other measures. After the ceasefire, 380 military observers were deployed to the area to oversee compliance and to coordinate a plan for the prevention of landmine accidents, which marked and cleared 425 minefields. The mission also had a civilian police division, which had over 600 staff at one point. Its mandate was to supervise the organisation and operation of the new police force in El Salvador, the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC). The civilian police force also supervised and assessed the training and selection of recruits from the Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Law Enforcement Academy), which began its activities on 1 September 1992. The Human Rights Division (composed of 30 human rights observers and legal advisors) collaborated with the Procuraduría Nacional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (National Attorney General's Office for the Defence of Human Rights) on the publication of regular reports on human rights in El Salvador.
However, those responsible for human rights violations received amnesty without even a public acknowledgement of their crimes or a statement of remorse. The feeling that those responsible for the atrocities against the civilian population in the 1980s have gone unpunished is clearly not beneficial to national reconciliation. ONUSAL had 138 military observers from the Spanish Army and brigadier-general Víctor Suanzes Pardo was in charge of the military component of the mission. In May 1995, when the peacekeeping operation was replaced by a peacebuilding mission (MINUSAL), members of Spain’s Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) were incorporated into the operation.

In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly set up the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) with the mandate of investigating human rights violations perpetrated by the two warring factions in Central America’s longest civil conflict (36 years) between the government of Guatemala and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). In June, the Oslo Agreement set up a commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.

At the end of 1996, the two parties signed the definitive peace agreement (Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera). On 20 January 1997, the Security Council authorised the deployment of 155 military observers to supervise the ceasefire (informally in force since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1996), the separation of the forces and the demobilisation of 3,570 URNG militants. In 1994, fourteen Guardia Civil officials joined the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala. From 1997, Spain stepped up its participation in the peacekeeping mission in Guatemala (42 military observers) and brigadier-general José B. Rodríguez Rodríguez took over the Military Observer Group. As with the peace process of El Salvador, the commission to clarify past human rights violations has been criticised for its limited contribution to the recovery of the historical memory of the conflict. Seils has questioned the transparency and impartiality of the process and the political commitment of the Guatemalan government to initiate legal proceedings against the accused.

2.6. Case Study: The growth of South American peace operations since 2004 and the emergence of a South American peacebuilding model

South American countries have emerged as a major contributor to peacekeeping missions in the past ten years or so and their activities, especially in Haiti, have resulted, according to Kenkel, in a distinctively South American model of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

One way this growth of peacekeeping in South America might be observed is in the formation of a number of significant new peacekeeping training centres. The first training centre was opened in Uruguay in 1982 and this was established as the National Centre for Peace Operations in 2009. In
1995, Argentina founded its Joint Centre for Peace Operations in 1995 (CAEOPAZ) and Chile founded a similar centre (CAECOPAC) in 2002. By June 2010, Brazil had decided to merge separate service centres into a Joint Peace operations centre (CCOPAB). By 2007, a region wide Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training Centres (ALCOPAZ) was established comprised of most of the troop contributing countries from the region to the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. The main contributors from the Southern Cone are the so called ACBU states –Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay– and by April 2011 Uruguay was the tenth largest contributor to UN missions, Brazil the 13th, Argentina the 25th largest in the ranking, and Chile 34th, in a UN list that was composed of 115 contributors overall.

Collectively, South American countries contributed nearly 50% of the 11,578 strong (at June 2010) personnel for the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. This collaboration has, according to Kenkel, enabled South American nations to fashion a distinctive model of peacekeeping and peacebuilding characterised by the following features:

- A reluctance of use force and to deploy only under Chapter 6 of the UN charter.
- A focus on using sustainable development projects to support the peace process.
- And close contact of military contingents with the local population.
3. Third-generation peacekeeping. Peace support operations

3.1. The need to improve second-generation operations

A decade after the launch of the first wider peacekeeping operations, the shortcomings of this type of intervention were highlighted by the failures of the operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. In Rwanda, approximately 800,000 people were murdered between April and July of 1994. The Rwandan genocide has been described as the most abominable crime in the history of the twentieth century. One of the most thorough and moving accounts of the Rwandan genocide, *Shake Hands with the Devil* was written by the Canadian lieutenant general and force commander of the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission, Romeo Dallaire.

A year after the Rwanda genocide, in 1995, a contingent of UN peacekeeping forces witnessed one of the most horrific war crimes in Europe since the end of World War II when Serbian militias broke through the enclave of the Muslim Bosnian city of Srebrenica and killed 8,000 Muslims after the United Nations had declared it a demilitarised safe zone in its Resolution 819 of 1993 to protect the civilian population.

Since these events, academics and institutions have stressed the need for reform of the organisation. Problems have been identified in the preparation of the forces (assembly and deployment of forces) and operating issues have also been raised. Missions are coordinated from United Nations offices in New York and lack adequate ground support. The logistical and coordination problems are substantial, particularly in operations with participation of contingents from different countries. The difficulties faced by peacekeeping missions and the efforts to overcome these difficulties in developing a third-generation model of peacekeeping, are illustrated in the following case study, based on events in the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

3.2. Case Study. The Yugoslav Wars and UNPROFOR: Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia

On 25 June 1991, the republics of Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence from Yugoslavia. This marked the beginning of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation and the bloodiest period of war in contemporary Europe. In August 1991, hostilities between the Serbs of Krajina, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and Croatian forces reached a head with the civil war spreading across Croatia. The Serbian victory in Vukovar on 17 November marked a turning point. From this time, the United Nations
began to adopt a more active diplomatic role. On 2 January 1992, the military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the representatives of the JNA agreed to a ceasefire. Meanwhile, on 15 January, following pressure from Germany, the European Community recognised the new independent states of Croatia and Slovenia. On 21 February, the United Nations Security Council set up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR's mandate was to demilitarise the United Nations Security Zones (UNSZ) and protect the civilians from combats between the warring factions in Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia.

In the meantime, in March 1992, the neighbouring Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina approved its independence from Yugoslavia in a referendum and was recognised as an independent state by the European Union. Bosnian Serb militias immediately embarked on a military campaign with the support of the JNA against Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia by laying siege to the city of Sarajevo. In May, as fighting intensified, UNPROFOR sent the first military observers to Bosnia. By the end of the month, Resolution 757 of the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised an embargo of commodities from the Yugoslav federation (Serbia and Montenegro) as a means of pressure for the intervention of JNA forces and the use of their armaments in the Bosnian War. NATO and the WEU set up missions in the Adriatic to oversee compliance with the resolution. In October, the Council outlawed all military flights over the air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Spain took part in the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia with a tactical group of over 1,000 units (engineering, cavalry, health and logistics), military observers and officials. In December 1999, following the Dayton agreements, UNPROFOR was replaced by NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), which gave way to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) after a year. 682 Spanish soldiers from the SPAGT XVIII tactical group were deployed in southern Bosnia. In addition, the Spanish Army contingent had over one hundred management personnel at the mission headquarters, one unit of engineers and units of the Guardia Civil. The Spanish contingent also had a helicopter base, SPAHEL X, with two utilitarian helicopters for the carriage of personnel, logistics material and reconnaissance tasks. The Spanish Navy had a frigate in the Adriatic Sea and its Air Force had four combat planes at the Aviano airbase in Italy.

In December 1992, the Council authorised the deployment of a preventive force of UNPROFOR members to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (independent since 1991) "to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory".

Meanwhile, in the Bosnian War, Serb attacks were forcing the Muslim population to seek refuge in enclaves that were extremely difficult for United Nations humanitarian organisations to enter. With the aim of protecting the
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refugees, in April 1993, Resolution 819 of the Security Council declared the city of Srebrenica a safe area (it was followed by Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla and Zepa).

3.2.1. Srebrenica

The city of Srebrenica was a predominantly Muslim enclave (75%) in a territory controlled by Serbian forces. In March 1993, Philippe Morillon, general of the French Army and commander of UNPROFOR, visited Srebrenica, where he told the civilian population: "I will never abandon you". In Summer 1995, two years after the city was declared a safe area by the United Nations, the city witnessed the worse massacre of the Bosnian War. This is how events unfolded over the days of the killings:

a) 6-8 July 1995

Bosnian Serb forces besieged the city of Srebrenica. Tens of thousands of civilians sought refuge in the city following the Serb offensive in north-east Bosnia. They were protected by a sole battalion of infantry from the Dutch army with 600 units and light weaponry. There was barely any petrol left in the city and fresh food had not entered since May. The Serbian forces began to bomb Srebrenica. The Bosnian Muslim soldiers asked the Blue Helmets to give them back the weapons they had turned in but their request was denied. The Dutch commander asked the United Nations central offices in Sarajevo for more air support after missiles and shells fell close to the refugee centres and observation points of the peacekeeping forces.

b) 9 July 1995

The Bosnian Serbs intensified the air strikes and thousands of refugees fled to the city from the camps in the south to avoid a clash with the Serbian troops who were advancing to their positions. The Serbian troops attacked the observation points of the Dutch forces and took thirty Blue Helmets hostage. The Serbian offensive included units from the Bosnian Serb army and paramilitary forces (Drina Wolves, Seselj’s Chetniks and Arkan Tigers).

c) 10 July 1995

The Dutch colonel Karremans made an official request for air support to the United Nations after the Bosnian Serb forces bombed their observation points. The Commander of UNPROFOR, general Janvier, initially rejected the request but subsequently agreed after another request from the colonel. The Serbian attacks stopped before the planes arrived and the air strike was postponed. There were around 4,000 refugees in the city that afternoon and panic hit the streets. The crowd congregated around the observation points of the Dutch
troops. The Dutch commander explained to the city authorities that NATO planes would carry out a mass bombing of Serbian positions if they did not leave the safe area before 6 a.m.

**d) 11 July 1995**

The Serbian forces did not withdraw and, at 9 a.m., colonel Karremans received a note from Sarajevo informing him that his request for intense air support had been submitted incorrectly. At 10.30 a.m., general Janvier received a new request but by then it was too late because the NATO planes had to return to their bases in Italy for refuelling, having been in the air since 6 a.m. The United Nations air forces were unable to save the safe area. At noon, over 20,000 refugees –mainly women, children and the sick– fled to the main Dutch base in Potocari. At 2:30 p.m., two Dutch F-16 bombers dropped two bombs on Serb positions around Srebrenica. The Serbs responded with the threat of killing the Dutch hostages and bombing the refugees. The threat was enough to suspend the F-16 bombings. The Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic entered Srebrenica two hours later, accompanied by Serbian cameras. In the afternoon, general Mladic met with colonel Karremans and gave him an ultimatum: the Muslims must hand over their weapons to guarantee their lives.

**e) 12 July 1995**

The women and children were taken by bus to the Muslim zone. Meanwhile, the Serbs began to look for all men between the ages of 12 and 77 to interrogate them under suspicion of having committed war crimes. It is thought that 23,000 women and children were deported in 30 hours. Hundreds of men were held in trucks and warehouses. Around 15,000 Bosnian Muslim guerrillas attempted to escape from Srebrenica during the night but were bombed as they reached the mountains.

**f) 13 July 1995**

The first unarmed Muslims were killed in a shed in the village of Kravica. The peacekeeping forces handed over 5,000 Muslims who had taken refuge at the Dutch base in Potocari. In exchange, the Bosnian Serbs released the 14 Dutch soldiers held at the base in Nova Kasaba.

**g) 16 July 1995**

The first news from survivors of the Srebrenica massacre reached the territory in the hands of Muslim forces. Following negotiations between the United Nations and the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch were allowed to withdraw from
Srebrenica, leaving behind their weapons, food and medicines. In the five days that followed the entry of the Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica, it is estimated that more than 7,000 Muslim men were killed.

The report of the UN into the causes of the massacre and its implications for the reform of peacekeeping is summarised in the following document:

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35

The fall of Srebrenica


XI. The fall of Srebrenica: an assessment

467. The tragedy that occurred after the fall of Srebrenica is shocking for two reasons. It is shocking, first and foremost, for the magnitude of the crimes committed. Not since the horrors of the Second World War had Europe witnessed massacres on this scale. The mortal remains of close to 2,500 men and boys have been found on the surface, in mass graves and in secondary burial sites. Several thousand more men are still missing, and there is every reason to believe that additional burial sites, many of which have been probed but not exhumed, will reveal the bodies of thousands more men and boys. The great majority of those who were killed were not killed in combat: the exhumed bodies of the victims show that large numbers had their hands bound, or were blindfolded or were shot in the back or the back of the head. Numerous eyewitness accounts, now well corroborated by forensic evidence, attest to scenes of mass slaughter of unarmed victims.

468. The fall of Srebrenica is also shocking because the enclave's inhabitants believed that the authority of the United Nations Security Council, the presence of UNPROFOR peacekeepers and the might of NATO air power would ensure their safety. Instead, the Bosnian Serb forces ignored the Security Council, pushed aside the UNPROFOR troops and assessed correctly that air power would not be used to stop them. They overran the safe area of Srebrenica with ease and then proceeded to depopulate the territory within 48 hours. Their leaders then engaged in high-level negotiations with representatives of the international community while their forces on the ground executed and buried thousands of men and boys within a matter of days.

469. Questions must be answered, and foremost among them are the following: how can this have been allowed to happen? And how will the United Nations ensure that no future peacekeeping operation witnesses such a calamity on its watch? In this assessment, factors ranging from the proximate to the overarching will be discussed in order to provide the most comprehensive analysis possible of the preceding narrative.

A. Role of the United Nations Protection Force in Srebrenica

470. In the effort to assign responsibility for the appalling events that took place in Srebrenica, many observers have been quick to point to the soldiers of the UNPROFOR Netherlands battalion as the most immediate culprits. They blame them for not attempting to stop the Serb attack, they blame them for not protecting the thousands of people who sought refuge in their compound.
471. As concerns the first criticism, the commander of the Netherlands battalion believed that the Bosnians could not defend Srebrenica by themselves and that his own forces could not be effective without substantial air support. Air support was, in his view, the most effective resource at his disposal to respond to the Serb attack. Accordingly, he requested air support on a number of occasions, even after many of his own troops had been taken hostage and faced potential Serb reprisals. Those requests were not heeded by his superiors at various levels and some of them may not have been received at all, illustrating the command-and-control problems from which UNPROFOR suffered throughout its history. However, after he had been told that the risk of confrontation with the Serbs was to be avoided and that the execution of the mandate was secondary to the security of his personnel, the battalion withdrew from observation posts under direct attack.

472. It is true that UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica never fired at the attacking Serbs. They fired warning shots over the Serbs’ heads and their mortars fired flares, but they never fired directly on any Serb units. Had they engaged the attacking Serbs directly, it is possible that events would have unfolded differently. At the same time, it must be recognised that the 150 fighting men of the Dutchbat were lightly armed and in indefensible positions, and were faced with 2,000 Serbs advancing with the support of armour and artillery.

473. As concerns the second criticism, it is easy to say with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of what followed that the Netherlands battalion did not do enough to protect those who sought refuge in its compound. Perhaps the soldiers should have allowed everyone into the compound and then offered themselves as human shields to protect them. This might have slowed down the Serbs and bought time for higher-level negotiations to take effect. At the same time, it is also possible that the Serb forces would then have shelled the compound, killing thousands in the process, as they had threatened to do. Ultimately, it is not possible to say with any certainty that stronger actions by the Dutchbat would have saved lives, and it is even possible that such efforts could have done more harm than good. Faced with this prospect and unaware that the Serbs would proceed to execute thousands of men and boys, the Dutchbat avoided armed confrontation and appealed in the process for support at the highest levels.

474. It is harder to explain why the Dutchbat personnel did not report more fully the scenes that were unfolding around them following the enclave’s fall. Although they did not witness mass killing, they were aware of some sinister indications. It is possible that if the members of the battalion had immediately reported in detail those sinister indications to the United Nations chain of command, the international community might have been compelled to respond more robustly and more quickly, and that some lives might have been saved. This failure of intelligence-sharing was also not limited to the fall of Srebrenica, but an endemic weakness throughout the conflict, both within the peacekeeping mission and between the mission and the member states.


3.3. Third-generation peacekeeping and the emergence of new doctrine on peacekeeping during the late 1990s

We have examined above the catastrophic failure of peacekeepers in Srebrenica. As a direct response to this and similar or even worse failures in Rwanda and Somalia, the military doctrine of peacekeeping operations was once again reviewed and radically altered. The aim of the doctrine from the mid 1990s was to develop new operations capable of carrying out more powerful actions in order to protect the civilian population effectively and offer security to the peacekeeping forces and United Nations workers (UN staff had been kidnapped and assassinated by militias and bandits in Sierra Leone and East Timor).
These operations have been termed peace support operations (or third-generation peacekeeping) and their doctrinal principles were developed in the military academies of the countries that took part in the major operations of the 1990s. Their aim was to prevent the deployment of armed forces without adequate training or support in areas of armed conflict. These doctrines were based on the premise that the traditional notions of peacekeeping operations were no longer applicable in a world of civil wars, states in crisis and declining respect for international law and human rights.

According to this new doctrine, future peace operations must have the flexibility, strength and military capacity to act in a wide range of situations and deal with actors who attempt to discredit the peace process through violence and intimidation or who threaten local populations and the staff of international organisations. One of the first operations based on this new strategy was the Kosovo Force (KFOR) set up by NATO in 1999.

Other examples include the intervention of Australian armed forces in East Timor in 1999 and the back-up to the British military contingent in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2000. In contrast to traditional peacekeeping operations, they do not require the consent of the warring factions. Moreover, their mandate (in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter) includes measures to enforce peace (they are ready to engage in combat) and promote the consent of the parties. The essence of third-generation peacekeeping based on peace support doctrine developed by Col Philip Wilkinson and the UK’s Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre is illustrated in the following two charts (adapted from Wilkinson). The first chart (see below) shows how when peacekeeping meets resistance in a conflict area (from violent opponents of an agreed peace process such as warlords and spoilers), then it needs robust force capability, but the objective is to move to a situation of high consent (as in first-generation peacekeeping), therefore requiring less force capability. This is achieved by using consent promoting techniques as well as combat capability, as shown in the second chart, where peacekeepers are effectively acting as both hawks (when they meet violent opposition) and as doves in order to build cooperation and consent.
The peace support operations doctrine acknowledges that the military needs to be robust but also that it needs to be limited. The aim is to create a secure space in which civilian and humanitarian organisations can work to make and build peace. Colonel Philip Wilkinson of the British Army has developed a British Peace Support Operations (PSOs) Doctrine, JWP 3.50.

Peace support operation (PSO) was a term first used by the military to cover both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but is now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace-related operations that include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. In Great Britain, the military doctrine defining the concept was published in 1997 (Joint Warfare Publication 3.01) and was revised again as JWP 5.00 in 2004. This document replaced the doctrinal concepts published in 1994 under the title Wider Peacekeeping. Colonel Wilkinson defined peace support operations as follows:
“All military operations are conducted with a degree of restraint, be that only an adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict or Geneva Conventions. What makes PSOs distinct is their impartial nature. PSOs are neither in support of nor against a particular party, but are conducted in an impartial and even-handed manner. Rather than achieve a short-term military victory, PSOs are designed to enforce compliance with the operation's mandate and to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace. PSO Force actions are based upon judgements of the degree of compliance and/or noncompliance of the parties with the operation's mandate and not against any bias or predetermined designation. The conduct of a PSO force should be analogous to that of a third-party referee and should remain that way even if only one party consistently fails to comply with the mandate and suffers the consequences. In peacekeeping (PK) mode, the level of consent is such that the referee requires relatively few resources. In peace enforcement, however, the referee requires enough resources to enforce compliance with the mandate, no matter how much the parties may object. But the referee must not become a party to the conflict. Referee status requires a very different approach from that of a player whose ambition is to defeat the other team or teams. The operational plans for I/SFOR [in Bosnia] and KFOR [in Kosovo] all directed military operations to enforce compliance in an impartial and even-handed manner.”

Ph. Wilkinson. *Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. UK Military*

The NATO doctrine published in July 2001 (*AJP-3.4.1. Allied Joint Peace Support Operations*) is based on the concepts developed by Wilkinson. The military doctrine currently used by the Spanish Army in peace support operations is set down in the Atlantic Alliance documents (*AJP-3.4 Military Operations Other Than War MOOTW* and *AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations*).

### 3.4. Consent-promoting techniques

While this new, muscular or robust doctrine that defined third-generation peacekeeping was designed to be able to project meaningful military force against war lords, spoilers and others violently opposed to peace processes, the doctrine ultimately relied on agreement, negotiation and consent, and the definition of consent-promoting techniques lay at the core of the conflict resolution character of third-generation missions. In 1997, the secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, pointed out the need to develop incentives to obtain support for peacekeeping operation mandates from the local population in areas of conflict. Annan warned that while the use of force would be decisive in the success of new peace operations, it was not enough. To obtain sustainable and lasting peace, the actors in peacekeeping operations must be able to offer positive incentives in the area of operation. Clearly, the challenge faced by peace-support operations is to improve non-violent measures so as to obtain the consent of the parties, using techniques and practices developed in the field of conflict resolution, thus avoiding the use of combat techniques.

Management of the consent of the belligerent parties is based on the principles of impartiality, legitimacy, limited use of force, credibility and transparency. It requires developing measures to improve communication between the parties, such as negotiation and mediation, and maintaining a positive attitude, fostering communication and relations with the population through an active programme of civilian activities. Soldiers rarely inspire trust among local...
populations, so activities promoting consent are vital. The peacekeeping forces must be able to build trust among the local population. These measures include:

- **Interacting with the population**: this involves encouraging social contact between mission members and the local population. The aim is to generate a positive view of the mission and the feeling of cooperation with peace support activities.

- **Conducting negotiation and mediation**: Article 33 of the United Nations Charter highlights the importance of negotiation, investigation, mediation and conciliation in conflict resolution. Negotiation and mediation are used to encourage good relations between mission members and the belligerent parties. These techniques are key to the success of peace support operations.

- **Promoting liaison functions**: rumours, prejudices and uncertainty encourage tensions and conflict. It is therefore vital for the mission to treat information with utmost rigour and to pass it on to the actors in a context of absolute trust. If the liaison is not good, misunderstandings can occur and frictions can lead to a violent escalation of the conflict. Liaison functions include the exchange of information at the right time, statements of intentions, reporting of compliance, coordination of activities, crisis management and the resolution of disputes. The liaison officer coordinates the peacekeeping forces, communities, civil authorities, belligerent parties, humanitarian organisations and the media. While these new principles were being developed with specific national defence academies, reform proposals designed to avoid the mistakes of the 1990s, were also emerging in the UN system itself.

3.5. **Proposals for the reform and improvement of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-support operations**

In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed the training of peace-enforcement units. These units, unlike the forces of traditional peacekeeping operations, would be heavily armed and trained for combat. To deploy troops as swiftly as possible, Boutros-Ghali also proposed the creation of a System of Reserve Forces by which the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations had access to information on the forces that can be offered by each country. The system was put in place in 1994 (also called the Standby Arrangements System - UNSAS).

The participation of the Spanish armed forces in this system was set down in the *Libro Blanco de la Defensa* (*White Paper on Defence, 2000*):
"In 1999, Spain signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Secretariat to formalise our participation in this system of forces as an additional way to extend our commitment to peace support operations. Spain has offered units for the constitution of the UN Stand-by Forces and the Minister of Defence has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Secretary-General of the UN regarding the number, type and availability of Spanish forces in this context. Among other forces, Spain offered an infantry squad unit, a transport plane squadron and sea vessels according to mission, as well as personnel for international general headquarters and military observers."


Nonetheless, the progress of the United Nations in the creation of an effective instrument that can respond quickly to crises has been somewhat slow since the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. In recent years, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada expressed an interest in improving the system. For example, the Danish government set up a brigade of standby forces with over 4,000 military personnel who can be ready for deployment in less than 30 days. In 1995, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations set up the Lessons Learned Unit, now called the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. Its mission is to document and evaluate the experiences of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations to boost the institutional memory and improve subsequent operations. The Unit has published case studies on the missions in Somalia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1993-1996) and Eastern Slavonia (1998).

The conclusions of these studies include the following:

- The mandates of the operations must be clear, realistic and applicable.

- The planning of peace support operations must cover all activities and be effective in the long term; the planning process must be as comprehensive as possible.

- Effective coordination of all of the components of the peace operation is essential if the mission is to meet its aims.

- Standard operating practices must be defined and developed for all functions of the military component of the mission.

- The support of the local population is key to the success of the mission.

Forces on various missions of peace operations have been criticised (Somalia, Cambodia, DR Congo) for human rights abuses among the civilian population. It is important that international forces are able to respond for their actions (the figure of an ombudsman has been proposed) and that the United Nations can guarantee transparency in its actions. Respect for the cultural traditions and social norms of the local population are a key element of relations between the international contingent of the mission and the local
population. The United Nations and contributing countries should focus on the training of their personnel and on the history and culture of the target country.

Peacebuilding activities such as helping to restore basic services and support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country can be effective ways to win over the local population and obtain social support for the operation. Peace initiatives need to take into account local conflict management practices where these do not contravene the international principles of human rights protection and humanitarian law. Identifying the representatives of the local community is not always an easy task and the mission must reveal caution in so doing. In areas where the climate of conflict is intense as a result of population displacements and other exceptional wartime circumstances, the traditional roles and structure of the society are changed or quashed by new hierarchical structures controlled by the military.

Of the new functions adopted by United Nations peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding activities are fundamental (support to processes and institutions that encourage the reconciliation of the two warring factions and the reconstruction of the financial infrastructure and social system). Peace missions need to adapt to these new functions by increasing the civilian component of the missions. The important role of peacebuilding and its connection with peacekeeping is explored and explained more fully in unit 4 of this module.

In March 2000, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, commissioned a group of experts led by the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi to produce a report on the lessons learned in peacekeeping operations with a view to drawing up guidelines for new missions. The Brahimi report recommended:

- adopting firm rules for engaging in combat;

- drawing up realistic and achievable mandates;

- deploying mission components quickly and effectively (within 30 days of setting up the mission, by Security Council resolution and within 90 days in the case of wider peacekeeping operations);

- encouraging member states to join the Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) to create brigades that can be rapidly deployed;

- improving measures for the integration of civilian police and human rights experts in peacekeeping missions;

- establishing a national database of civilian police with short-term availability for deployment in United Nations peace operations;
• improving the security instruments of the mission; and

• providing protection for the local population.

Creating a peacebuilding unit in the Department of Political Affairs in order to coordinate peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the long term (this recommendation is a clear acknowledgement of the importance of preparing and integrating civilian elements into peace missions correctly).

As stated in the report, peacekeeping operations like those in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, The Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, required an increased police presence and extension in the scope of civil activities for the promotion of conflict resolution techniques and measures. The European Union will also need to develop conflict resolution techniques as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In June 1999, the European Union approved its European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in Berlin. In December, the Helsinki summit saw the creation of a European rapid intervention force consisting of 50,000 – 60,000 troops and a civil contingent for crisis situations.

To date, EU member states have failed to offer adequate support to the promotion of civilian conflict resolution techniques. The pacific resolution of future conflicts will depend largely on the resolve of the international community and most especially on the United Nations and regional organisations in promoting these techniques.

3.6. Kosovo and the KFOR Mission. Case study of a third-generation force

3.6.1. Background

One of the first conflicts to experience a robust third-generation peacekeeping deployment was the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo is a region in the south of Serbia (Former Yugoslavia). Most of its inhabitants are of Albanian origin though there is also a Serb minority (10%). Kosovo enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in the Yugoslav federation until 1989, when the Serb President Slobodan Milosevic withdrew its autonomy and the province came under the direct control of the Serbs. In the 1990s, the Kosovar Albanians initially opposed this policy with a campaign of civil resistance and set up parallel institutions (schools, health centres etc.) to represent their interests. However, the conflict between soldiers and Serb police forces and the rising guerrilla movement of Kosovo came to a head in 1998 with a tragic outcome of over 1,500 deaths and 40,000 people displaced from their homes. It looked as though the model of ethnic cleansing applied in Bosnia was being repeated in Kosovo with the Serbs forcing the Kosovar Albanians to leave their birthplace.
The Kosovar Albanian militias, in turn, attacked Serb forces in order to consolidate a movement of political independence. In October 1988, parallel to diplomatic efforts to try and make Milosevic withdraw his military forces from Kosovo and allow the return of the refugees, NATO authorised the aerial bombing of Serbia. President Milosevic accepted the conditions of the political agreement and OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and an aerial surveillance mission were set up. A military detachment was also set up under NATO control in Macedonia to help with the repatriation of staff on the KVM if the situation worsened.

In January 1999, following a series of provocative developments and fears of a renewed escalation of the conflict, new diplomatic initiatives were introduced to find a political solution. The contact group formed by six countries (originally established at the London conference on the former Yugoslavia in 1992) agreed that the parties should begin negotiations. These took place in Rambouillet near Paris from 6 to 23 of February, followed by a second round in Paris between 15 and 18 March. The Kosovar Albanians signed the peace agreement but the Serbs abandoned the negotiations. The Serb militias then intensified their operations against the Kosovar Albanians, breaching the October agreements.

On 23 March, the Atlantic Alliance gave the order to begin the bombings of Serbia (Operation Allied Force). After a 77-day long air campaign, NATO reached an agreement to cease hostilities with the Yugoslav army and the bombings were stopped. The special representatives of Russia and the European Union negotiated the definitive agreements with the Yugoslav leaders.

3.6.2. Establishment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR)

On 10 June 1999, the Security Council announced its decision to set up a civilian security mission in Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations (S/RES/1244). Resolution of the conflict was based on the agreements adopted on 6 March by the G8 foreign ministers (which included Russia), submitted by Russia and the European Union on 3 June to the government of the Yugoslav federation. Their main conditions were:

- An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression
- Withdrawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces from the Yugoslav federation
- Deployment of an international security presence with substantial NATO participation under unified command in the safety area
- The return and protection of refugees
• A political process to establish self-government and the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

• A comprehensive view of economic development in the region.

General Michael Jackson was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the security force, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, under the authority of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. The security force was named the Kosovo Force (KFOR). On 12 June, the first security forces began to enter Kosovo. The withdrawal of Serbian troops was completed on 20 June. Since the end of June 1999, Spain has contributed to KFOR with a Tactical Group (KSPABAT) and a logistical National Support Element (KNSE). The tactical group was composed of 868 military personnel from the Aragon Group. Their main functions in their field of responsibility were:

• guaranteeing security,
• monitoring freedom of movement and
• protecting returned refugees.

The logistical National Support Element was composed of 300 men and women. Their base was in Skopje (the capital of the Republic of Macedonia) and their purpose was to supply the troops in Kosovan territory and to carry out tasks relating to the transportation and maintenance of vehicles and staff.
3.6.3. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Functions, activities and mandate

On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council set up the interim administration mission to substantially increase the autonomy of the Kosovar people. On 12 June, Kofi Annan presented the operating guidelines of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In mid-July 1999, the Secretary-General presented the global operating framework of UNMIK.

UNMIK is assigned all legislative and executive powers in Kosovo, even the administration of justice. Its activities were carried out in five phases:
I) Establishment of administrative structures, deployment of the civilian police (CIVPOL), provision of emergency assistance for returned refugees, restoration of public services, training of local police and judiciary and the design of an economic recovery plan.

II) Development of administration of social services and utilities, law and order, and the transfer of education and health to the local and regional authorities.

III) Organisation and supervision of the election of representatives for the new Kosovo Transitional Authority.

IV) UNMIK, in conjunction with the elected Kosovo representatives, will set up provisional democratic institutions for the new autonomous government to which UNMIK will transfer its administrative responsibilities.

V) Signing of the final political agreement. UNMIK will supervise the transfer of authority of the provisional institutions to the authorities established in the final agreement.

On 15 July 1999, doctor Bernard Kouchner took control of UNMIK as the special representative of the secretary-general. Kouchner led the four areas of civil competences (known as pillars). Each pillar concerns an aspect of restoring the peace:

Pillar I: Civil administration, under the supervision of the United Nations
Pillar II: Humanitarian aid, led by OHCHR
Pillar III: Democratisation and institutional reform, headed by the OSCE
Pillar IV: Economic reconstruction, led by the European Union.

3.6.4. Peacebuilding in Kosovo. Military operations for peacekeeping and conflict prevention

The peacebuilding activities of the United Nations were coordinated by UN agencies (OHCHR, UNDP, OCHA, DPA) that work with external organisations (EU, OSCE, NATO). The United Nations mission in Kosovo has carried out the following peacebuilding activities:

- Training of the civilian police force
- Supervision of human rights
- Promotion of the media
- Training of civil servants
- Supervision of elections
- Promotion of educational institutions and development of their syllabus
- Development of the legal system (training of members of the judiciary)
- Fostering of the capabilities of civilian society (training and aid for NGOs).
The doctrine and practice of peacekeeping operations have evolved and personnel are now trained in peace support techniques (peace enforcement). The aims as far as security is concerned are long-term peacebuilding and greater coordination between civilian and military activities. With NATO's operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United Nations has adopted the political and civilian role of peacebuilding, while the military functions have been taken up by the regional security organisations, KFOR in Kosovo, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, under NATO control; or country coalitions, such as the force under Australian command in East Timor, and the ISAF force in Afghanistan headed first by the United Kingdom and then by Turkey. The NATO has developed a concept of security that goes beyond its strictly military sense.

In its 1994 Association for Peace initiative, it adopted the mandate of fostering democracy and new models of human security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Britain's new peacekeeping doctrine defines a sophisticated system of complementarity between the legitimate use of force (coercion) and the promotion of consent and persuasion ("winning hearts and minds") in the area of conflict. To sum up, in Kosovo, the international community has developed a pillar system of post-war reconstruction in which different actors take on responsibilities in different areas of the peace process: the United Nations, governance and interim administration; the European Union and the World Bank, economic reconstruction, and the OSCE, human rights protection and the democratisation and development of civilian society. Security is enforced by NATO's UN authorised multinational peacekeeping force, KFOR. The peacebuilding model used in Kosovo takes into account the structuring of the spheres of social, economic and political development and the ability to enforce compliance with the precepts covered by the United Nations mandate for Kosovo. Compliance with agreements can be enforced by the establishment of firm rules for engaging in combat or robust peacekeeping (peace support operations). With these rules for engaging in combat, KFOR has the ability and the authority to pursue criminal mafias, warlords and violent groups opposing the peace process (known as spoilers). Despite fears over a resurgence of the chaos, instability and guerrilla terrorism in Kosovo, the dynamic combination of peacebuilding strategies applied to the conflict has prevented a worse situation.
4. Towards fourth-generation peacekeeping.  
Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and cosmopolitanism

4.1. Theoretical frameworks: Towards a fourth-generation (cosmopolitan) model of peacekeeping

Until the 1990s, the United Nations did not have a well-defined concept for its peacekeeping operations. As we have seen, these operations were not envisaged in the Charter and the decision was taken to adopt an ad hoc organisation. For example, Brian Urquhart, former under secretary-general of the United Nations argued that,

"care should be taken in attempting to generalise excessively about peacekeeping and to improve upon what has been part of the recipe of success, namely improvisation..."


However, there are several reasons why it is necessary to develop theories on peacekeeping. For example, it is essential to distinguish between peacekeeping operations as an instrument of conflict management and as an instrument of conflict resolution – the latter aimed at peacemaking and peacebuilding, the former perhaps aimed more at the stabilisation and containment of conflict. Miall studied the outcome of eighty-one conflicts that took place between 1945 and 1985 and reached the conclusion that the United Nations was more effective at intervening in interstate conflicts than in intrastate conflicts. Hence, any assessment of peacekeeping operations needs to take into account the objectives of the mission and this requires the adoption of a critical view of the relationship between peacekeeping operations and the principles and processes of conflict management put into practice in these operations.

Galtung was one of the first peace researchers to analyse peacekeeping from the perspective of conflict resolution:

"If the peacekeeping intervenes maintaining the status quo in a vertical conflict between the periphery and the centre, then, whether it would like to or not, the operation is another party to the conflict, since it aligns itself objectively with the party keenest to preserve the status quo".


Fetherston adds:
"If the peacekeeping operations are not duly coordinated with other interventions or they are lacking the will and determination to contribute to a management process not restricted to controlling the violence, the operation will have great difficulty in going beyond (maintenance of the status quo)".


UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution as a distinct discipline are not only closely related conceptually. They can also be said to be almost exactly the same age, if we take the Hammarskjold-Pearson principles for the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I 1956-67) as seminal for the former and the founding of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957 as the formal initiation of the latter. Since 1988, however, when the Blue Berets were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the scope for UN peacekeeping as ‘a viable instrument for international conflict management’ was more widely recognised. Inspired by earlier conflict theorists, including Quincy Wright and Lewis Richardson in the 1920s and 1930s, Kenneth Boulding, who with Norman Angell coined the term ‘conflict resolution’ in the 1950s, described the new discipline as one which combined 1) the analytical-descriptive science of ‘polemologie’ (conflict study) with 2) the ‘minimum normativeness’ of positive conflict management (the theory and practice of peaceful resolution). Central to conflict resolution has been the analysis of the conditions under which peaceful third party intervention can help mitigate, manage, settle or even resolve violent and intractable conflicts. Peacekeeping is also usually described as a ‘non-violent’ or ‘non-threatening’ international military operation, which is itself, precisely, a ‘peaceful third party intervention’. There has been an increasing recognition that peacekeeping operationally has much to learn from the academic field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in turn can inform the development of theory by providing rich case study material of conflict behaviour. In the following section we explore how new thinking about conflict resolution and new policies for the development of peacekeeping might interact to define a fourth-generation model of peacekeeping.

### 4.2. Cosmopolitan peacekeeping: Towards a fourth-generation of peacekeeping

In view of these and similar critiques, UN peacekeeping is once again undergoing a period of intense critical scrutiny. Having passed through three major phases of development, from first- (classical or traditional) to second-(multidimensional) generation configurations, to a third phase in the mid- and late 1990s when peace support operations emerged, it currently faces another period of transition. The minimum requirements for a fourth-generation of peacekeeping are 1) to develop the capacity to address the need to protect civilians from violent conflict where the state has failed to do so (the negative peace dimension) and 2) to develop the capacity to address the human security agenda adopted by the UN in recent years (the positive peace dimension). Drawing on work by David Held and Mary Kaldor, we can
identify an emergent discourse about cosmopolitanism and global governance which provides an opportunity and a rationale for taking proposals for a stronger and more permanent peacekeeping force more seriously. This idea of cosmopolitanism provides a normative framework within which the agenda of a reconstructive or transformative project for peacekeeping can be realised: first because it identifies a post-Westphalian direction for international politics, which transcends the state-centricity of peacekeeping: and second because it provides a way of applying international humanitarian standards (the duty to protect civilians) through a consistent rationalisation, legitimisation and operationalisation of concepts of human security. Human security in turn is linked to the value of global security (security for all) rather than to national or state security. Cosmopolitan peacekeeping is, therefore, an expression of how peacekeeping may evolve, as a concrete manifestation of such a cosmopolitan model of global governance.

Looking at the current landscape of peacekeeping, can we say that such a transformation in peacekeeping theory and practice is likely or even possible? The relative decline of UN peacekeeping activity after 1994 reflected a loss of confidence following well-documented setbacks in Rwanda, the Balkans and Somalia especially, to which we have already referred in this unit. When a new set of security challenges manifested themselves in the form of the attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, followed by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the world organisation appeared even more marginalised. Nevertheless as the world turned its attention to these new challenges to security, it should be noted that UN peacekeeping has persisted and even revived. By 2004, the force number had raised again to over 60,000 peacekeepers (the large majority of these from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana and India) deployed in 16 missions.

By 2011, as we saw in the introduction to this unit, there were 123,000 peacekeepers serving in 16 missions with contingents provided by over 100 countries. While this expansion suggests that peacekeeping remains a vital instrument in pursuing conflict resolution goals internationally, the problem is that, in the context of the human security agenda of the UN and in the light of Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000), which confirmed that the deliberate targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in war zones constituted a threat to international peace and security, the potential demands on the duty to protect overwhelms the capacity of the UN to act. In other words, peacekeeping is in effect still underpowered.

**To think about it**

The question remains, what is the potential to strengthen UN peacekeeping not only to protect civilians in areas of violent conflict, but also to develop peacekeeping as a force for inclusive reconstructive peacebuilding, that is, to protect human rights and to help communities develop after conflict?
There is evidence now that at regional and sub-regional levels, and at the level of national peacekeeping policy development, significant innovations and policy developments are being made by both the AU and the EU, and also by the G8, to strengthen peacekeeping forces, especially in Africa, which continues to be the location of many of the world's most intense conflicts. We give some examples of this below.

In the European Union (EU) for example, revisions of policy have impacted on an increasingly coherent common EU security and defence policy (CESDP), characterised by a dual track approach involving the combination of military and civilian capacities. The proposal to establish a Rapid Reaction Facility (now the Rapid Reaction Mechanism) for EU non-military crisis management came out of the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 and the Lisbon Council in March 2000 proposed the setting up of a Rapid Reaction Fund to finance 'any kind of non-combat activities aimed at countering or resolving emerging crises and serious threats or outbreaks of conflict'. The Helsinki Summit also set the headline goal for a military crisis management force, the EU RRF, whereby 50-60,000 ground troops were to be ready for deployment in a crisis within 60 days. A subsequent development of this policy came in November 2004, when all 25 EU members agreed to form EU rapid response 'battle units' for crisis zones. Thirteen such groups were planned for 2007, each of 1,500 troops, to be ready for deployment in 10-15 days. Single nation battle groups are to be formed from Britain, France, Italy and Spain, the remaining units to be made up from multinational contingents from EU member states. These EU battle groups are intended to be combat-capable, ready for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, and also capable of acting to stabilise crises before they escalate to wars.

However, the context of the emergent peacekeeping battle group concept is located within a European Union security strategy that favours conflict prevention and acknowledges that 21st century conflict threats cannot be tackled by purely military means. The EU strategy also recognised that the primary responsibility for international peace and security rested with the UN Security Council and that strengthening the UN and equipping it to act was a priority of the EU. The Human Security Report of the Barcelona Study group, convened to advise Javier Solana, the EU high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and chaired by Mary Kaldor, recommended that the EU should adopt a 'human security policy'. This was effectively cosmopolitan in tone and content, arguing that Europe should see its own emergent regional security policy as making a contribution not only to the region but also to global security.
The report identified a set of seven principles to guide its human security doctrine (primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom up approach, regional focus, use of legal instruments and appropriate use of force). Its recommendations for the implementation of such a strategy are relevant in the context of this article and especially in light of peacekeeping defined in the form of EU battle groups, (as outlined above). The Barcelona Report proposed the formation of a Human Security Response Force of 15,000 military and civilian personnel backed up by a Human Security Volunteer Force. While the EU 'battle groups' remain to be defined more fully in both an operational and doctrinal sense, their potential role in contributing to regional and global cosmopolitan peacekeeping capacity will depend on the willingness of politicians and planners to configure and prepare them in ways broadly in line with recommendations such as those in the Barcelona Report.

Proposals to strengthen peacekeeping at the regional level are also evident in developments in Africa. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiated by Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal was mandated by the African Union to provide a strategy for socio-economic development. The strategic framework to achieve this was agreed at the July 2001 summit of the AU and within the framework document peace and security, along with democracy and good governance, regional cooperation and capacity building were seen as priorities. Chapter 5 of the NEPAD specified that peace and security in Africa meant building up capacity of institutions in Africa for early warning, conflict prevention and resolution. At its summit at Kanasakis in Canada in June 2002, the G8 made NEPAD one of its priorities and committed the G8 to provide 'technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries, the AU and regional organisations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter'. In terms of peacekeeping specifically, the objective of the AU is to secure and enhance African capabilities to undertake PSOs through a series of building blocks, including, by 2010, the establishment, equipping and training of multinational, multi-disciplinary standby brigade capabilities available for UN-endorsed missions, but undertaken under the auspices of the UN, AU or an African sub-regional organisation.

These Standby Brigades would be linked into a complex conflict management network that includes the establishment of a continent-wide regional observation and monitoring (early warning) centres, and a series of regional peace training centres and peacekeeping training schools. The proposal to link these centres, using networked information and communication technology, to a network of international peacekeeping training centres, promises both to provide high value capacity building and to enhance the project with an international-cosmopolitan perspective. Finally, in terms of tracing these initiatives to build regional peacekeeping capacity in Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is considering a proposal made by Indonesia to create a Southeast Asian peacekeeping force that might have a role in
addressing conflicts in the region, such as those in the southern Philippines and in Aceh. The proposed force is seen as a prospect for the future, though it is regarded as a component part of a wider attempt to establish a Security Community for the region agreed at the Bali Summit of ASEAN in October 2003.

Globally, at the operational level there is some evidence in favour of a move in the direction of what Woodhouse and Ramsbotham call 'cosmopolitan peace operations'. Among the most innovative ideas here are the quite detailed proposals now on the table for the development of a military intervention capability specifically owned by the United Nations in which designated forces will train and serve entirely as UN forces, not national troops. Plans for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) were presented to the UN in 2006 (Johansen, ed. 2006) and Michael Codner has elaborated requirements for a United Nations Intervention Force (UNIF) of some 10,000 troops in the first instance.

These ideas for a permanent UN force, located at the ‘visionary’ end of the spectrum of policy options, echo the call made by Lester Pearson in 1957. This may seem to be a tall order given the current overt hostility of the United States to any such idea, the unwillingness to participate of a number of other countries, and the suspicions harbourd by many non-western states. But it is not an impossible aspiration and further detailed proposals for enhanced UN peacekeeping capacity continue to emerge. From Canada, for example, Peter Langille suggests that the development of a UN Emergency Peace Service is no longer a ‘mission impossible’, but an initiative that links and expands upon the work provided by the Brahimi Report, earlier multinational efforts to enhance UN rapid deployment, the responsibility to protect, the ongoing emphasis on the prevention of deadly conflict and the establishment of an International Criminal Court. The future roles and potential tasks of the new service should include the provision of

- reliable early warning with on-site technical reconnaissance,

- rapid deployment for preventive action and protection of civilians at risk and

- prompt start-up of diverse peace operations, including policing, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance.

Bibliographical references


The UN Emergency Peace Service would include a robust military composition, capable of deterring belligerents and of defending the mission, as well as civilians at risk. Notably, recent UN peace operations have included mandates with authorisation under Chapter VII for the limited use of force. While the proposed UN service would not be another 'force' for fighting wars, deployable military elements should have a capacity for modest enforcement to maintain security and the safety of people within its area of operations. The UNEPS force proposal includes a balanced integration of military capacity and a range of civilian expertise, recognising that from the initiation of a mission at first deployment, there will be a need for prompt disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, as well as conflict resolution teams, medical units, peacebuilding advisory teams and environmental crisis response teams.

4.2.1. Civilian peacekeeping in a cosmopolitan model

One indicator of the potential to balance military security roles with the civilian led elements of a conflict resolution process is the evolution of civilian modes of peacekeeping that can complement and strengthen military peacekeeping. Civilian peacekeeping, as Schrich outlines, is similar to some of the more benign tasks of military peacekeeping, such as interpositioning, accompaniment and monitoring. However, while the tools of power used by the military are the threat or use of limited force, the power in civilian peacekeeping initiatives lies with the very nature that they are unarmed civilians from the international community. Schrich explains:

"Civilian peacekeeping works with different sources of power. Instead of weapons, civilian peacekeepers rely on nonviolent forms of power including moral authority, the power in numbers of people, the power that comes through economic and political leverage, and the power embodied in different forms of identity, like those held by religious leaders or people with Western passports".


Schrich outlines the potential of civilian peacekeeping to deal with a number of scenarios. These include:

- providing a human shield or moral deterrent against international or civil warfare;
- strengthening ceasefires by providing a deterrent presence and monitoring of violations;
- monitoring and reducing the likelihood of violence during elections;
- accompanying human rights activists or people who may be targeted by armed forces because of their work for peaceful social change;
• accompanying internally displaced people, refugees, communities who are threatened because of their ethnic or religious identity or their refusal to cooperate with armed groups;

• preventing terrorism by non-state actors;

• deterring violence during transitions in leadership; and

• preventing looting in crises or after natural disasters.

This list may look ambitious, but has roots in working examples of non-violent civilian peacekeeping taken from a wide range of organisations. These organisations include: Nonviolent Peaceforce, Peace Brigades International, Witnesses for Peace, Christian Peacemaker teams, Servicio Internacional Para La Paz, Swedish Fellowship for Reconciliation, as well as the more traditional aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Care, the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières.

There is a crossover in this list between civilian peacekeeping and military peacekeeping, through the monitoring of ceasefires, election monitoring, and protection of returning IDPs and refugees. To take one example, the organisation Nonviolent Peaceforce has been intrinsically involved with the peace process in Mindanao, a southern province in the Philippines. The organisation was invited to peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro-Islamic liberation Front (MILF) and has been able to deploy civilian peacekeepers into the conflict area with a wide-reaching mandate (outlined below):
Nonviolent Peaceforce strategy in Mindanao (NPF, 2010)

- To enhance the scope and quality of locally based people's organisations and peace/human rights advocates.
- To reduce the incidence of violence in the vicinity of NP field sites through means of unarmed international civilian peacekeeping, thereby aiding in the maintenance of the ceasefire(s).
- To support human rights reporting mechanisms in remote conflict areas and assist/connect local and international advocacy groups that work for peace with justice by responding to people's grievances.
- To localise grassroots conflicts so that they are resolved through dialogue at the lowest level and do not snowball into larger crises.
- To provide conscious international presence by deploying international civilian peacekeepers in vulnerable areas to associate with partners from local civil society.
- To offer protective accompaniment to individuals, groups or communities wedded to non-violent solutions but exposed to threats.
- To provide neutral spaces and facilitation services to local peacemakers who attempt to resolve traditional (‘rido’) and non-traditional disputes carrying the potential of violence.
- To facilitate mutual sharing, learning and training on nonviolent strategies with peacemakers and authorities dealing with the peace process.
- To monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, reporting them to relevant national and international agencies upon the consent of survivors.
- To interposition international civilian peacekeepers along with local peace volunteers and ceasefire monitors to boost the sanctity of buffer zones and zones of peace.

Nonviolent Peaceforce's involvement in the peace process has gained a great deal of momentum since the initial entry of the organisation in May 2007. It is now part of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a multinational force comprised of military personnel from Malaysia, Brunei, Japan and Libya, and other civilian representation from the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a local peacebuilding organisation –Mindanao People's Caucus. The strong civilian component of the IMT allows Nonviolent Peaceforce to play a key role in carrying out work under the Civilian Protection Component, which is tasked to ‘monitor, verify and report noncompliance by the Parties to their basic undertaking to protect civilians and civilian communities’.

The development of a UN Emergency Peace Service at the global level or of a mechanism similar to it is then a logical progression of the idea of the collective human security agenda to which the UN is committed. Linking up with the critical peacekeeping agenda discussed above, this does indeed require new ways of thinking about the nature and roles of peacekeeping and about the function of peace operations in the emerging global order. Developing the idea and practice of cosmopolitan peacekeeping provides an opportunity to continue to develop the reform potential initiated in the
Brahimi report. In the end the touchstone should be to develop forms of peacekeeping that serve not primarily the interests of the powerful, but mainly the interests, represented globally, of what Edward Said called

"the poor, the disadvantaged, the unrepresented, the voiceless, the powerless".


If a new fourth-generation model of cosmopolitan peacekeeping that is capable of providing security for all is to emerge, then there are important areas that must be considered, principally in relation to cultural sensitivity, gender sensitivity and the need to connect with emancipatory processes of post conflict peacebuilding. We consider each of these in turn in the concluding sections of this unit.


The material on civilian peacekeeping is extracted from D. Curran (2010). *More than Fighting for Peace? An examination of the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers*, University of Bradford PhD.

### 4.3. Linking peacekeeping with peacebuilding in fourth-generation missions

Once peace agreements have been established, often with the support of peacekeeping missions, it soon became apparent that sustaining the peace in the medium to long term was at least as difficult as securing the initial agreement. With this realisation, the focus of concern in the field became very much centred on the dynamics and process of post-conflict peacebuilding and the term peacebuilding began to assume a central place in the discourses of conflict resolution and peace research. The emergence and evolution of the term peacebuilding illustrates the complex dynamism of the conflict resolution field in general. Over the past twenty years, there has been a proliferation of the literature on peacebuilding, dominating the concerns of theorists and practitioners in the first decade of the 21st century in the way that the concern with conflict prevention dominated in the 1990s.
The term peacebuilding was used by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in the 1990s to define the developmental phase of post-conflict reconstruction that should follow peacekeeping. When, in his *Agenda for Peace* of 1992, Boutros Ghali provided a definition of the role of peacebuilding in the UN as the medium to long term process of rebuilding war-affected communities, it took another ten years before this policy commitment to peacebuilding was institutionally consolidated. The failure of the UN system to implement the prescriptions of the *Agenda for Peace*, especially in the most challenging tests faced in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, led to a series of investigations and proposals for reform that would eventually result in proposals to institutionalise peacebuilding in the UN system. Two influential reports in December 2004 (the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change) and in March 2005 (Kofi Annan’s *In Larger Freedom*) called for the formation of a dedicated body to advance peacebuilding. The political will to strengthen post-conflict peacebuilding capacity also gained momentum from increasing recognition of the statistical reality of the proneness of peace processes to collapse.

The research by Paul Collier and his colleagues into the economic causes of civil wars established that there is a 39% risk that a peace will collapse within the first five years and a 32% risk that it will collapse in the next five years.

The World Summit held in the UN Headquarters in New York in September 2005 agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an intergovernmental advisory body within the UN system, a decision formalised in the UN General Assembly’s Outcome Document of September 2005. The decision was implemented under a joint UN General Assembly and Security Council resolution (A/Res/60/180 and S/RES/1645 (2005)) on 20th December 2005. The PBC was mandated to operate strategically in three areas: first, to advise on integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; second, to marshal finance for early recovery and sustained resources in the medium and long term; and third, to develop peacebuilding best practices in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors. The PBC is composed of a 31-member Organisational Committee, assisted by a Peacebuilding Support Office, based in the UN Secretariat in New York, and a Peacebuilding Fund. The Commission began to operate from October 2006 by evaluating peacebuilding needs in Sierra Leone and Burundi and, by late 2009, the Commission had also had active projects supporting peace processes in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Kenya, Comoros Islands, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Timor Leste and Nepal. Despite the challenging mandate of the PBC, the allocated budget for peacebuilding was relatively low, with a target allocation of $165 million in over 100 projects in twelve countries. In late 2009, the bulk of this was spent on the two initial priority countries, Sierra Leone ($35 million) and Burundi ($35 million).
Although the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission is undoubtedly a major move forward in resolving armed conflict and in linking peacekeeping with peacebuilding (as called for in the Brahimi Report noted in unit 3), there is a lively debate in the academic literature about what kind of peace is being built. Different commentators take different positions on this. For example: for Roger MacGinty, peace in the mainstream policy of international organisations can be reduced to a functional and technocratic exercise of 'ticking boxes, counting heads and weapons, amending constitutions, and reconstructing housing units...' (Mac Ginty, 2006, pp. 3-4). Used in this sense, what is being constructed is not peace, but a liberal peace led by hegemonic powers, who may be more concerned with stabilising a world order dominated by the rich and powerful than with addressing the root causes of conflict and enable the liberating transformation out of violence. For Oliver Richmond, peacebuilding should not be an imposition from above, led by UN institutions, but it should have legitimacy and acceptance amongst the communities in which the peace is being built.

John Heathershaw has suggested that it is better to talk about 'peacebuildings' rather than 'peacebuilding'. He suggested that there are at least three variants of peacebuilding,

- a conservative order-stability based variant equated with the state-building end of the peacebuilding spectrum aimed at integrating states in conflict into a Western dominated political and economic system;

- an orthodox liberal peacebuilding model equated with pluralism and democratic reform (democratic peacebuilding); and

- a justice-emancipatory variant equated with a civil society dominated mode of peacebuilding.

The third variant is based on efforts and processes that try to represent a people-centred approach to peacebuilding, in ways that enable any approaches based on variants I and II (the dominant approaches) to be opened up to the needs of people in communities. These dynamics are illustrated in the following case study of Sierra Leone.

4.3.1. Case study: Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

One of the strategic objectives of the UN PBC is to assist in the coordination and development of international efforts to manage the transition from the security roles of UN peacekeeping forces to supporting indigenous efforts for post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The conflict in Sierra Leone presented the PBC with one of its first tests in fulfilling this objective. The civil war in Sierra Leone started in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front led by a former army corporal, Foday Sankoh, launched an insurrection against the government of president Momoh. Years of violent conflict marked by...
high civilian casualties and atrocities, and a series of failed peace initiatives, followed. In July 1999 a peace agreement was finally brokered in Lome, the capital of Togo. The following year, a UN peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, was deployed to replace an earlier Nigerian led regional peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). The UNAMSIL mission was crucial in supporting the Lome Peace Agreement and ending the war in 2002, after which UNAMSIL created a more secure environment in Sierra Leone with the demobilisation of 45,000 former combatants by early 2002. The peacekeeping phase of the conflict resolution process in Sierra Leone was marked by notable achievements in the form of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme and a strong emphasis on security sector reform.

From peacekeeping to peacebuilding

The international contribution to facilitating peacebuilding in Sierra Leone is primarily embodied in the UN's mechanisms: the Peacebuilding Commission (and its subsidiary bodies) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, UNIOSIL. UNIOSIL was created under UNSCR 1620, which mandated the office to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a number of peacebuilding measures, including

"building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS".


The resolution also covered human rights, assisting elections, good governance, rule of law, security sector reform, 'promoting a culture of peace, dialogue and participation in critical national issues' through public information campaigns and developing initiatives to promote the well-being of young people, women and children.

The UN’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) recognised deep structural problems obstructing the development of Sierra Leone. The UNDP Human Development index has placed Sierra Leone 172nd out of 173 countries in terms of its development. Life expectancy is 41.0 years (170th out of 177 countries) and there is a 47% probability of not surviving past the age of 40; literacy rates are low, 65% of the population (over 15 years) being illiterate and the country is 134th out of 136 in the level of gender disparity.

The Peacebuilding Commission identified four key areas in which sustained peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was facing serious difficulties, namely:

- youth unemployment and disempowerment,
- justice and security sector reform,
- democracy consolidation and good governance, and
• capacity-building.

The PBC had a relatively slow start in carrying out the duties entrusted to it in Sierra Leone. With 31 members, the commission is large and perhaps unsurprisingly has also spent a good deal of time attempting to define its exact role. Biersteker observes that the resolutions that created the PBC contain ambiguities over key issues:

"There is no definition of peacebuilding itself and, although the resolutions recognise the important role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organisations, they never specify how these actors will be engaged."


The role of women and the development of a gendered peacebuilding model and strategy are particularly pertinent for Sierra Leone. Molloy has shown how women in Sierra Leone, where they represent over 50 per cent of the population, were not only victims of some of the worst abuses and atrocities of the conflict, but were also a moderating force on the violence and strong advocates for the peace process. Yet women gained little benefit from the Lomé Accord, which settled the conflict. Molloy suggests that the accord was designed—as are most peace agreements—with an eye to balancing the interests of the politically powerful, including potential spoilers, but, despite the commitment implied by SCR 1325 of October 2000 to gendered peace processes, with very little attention to the needs of women in the post-conflict environment. Only 7 per cent of the ex-combatants who were reintegrated through DDR programmes were female and there are strong indications that women will benefit least from programmes associated with the peace process. Similarly, he points out that there was not one Sierra Leonean woman among the twelve signatories to the Lomé Accord, so that

"those who represented the major victim group were not afforded the opportunity to record their consent, or otherwise, to an internationally brokered Accord that was to have dramatic impact on their lives."


In addition, the country's hard-won peace has provided business opportunities for transnational extractive industries, which show scant attention to local people's human rights. Some of these companies, for example Koidu Holdings Limited, are closely connected to mercenary forces who played a determinant role during the civil war. Whilst some aspects of the international peacebuilding effort, such as the promotion of human rights and democratisation, contributed to the peaceful resolution of social disputes in post-conflict Sierra Leone, neoliberal economic policies still in vogue feed patrimonial networks, particularly in the vital extractive industries sector; thus reproducing structural inequalities that were root causes of the civil war.
With this kind of analysis emerging from the early stages of post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, it seems that meeting the challenge of establishing transformative agendas that address power asymmetries, including those of gender, in post-conflict peacebuilding remains a vision in academic theory rather than a reality on the ground. In the absence of an informed debate on the meaning and politics of post-conflict peacebuilding, discussion in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has taken a more technical approach, with the creation of further committees and working groups to elaborate on provisional rules of procedure. This does raise questions over the commission's strategic effectiveness, especially when such discussions (and lack of real-time commitment by donors and member states) have a limited impact on the ground. In order for the peacebuilding mechanisms of the UN to work effectively, there needs to be a coherent strategy in place that incorporates all aspects of the peacebuilding process. Within a conflict resolution perspective, it is essential that the development of immediate post-conflict needs is coordinated with the longer-term strategies and the removal of structures that fostered the conflict in the first place. It remains to be seen whether this coordination and perspective will emerge in Sierra Leone. As of 2010, Sierra Leone remains classified by the Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Group of the World Bank as a fragile and conflict affected state, along with 36 other states or territories that score below 3.2 on its Country and Institutional Capacity (CPIA) measure, although some progress in post-conflict peacebuilding may be inferred from the fact that it is ranked not with the 'core' fragile state group (scoring 3.0 or below on the CPIA measure and including Afghanistan, Angola, Central African Republic and Comoros) but as a 'marginal' fragile state (scoring between 3 and 3.2, and including Burundi, Gambia, Kosovo and Nepal).

While it may be claimed that peacekeeping as a primary intervention tool for achieving stabilisation and security in areas of conflict is beginning to record some measure of success, as was shown in the deployment of UNAMSIL, the positive peace strategy associated with post-conflict peacebuilding is still very much in its infancy. This is perhaps not surprising, given the relatively recent institutionalisation of capacity and policy. Nevertheless, Sierra Leone has benefitted from peacebuilding support through two state and peacebuilding funded programmes of the World Bank, one on promoting school based peacebuilding programmes and another on a Youth Crisis Consultative Process. As has been noted, along with Burundi, it has also been a major recipient of UN PBC support in the form of $ 35 million for 22 projects since 2007 supporting work in the areas of youth employment and empowerment, democracy and good governance, justice and security, and capacity building in public administration. While these projects may not have transformed Sierra Leone into a haven of peace, its development from the situation in 1999 when its capital was being ransacked and its civilians terrorised by out-of-control militias is remarkable.
4.4. Culture, conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations

The analysis of culture in peacekeeping missions 1956-2000

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping relied on a handful of member states to provide the majority of the personnel and equipment required to execute a mission. In 1988, only 26 countries were involved in peacekeeping. However, by November 1994, there were 76 troop-contributing countries – with 49 new peacekeepers; as of December 1997, more than 80 countries had participated in a UN peacekeeping mission. By early 2010, there were nearly 100,000 peacekeepers from 115 countries from Albania to Zimbabwe.

There is a multiplicity of inevitable inefficiencies in the strategic and operational conduct of any multinational peacekeeping operation. Many of these inefficiencies can be viewed from a cultural perspective. That is, they arise from occasional variances in the objectives of troop-contributing states (which affect, amongst other things, the chain of command), the diverse mix of military capability, national differences in staff procedures, standards and equipment, language difficulties, and cultural custom and ethos.

As Duffey has shown, the reality of contemporary peacekeeping requires culture to be considered as it influences the interactions between:

1) the national contingents that comprise a peacekeeping force;

2) the military and civilian organisations involved in establishing and sustaining the mission; and

3) the peacekeepers (military and civilian) and the local population.

Moreover, serious attention must be given to the cultural applicability of the conflict resolution processes employed by the mission and its participants.

4.5. Culture and peacekeeping. Case study: Somalia

Lessons learned from UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia in the 1990s clearly illustrate how lack of cultural awareness may obstruct the potential effectiveness of peacekeeping intervention at both the interaction and process levels. Cultural obstacles may be reduced through improved training and preparation of policy-makers, humanitarian aid personnel and peacekeepers, and by the development of more culturally sensitive peacekeeping policy and practice.

The three multinational forces deployed in Somalia in the 1990s were composed of up to 37,000 military personnel from over 30 countries. One of the problems observed was the difference in military culture of the contingents and their interpretation and execution of orders, particularly regarding the use of force. For example, during the disarmament of the...
Somali militias, US forces tried to force the militias into cooperation by using offensive peace enforcement techniques (helicopter bombings). In contrast, other units (such as the Europeans or Australians) based their strategy on dialogue, mediation and the fostering of local support.

There was also considerable misunderstanding of traditional conflict resolution techniques in Somali society. Conflicts between tribal clans are regulated by a neutral court or arbitration panel (guurb), or by the intervention of tribal elders who act as mediators (ergo). Within clans, open councils (shirs) are forums for conflict resolution, often held under the shade of a tree; if the disputes cannot be resolved, the council takes drastic measures, such as the expulsion of the members of the group. Shir Nabadeeds are large peace councils held to foster inter-clan conciliation. Shirs are characterised by their long, open negotiations and use of poetry. Although women are excluded from the councils, they also play a role in peacemaking because inter-clan weddings are common practice and wives usually act as intermediaries. In the case of international intervention in Somalia, the UN's insistence on one clan adopting the country's presidency was based on a misguided idea of the clan system and the decentralised nature of traditional public institutions in Somalia. Instead of promoting a balance between clans and the traditional distribution of powers, UNSOM focused all its efforts on trying to reconcile the chief warlords (Aideed and Ali Mahdi). This strategy gave the Somali warlords the power and authority that they needed, despite not being legitimately theirs. The reconciliation negotiations and conferences focused primarily on the leaders whom the United Nations considered to be the most powerful at that time. Thus, the United Nations damaged the traditional balance of the Somali kinship system and failed to make use of the local resources.

However, while this case study provides an example of how cultural insensitivity or lack of information about cultural values has had a bad impact on UN peacekeeping performance, in the following section we discuss how culture can play a much more positive role in UN peacekeeping by promoting the values of a global peace culture.

4.6. New roles for culture in cosmopolitan peacekeeping: root metaphors in fourth-generation peacekeeping

In a recent study, Rubinstein has summarised and integrated his research findings on culture and peacekeeping to suggest that culture has significance not only in relation to micro and middle level conceptualisation (how peacekeepers react with local populations, how missions are planned and authorised), but also at the macro-level (how the cultural context of peacekeeping influences legitimacy through political symbolism and ritual). Rubinstein has defined this as a deeper level of cultural analysis drawing on a root metaphor of a pacific world order embodied in the United Nations:
“In which the weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled peacefully. In short, the legitimacy of the United Nations rests in part on its supporting a cultural inversion: it creates a sociopolitical space in which actions that would be unacceptable or foolish for an ordinary state are considered normal and acceptable. Peacekeeping developed within the sway of this root metaphor”.


His call was that in developing future peacekeeping ‘we work with an understanding of culture as a dynamic meaning-producing system and durable cultural dispositions’. The remaining part of this section provides an analysis of how such a project can be developed with a reconstructed root metaphor appropriate for post Brahimi model of 21st century peacekeeping.

In order to develop this analysis, a model of cosmopolitan (fourth-generation) peacekeeping, defined in the previous section of this unit, is proposed. This incorporates a root metaphor of a pacific world order culturally enriched by attachment to emergent UN cultures of peace norms. This new model adds a cultural space to peacekeeping, an additional dimension to the three conventional spaces in which peacekeeping has operated, namely: the security space (protection from violence), the humanitarian space (protecting humanitarian aid) and the political space (enabling the negotiations and political tasks that are necessary to settle the conflict and resolve it within a sustainable peace process). The argument is that the opening up of a fourth –cultural– space in the peacekeeping/peacebuilding continuum also provides new opportunities to promote symbolic, social and psychological dimensions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding that are not fully recognised in the security, humanitarian and political spaces of peacebuilding. Culture then provides the basis not only for a pacific root metaphor, in Rubinstein’s sense of the term, it also provides spaces for imaginative and creative activities that may help to build bridges and to foster understanding through forms of transcending public projects and activity (music, theatre, art and sport, for example).

The emergence of a global peace culture ideal

The United Nations defined a culture of peace as ‘a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes, to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations’. The empowering nature of peace culture as an overarching value of the UN system as a whole became increasingly recognised during the 1990s. Over the period 2000-2010, the International Decade for a Culture of Peace, initiated by UNESCO, has resulted in a wide variety of initiatives to achieve the goals of the programme of action. Various publications have appeared reviewing progress in meeting the objectives of the programme of action and, at the mid-point of the decade in 2005, a World Civil Society Report on the Culture of Peace was published, followed in 2006 by a Youth for a Culture of Peace Report. Seven hundred organisations worldwide reported on activities related to the IDCP objectives,
and a Foundation for the Culture of Peace/Fundacion Cultura de Paz runs two websites\(^1\), one in Spain and another in the USA, that provide information and progress on continuing activities. The main impact of the commitment to a global peace culture by UNESCO was twofold; first, to emphasise the value of peace as a positive experience and value in everyday life, not only as a negative definition of the absence of violence; and second, to accelerate and promote interest in the cultural dimensions of peacebuilding generally. The question now is to examine the connection between the norms of global peace culture as declared in the UN and UNESCO declarations, and the programmes and mandates of UN peacekeeping.

4.7. Case study: The role of sport as a cultural activity in peacekeeping and peacebuilding

For peacekeeping specifically, a potential connection between popular culture and peace can be suggested through the use of sport as a peacemaking activity. Sport and peace, or sport and conflict resolution, are not normally associated as related activities in the popular imagination. On the contrary, sport is a competitive process played with controlled aggression and motivated by a desire to win. However, it is also capable of mobilising passion, participation and, often, incredible levels of human achievement, both physically and mentally. It is suggested here that the potential of sport in general to contribute to the culture of peace and the practice of conflict resolution is greater than has been realised by those who see conflict resolution solely as an exclusive concern of politics. While sport of itself is not a primary vehicle for peacemaking, there are many examples where different sports and sportspeople have explicitly worked in a conflict-resolving manner, and when sport has been seen as a bridge-building activity and an alternative to violence and destructive conflict.

Within the UN itself, sport is seen as being consistent with the objectives of the UN Charter: ‘from indigenous sport to global sporting events, sport has 'convening power'. Sport can contribute to economic and social development, improving health and personal growth in people of all ages –particularly those of young people. Sport-related activities can generate employment and economic activity at many levels. Sport can also help build a culture of peace and tolerance by bringing people together on common ground, crossing national and other boundaries to promote understanding and mutual respect. The right to participate in sport is enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) and the IOC has agreements with a range of UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, UNESCO) to use sport in support of refugees and others suffering in areas of conflict.

In 2006 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Office on Sport Development and Peace and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) formed a partnership to use sport in the peacemaking framework of UN
peacekeeping operations and chose three missions as locations for pilot Sport and Peace projects –namely, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire and UNMIL in Liberia. Some examples of these pilot projects will suffice to indicate how sport has been used in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. In the MONUC mission, Peace Games were organised to support an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation around the elections of July and August 2006. In Liberia, UNMIL organised a Sport for Peace programme in March and April 2007. In Côte d'Ivoire, the UNOCI peacekeeping mission has promoted a very active sports-based peacebuilding programme since 2006, including during the 2006 football World Cup when it provided opportunities for viewing matches on wide screens throughout the country, during which peace messages and information about the mandate of the peacekeeping mission were delivered. UNOCI staff attempted also to

"sensitise the population on the purpose of sport for peace in countries in crisis or out of it; to encourage the population to get involved in crisis solving; and confirm the rallying role of sport".


4.8. Cultural activities as peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Beyond sport, taken here as an example from popular culture, there are many cultural programmes and art-based initiatives, often sponsored by international organisations, to promote recovery at grassroots level after conflict. The Japan Foundation has provided one of the few research programmes to date which has attempted to classify and locate the work of these projects within a broad spectrum of peacebuilding and conflict resolution activity, classified as preventive, in conflict, and post-conflict interventions. The following table summarises this work.

The role of cultural initiatives in the process of peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict prevention</th>
<th>Confidence building by mutual understanding, tolerance and trust building, awareness raising –through publishing picture books, concerts, library support, literacy classes, early childhood education, peace education.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In conflict</td>
<td>Support for cultural activities designed to assuage feelings of loneliness and hopelessness, giving hope, putting pressure on conflict parties, demonstrating inhumane aspects of the conflict region –through exhibitions, photography, plays and performances: use of sport as convening power, to promote messages of peace, to explain peacekeeping mandates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict first stage (humanitarian aid)</td>
<td>Culture as catalyst for care of trauma –through psychological and drama workshops, support for refugee and community sports, library and learning resource support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for reconciliation through cooperative drama workshop and performance, multi-ethnic orchestra and music, IT education, emotional aid through art therapy workshops, music therapy workshops, theatre workshops, confidence building for people coming out of conflict trauma through vocational training, restoration of cultural heritage sites, landmine avoidance education, activities to 'sense' peace, peace museums, peace prizes, peace education.


4.9. The gender perspective in peacekeeping

"In war torn societies... women often keep societies going. As a result, they are often the prime advocates of peace. We must ensure that women are enabled to play a full part in peace negotiations, peace process, and peace missions."


The gender perspective covers the roles, responsibilities, rules, expectations and stereotypes of the women and men who make up society. One gender perspective consists of analysing social relations between men and women in a given context, such as a specific cultural or historical context. Most members of peacekeeping operations are male, since it is mainly men who participate in the military contingents of the operations. Of the 17 active missions in 1993, only 1.7% of military personnel and less than 1% of the civilian police force were female. This is a slight improvement on 1957-1989 figures, when just 0.1% of military personnel on peacekeeping missions were women. At the end of the 1990s, the proportion of women increased slightly; for example, on the UNOSOM mission in Somalia, 4% of the military component was made up of women.

The proportion varies greatly according to the national contingent in question. The countries that contributed the most women to peacekeeping operations in 1998 were Poland, India, Bangladesh, Finland, Ghana, Austria, Ireland and Norway. In the latter country, women are allowed full and unlimited participation in military activities. Finland and Ghana have similar policies. For example, Ghana sent a mixed infantry unit to Rwanda. The participation of women in police forces, civil administration and human rights is low. The UNMIBH civilian police force had just 3% of women and, in Kosovo at the end of 1999, UNMIK had 2%. The proportion of female administrative staff is much higher: 48% in UNMIK. However, this figure is much lower if we consider the workforce as a whole (24% in UNMIK). The human rights missions with the highest proportion of women were Guatemala and Haiti, with 39% and 37% respectively.
Gender perspective studies on the US peacekeeping forces in Somalia concluded that the men who took part in the operation adopted a 'warlike' attitude and were more likely to use force in their interaction with the local population. In contrast, women developed more humanitarian strategies and their relations with the local population were close and good. Other studies have highlighted the social degradation problems generated by the arrival of large contingent of male soldiers to areas (increased sexual violence against women, increase in prostitution etc).

However, the issue of gender sensitivity and the development of robust policies against sexual exploitation in and around peacekeeping missions has been vigorously pursued recently. A historically significant move in this process was the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 31st October 2000, described by Kofi Annan as

"a landmark step in raising awareness of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, and of the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding".


Resolution 1325 called for fuller representation of women in peace negotiations and in the highest offices of the UN, and for the incorporation of gender perspectives in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and conflict-prevention activities. In relation to alarming evidence of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers on mission, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (The Prince Zeid Report²) was issued in March 2005 following allegations of widespread abuse and misbehaviour by peacekeeping troops, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the MONUC mission.

The following table lists the main steps by which gender awareness and the role of women has been progressively recognised and supported.

### The evolution of UN policy on women's roles and gender sensitivity in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1948</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution 217A) recognised the equal rights of men and women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1966</td>
<td>Resolution 2200A on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict recognised that women suffered as civilians in armed conflict. Member states should make all efforts to spare women from the ravages of war and ensure they are not deprived from shelter, food and medical aid (Articles 4 &amp; 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1975</td>
<td>First UN World Conference on Women, leading to the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and World Peace. Recognised the multiple roles as peacemakers played by women at the level of the family, community, and at national and international levels. Called for fuller representation of women in international fora concerned with peace and security. The declaration had the status of a recommendation and was not binding on states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Global Network of Women Peacebuilders: http://www.gnwp.org

²See the Security Council Report webpage for this report and a list of UN Security Resolution reports on and policy against sexual violence and exploitation.
### December 1979
General Assembly Resolution 34/180 on the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW), recognising that global peace and the welfare was linked to the equal participation of women in all areas.

### July 1985
Nairobi Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. Produced the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, a collective plan of action for women and their advocates.

### November 1989
UN Secretary-General reported to the Commission on the status of women to review the implementation of the Nairobi Strategies. Concluded that women remained victims of violence disproportionately and that they had not progressed significantly in decision-making roles since 1985.

### July 1993
The World Conference on Human Rights issued a *Programme of Action* to integrate women’s needs into human rights activities. The Programme identified a variety of forms of discrimination against women, including the rape of women in situations of armed conflict.

### September 1995
Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, held during the 50th anniversary of the formation of the UN, issued the *Beijing Declaration*, which identified six strategic objectives related to promoting the role of women in peacemaking, including commitments to increase women’s participation in decision making, to reduce military expenditures, to promote non-violent conflict resolution and the contribution of women to fostering a culture of peace.

### 2000
Women in the Balkans and Rwanda claim that systematic rape is a form of genocide. Influenced by the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* recognised these issues for the first time as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The *Rome Statute* also demanded the equal participation of female judges in trials and on gender-sensitive processes in the conduct of trials.

### August 2000
The UN conducts a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations under the direction of Lakhdar Brahimi. The *Brahimi Report* produced a wide range of recommendations for the reform of peacekeeping, which, although it did make some proposals to increase the role of women in leadership positions in peacekeeping operations, did not fully recognise the significance of gender perspectives.

### June 2008
UNSCR 1820, 2009 (September) UNSCR 1888, 2009 (October) UNSCR 1889: all three resolutions strengthened calls to take effective action against sexual violence in armed conflicts and in post-conflict situations and to support the inter-agency initiative United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict.

### February 2010
Margot Wallstrom appointed as first SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

Source: adapted from Global Network of Women Peacebuilders: http://www.gnwp.org

Although it has been slow, but with the growth of legal and institutional measures and policies listed above, it is now the case that significant progress has been made in the evolution of gender-aware and gender-sensitive peacekeeping. The percentage of women employed as civilians in peacekeeping missions has now (late 2010 figure) reached 30%. The first all-women contingent to serve in a peacekeeping mission, a formed police unit from India, was deployed in Liberia in 2007. More recently, three more all-female UN police units have been deployed: Bangladeshi in Haiti, Samoan in Timor and Rwandans in Sudan. Significantly also, a woman has been appointed as a deputy force commander, and there were three serving SRSGs and three deputy SRSGs on UN peacekeeping missions in 2010.
Finally, recently developed data sets prove the importance of representing women’s interests in gender balanced and effective peacekeeping. Other analyses based on the GDI have indicated a correlation between high levels of gender inequality and proneness to armed conflict. ECP estimated that 77% of the countries listed in their active armed conflict data for 2008 were also characterised by serious levels of gender inequality and alarming levels of sexual violence against women and children were reported in these conflicts (ECP, 2009:147-149). More positively, data is also being collected systematically on the roles and impact of women in peacebuilding. Gizelis has shown a positive link between gender empowerment and successful UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, a finding supported by Caprioli et al., who, in a survey of peace agreements that had positive provision for the involvement of women in post-conflict reconstruction, found that peace was much more likely to be sustained where this was the case, while the likelihood of conflict recurring was high in cases where there was no recognition of women’s roles in the peace agreement.
Bibliography

Compulsory Reading


– Chapter 6, "Containing Violent Conflict: Peacekeeping", p. 94-122.
– Chapter 9, "Peacebuilding", p. 226-245.

The journal International Peacekeeping is the best single source for all aspects of peacekeeping and it has been published as a quarterly journal since 1994. All articles in the journal are available to you via the UOC Library. Also note that all the best current data on United Nations Peacekeeping is available at the UN Department of Peacekeeping at UN website in English or in Spanish.

References to some of the key articles and special editions from International Peacekeeping that cover the content of this course follow:

International Peacekeeping,


Also, the following articles:


The following sources were used for and are referenced in the Study Guide:


