Abstract
The apprehension (cognition and consumption) of vocalizations—speech, performance, recording—is naturalized, so as to appear as a commonplace phenomenon, unproblematic, uncritical and familiar. The artifactual nature of the attachment of voice to a body, whether represented/reproduced or present is rendered invisible, and, with the disappearance of a technical trace, a world vanishes. As Gilles Deleuze notes, when primary and secondary are indistinguishable—or unnoticed, as when the recognition of a voice on a telephone appears as a presence rather than a representation, or when such distinction doesn’t matter—everything collapses to a plane of immanence, where substantive difference disappears. That is to say, a mediated and an unmediated voice are virtually the same; what appears on a screen, and what had appeared before the screen are phenomenologically indifferent. To address and analyse the attachments of voice does not dismiss their immanence, but reproblematizes their contingencies, through a re/cognition of artifactuality in difference, as a medial condition of our contemporaneity.

Keywords
alterity, apparatus, artifact, artifactual, attachment, Being, beings, capture, enunciation, gestell, mass [massenweise, Grösse], performative, phantasm, phantasmatic, proper, improper, somatolysis, subject, subjectivation, desubjectivation, technics, technical reproducibility, trace, typewriter, ventriloquism, voice
I would insist not only on the artificial synthesis (synthetic image, synthetic voice, all the prosthetic supplements that can take the place of real actuality), but above all on a concept of virtuality (virtual image, virtual space, and so virtual event) that can doubtless no longer be opposed, in perfect philosophical serenity, to actual [actuelle] reality in a way that philosophers used to distinguish between power and act, dynamis and energeia, the potentiality of a material and the defining form of a telos, and therefore also of a progress...

Jacques Derrida

At the very beginning of a book, which is not quite a book, Jacques Derrida writes/has written, about speaking, about having spoken, with Bernard Stiegler, in a series of filmed interviews conducted in 1993 at the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA). The redacted transcription of these utterances was published in 1996 by INA and Éditions Galilée under the title Échographies de la télévision: Entretiens Filmés, and an English translation appeared in 2002 through Polity Press. These filmed interviews were an exercise, an experiment, an exemplary and cautionary performative activity, improvised before a technical ensemble —camera, microphone, recording and transmission tele-technologies—to take up a series of questions concerning the effects of such technologies on our contemporary philosophical and political ‘moment.’ In their confrontation with the very techics that they address, Stiegler and Derrida not only trace, but perform, the breach in the natural conditions of address, expression, discussion, and reflection that is occasioned by such media. What happens when one speaks, as a philosopher, an artist, or as a politician, into a microphone—when that device is linked to conditions and infrastructures of “live” recording and transmission? What happens (what has happened) when one’s words, in the very moment of their utterance, are swept away, to ‘appear’ elsewhere, indeed, in many different places, occurring in a plural and distributed immanence, to be set into play, to take up varied ‘tasks’ in multiple, distinct, and even contradictory instances, while at the same time exercising a claim to a familiar embodiment, a subjectivity, responsibility and even culpability, which masks and naturalizes this disposition, covering over or distracting the consideration that this (re)attachment may no longer be possible.

One can’t help but be reminded of Walter Benjamin’s careful and anxious examination of certain aspects of technical reproducibility in relation to Derrida’s and Stiegler’s unusual ennunciative infrastructures. An utterance, precisely coextensive with its reproduction, has what Benjamin might have called a mass-like, or massive [massenweise, Grösse] disposition (Benjamin, 1980); for Benjamin, the formation of such ‘masses’ entails, as one of their distinguishing characteristics, a certain amorphousness, a dispersion which, at the same time, appears before (and within) a recording apparatus that recursively anchors the image as substantive. Whether it operates as an allegory of representation (as is commonplace within the political/public sphere) or exercises a claim to an ‘identity’ via the tracery of shadows and resonance holding place for an absent speaker, these medial processes reproduce and admit the artifactual attachments and...
inscriptions of corporeal elements (speech, gesture, presence) and incorporeal, even abstract, elements (intention, culpability, response) to a mass-like and material register of iterations through recorded and reproduced traces.

Speaking as a philosopher or as a politician or an artist, as one whose words have disappeared in the very moment of their production, into a reproduction that occurs elsewhere, ‘appearing’ and ‘becoming audible’ in many places and times, and with many effects, and even to re-appear, one is nonetheless held responsible for what has been ‘said’ even if it has become impossible to determine a location, or an addressee, or determine an intention commensurate with the disparate range of effects. Benjamin’s fascination with the cinematic involves a recognition of this very process: the recording, or reproductive inscription—aufnehmen, ‘capture’ or apprehension—where techniques of reproduction set up, or set into motion, an ‘apparatus’ (a camera, or instrument of inscription or reinscription, which may be photographic, phonographic, cinematic, digital) which takes up this strange residence in place of living subjects. Such a technical apparatus ‘takes up’ the ‘given,’ apprehending and arresting what seems to have been a spontaneous and intrinsic movement, in order to submit it to a series of operations that have nothing to do with its nature or inclination. At the same time, it opens a way for those elements to be dislocated and relocated, displaced, fragmented, and recombined into ensembles that have little to do with their initial state (even if such reinscriptions and reinvestments are for the most part indistinguishable). Finally, the finished reproduction is placed into circulation, accompanied by the semblance of what has been radically undermined, the technical apparatus imparting an aura of individuality to a (re)production that takes place in many places at once, in multiple heres, nows, and elsewhere, and which, in spite of the (re)attachment of evidentiary traces and impressions—images, voice, tone, text—cannot retain any original occurrence or actuality, or even exercise an unproblematic indexical claim to that origin.

Derrida has insisted on a set of portmanteau terms, provisional names, or ‘nicknames,’ for the traits that he says make “actuality in general,” neologisms that are nevertheless a bit ad hoc, and so are both improbable, and inegalite. But, like many neologisms, their very discomfort also marks the place of something that has hitherto remained invisible and insolent as such. The first of these traits, which Derrida names artifactuality, is...

...that actuality is, precisely, made [faite]: in order to know what it's made of, one needs nonetheless to know that it is made. It is not given but actively produced, sited, invested, performatively interpreted by numerous apparatuses which are factitious or artificial, heirarchizing and selective, always in the service of forces and interests to which “subjects” and agents (producers and consumers of actuality—sometimes they are “philosophers” and always interpreters, too) are never sensitive enough. No matter how singular, irreducible, stubborn, distressing or tragic the “reality” to which it refers, “actuality” comes to us by way of a fictional fashioning. ...We ought never to forget the full import of this index: when a journalist or politician seems to be speaking to us, in our homes, while looking us straight in the eye, he (or she) is in the process of reading, on screen, at the dictation of a “prompter,” a text composed somewhere else, at some other time, sometimes by others, or even a whole network of anonymous authors.

There are other examples, instances that are more straightforward, even if they are almost unnoticeable, and also increasingly common, examples that need not be phrased in formal, philosophical terms in order to become clear. One might have observed, for example: a group of seven or eight girls, aged 11 or 12 years, walking home from school, laughing and squealing and talking loudly, as students of that age do. On closer observation, what was remarkable was that each of the girls had a cell phone, and each was having a conversation, and not one of those conversations was with someone who was present in the group, but was with someone who was elsewhere and absent. What is brought to light here, in a manner both modest and subtle, are certain processes of subjectivation and desubjectivation that take place within such configurations. What sorts of subjectivities come into being here, persist or disappear? What tacit governance is exercised through the organized ensemble of technologies—telephone, interface, infrastructure, transmission, reception, habit, response—and what is the (after) affect of that governmentality on bodies, voices, dispositions and intentions?

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In an essay that is perhaps read too often, and often too quickly, Walter Benjamin marks the distinction between the optical disposition of the camera and human perception, noting the camera’s intervention into the human visual arena, via the substitution of a nonconscious instrumentality in the place of our own regard—that is, at a remove, in a prosthetic deferral that institutes a constant aporia in perception via certain intercessionary technologies—photography, cinema, digital media—that has become as difficult to discern as it is to avoid. For all of its increasing sophistication, the camera remains, in one sense, an instrument of citation, a “writing in/of movement and light” that secures only the most minute trace of movement as it flashes by (aufblitzendes). Still, when we see what the camera has recorded, it nonetheless engages a reflex, one that is within us, a part of our phylogenetic heritage, one that perceives movement, and even reflection, as substance, and which compels us to seek recognition in/for/as response to an other, apprehended as having appeared either within the frame of the image or operating at its presumed point of origin. Facial recognition is one of our earliest unconscious accomplishments; we secure it in our infancy; the camera intervenes in that, almost invisibly, to present a technically reproducible shadow, an apparition of presence, one that operates at the same time as an
index of loss. For Benjamin, it is through the instrumentality of the camera that “an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored” where the naturalisation of prosthetic perception via the camera “introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses”, —that is, from the exterior, outside the image or scene, and yet with a compulsion to repetition and the promise of recuperation. There is what one might call an uncanny doubling of the camera’s unconscious optics with our own impulses, a technicophilosophical sleight of hand that purports to secure the whole of the real through the mere promise of its possible access.8 Cinematic-medial perception is folded back into our own experience, an artificial memory—audial and visual— which, naturalized and subsumed, holds forth its proleptic promise of recall, even as it circumscribes a doubled site of loss.

In general people’s appearance does not show that they are anything, even less what they are.

Sigmund Freud9

Even if one has a general knowledge of the way people walk, one knows nothing of a person’s posture during the fractional second of a stride.

Walter Benjamin10

What we thought were sensations have become ghosts, transfixed in a flash, mere afterimages; there is a profoundly phantasmatic aspect in the naturalisations of media: we are haunted by images, voices, sounds and traces of an elsewhere that we have presumed and made our own, domesticated fragments that have compelled to enter into strange yet familiar relations, different economies of sense. Presence deferred to an impossible proximity, but not lost entirely. These patterns of deferred presences may be considered a species of allusion, and it is within the contingent spaces of allusion that a complex interplay of simulation and dissimulation occurs, through which we recognize, engage with, and consume sounds, words, and images. Our presumption of the verisimilitude of recording devices—of their “objectivity” and tacit claim to the truth of human presence—is related to this allusive disposition, and persists as an index to the reproductive apparatus and the exercise of its claims to origins.

The history of our apprehension of the material basis of photographic artifacts as depicting an image of something has secured for the photograph—and for subsequent post-photographic media—a powerful, if problematic, signifying presence. Perhaps there was a certain era in the reception of photography where such artifacts could be unproblematically introduced as, for example, the mark or impression of an occurrence or fact, evidence of culpability or innocence in a court of law, or convincing proof of events or phenomena; today no such claim to evidentiary verisimilitude can be presumed, as the consequences of an increasingly widespread recognition of the photographic surface, the visual, temporal, and audial field, as complex and hybrid constructs are rendered pressingly salient in our digital milieu, tracing the hitherto hidden contours of a constantly renegotiated and “generalized pedagogy of verisimilitude,” wherein our perceptual regard and consumption of images is shaped and constrained into a register of habits, and any altering or difference suffers either a rapid and voracious domestication, or a dismissal as erroneous or without use or value.11

“Machines for seeing modify perception,” as Paul Virilio notes,12 but they do so invisibly. Media is a complex intertwining of architecture and memory, image and echo, technology, perception, unconscious habit, and bodily disposition, a “lived technology” whose prosthetic perceptions are naturalised as our own, and whose aura of objectivity underwrites our investment in its phantasmatic registers. Inside the medial prosценium, we are linked to a specular machinery where habitual behaviour modifies, and is modified by, instruments that interactively construct experience, and our perception of the real is grounded in and by historically contingent technical substrates of unconscious memory—relations to specific forms of the specular and the phonologic—so that we respond as if the play of light and shadow, voice and tone, were the tracings of (human) presence. Everything collapses, secondary screen and primary trace, onto a plane of immanence.13 There is, at a deep level, the integration of our own subject-position into these reproducing apparatuses, as if their “perceptions” were our own, and while we may recognize, for example, the simultaneous portrayal of an actor and the character played, it is as if they, too, once having been so, are still present. This is also the case with the imagined presence of the operator of a camera or recording device, and holds true even when that presence is only potential, as in the case of automatic surveillance systems, sampling, or predictive systems. The body’s engagement with other (imagined) bodies persists as a common and inextricable component of the medial apparatus, and our familiar everyday perceptions are linked to a history of its artifacts, memories, and behaviours in diverse, complex, ways—so much so that even our recognition of their artifice is a culturally mediated form, a naturalization of the phantasmatic nature of such intercessionary technologies, one which renders them invisible.

There is a great deal about media that is invisible, that depends upon the invisible, that remains invisible; and the sense that we have of the boundaries, contours, ends, or completeness of medial artifacts is also an interactive social (and unconscious) construct. Media does not resist desire but accommodates it, and there are certain irreducible attributes of the artfactuality—permeability, repetition, variability, plurality—that are repressed in that accommodation in order to stabilise the constant consumption of images, whether public, private, intimate, or dangerous.

In the utterance, discourse fails as realized structure; in the enunciation, it is always infinite, unfinished.

—Luce Irigaray14
As is the case in language, the subject (of media) is never a given substantive, but is actively constructed within a field of relations, which are both constant and incomplete(able). In terms of the possibility of potential relations, the subject-positions engendered in cinema, are similarly incomplete. In our attendance to the cinema, we, as subjects, do not really carry out an action, contemplate a spectacle, or articulate a discourse; we are included within the spectacle, within discourse. So, too, we do not designate an act of enunciation, but operate in the place of enunciation itself. This is the site of the phantasm. Whether of the nature of delirium or dream, hallucination, misprision or artifice, we—who are always marked by anterior and exterior discourses—are not substantialised within this frame, but situated in a system of relations that constrain the realization of discourse, as an unstable signification, to the most irreducible sort of phantasm. For all of our strain, it is still “only a movie,” no matter how seriously we might believe, act, or receive the impress of its affects.

The trace of ourselves as speaking subjects within the cinematic enunciative apparatus is therefore negative, an act of inverse ventriliquism, something acted upon us, even as a subvocalisation, or a scare is induced. Recognition of the productive subject-positions within cinema occur then as a reflection, exterior to one’s investment in the illusory, excised or cut off from the relations engendered by parasitic speech, less a subject of, than to, mediation. This is also the case in game spaces utilizing configurations of the first-person shooter, avatars, multiplayer interactivity, and simulation.

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Do bodies even take place? What takes place? Perhaps nothing. No bodies touch. Take a look at Second Life, that free 3D virtual world where users can socialize, connect and create using free voice and text chat… If you were logged into Second Life and looking at the scene through your own avatar eyes, you would read the avatar movements as odd, nothing like human motion.

—Sandy Baldwin

The subject of the avatar is absent; bodies, movements, enunciations are empty, operations directed by codes and protocols. Avatars are not embodied subjectivities, metaphors, masks, or ventriloquies, but something much stranger, even if they are at the same time rather familiar. A phantasmatic figuration, nothing but somatolyysis, a figure (of) dissolution, or bodily dismemberment (or even body as bodily dismemberment) and refers here to the sort of obliterate camouflage that does not hide but dazzles and disrupts the field of vision, occluding and holding place, even as we are introduced, inscribed, into a continuum moving rapidly from alterity to familiarity, sutured within a medial disposition which admits the separation, attachment and reattachments of voice, utterance, sound, and the tactile and motile somatographies and images by which we [re]cognize even ourselves. An obliterate camouflage which takes place in the very site which it has excised, taking place as that which is both present and absent: an image; a voice.

Adorno observes that our capacity to sympathize, or empathize with animated figures, cartoon characters (the Capitalist art form par excellence), is both ubiquitous and bizarre; it is like having sympathy/empathy for a toaster or lawnmower. Cartoons are artifacts, having more in common with technical appliances than with the living beings, figures, characters, subjects, personalities they purport to represent. They are not traces or citations, shadows captured as impressions of events, but true phantasms—material and projective phenomena that present themselves to the senses as, in a certain sense, real, even as they constitute a composite, hybrid, technical being, a semblance of the site of a body. And here they are: ‘impossible bodies’ in every sense, no less impossible perhaps, than the voices in telephony, digital signals, encryptions and descryptions that mimic the bodies to which they are attached, that articulate the register of the audible, the visible, the communicative and consumptive, as already artifactual, and situate ‘subjectivity’ as a merely technical supplement.

In his seminar of 1942–43, named _Parmenides_, Martin Heidegger16 writes of the ‘hand that writes’ as the confluence of word and body, an immediate and logographic relation that is, literally, the disposition of the human, inssofar as man does not simply embody the word, but is the word to the degree that he writes with his hand. When the hand withdraws from that immediacy into a technical register, to write via the intercessionary technical apparatus of the typewriter (and here we may cite any technical recording device) it creates a fissure or division, between the proper act of writing, and the improper. In its taking up residence within the technical register (gestell, frame) what is human suffers a division, not only between proper and improper, but is its very being: “In handwriting the relation of Being [des Seins] to man, namely the word, is inscribed [eingezzeichnet] in beings themselves.” Heidegger distinguishes between the hand that writes and the hand that types, and considers the latter as having emerged out of the hand through a withdrawal that is accomplished by its ‘mechanical imprinting.’ It is a withdrawal that also demarcates a split between what Heidegger calls ‘species’ and ‘mass,’ inssofar as the specific is the properly human, and the mass(es) (Grössen), which have been transformed by their engagement with technology only to be subject to objectification, instrumentalization, and a whole series of procedures that we might call by another term: biopolitical. Heidegger’s term for ‘mass’ (Größe) differs from the terminology employed by Walter Benjamin, though there are certain complicities. Massenweise (‘massive,’ or ‘mass-like’) is the word Benjamin uses to describe the plural and ubiquitous distribution in space and time of innumerable technical reproductions—‘copies’—in relation to a unique and singular ‘original.’ Consequently it also refers to the pluralized materialities of reception of such copies, and the standing for, or holding place, by those copies as a possible point of access in relation to a (possibly absent) original. But if we look closely at
this ‘possible point of access’ it appears, in Heidegger’s terms, as an ‘improper’ index, in that it does not partake of the originality of the original, but actually occludes it, stands in the way. This occlusion, which may even obviate the necessity for any originals at all, is akin to the technological ‘frame’ [gestell] that Heidegger defines as the condition of the contemporary world, and it’s complicit, and greatest, danger, a condition he names Bestellbarkeit, the propensity of an individual to displaced, replaced, misplaced — placed — at the will, or whim, of another. To be ‘subject’ to these procedures requires the impropriety of mass, to have been defined as inert and incapable of self-generation or movement, to be acted upon, as a tool or an instrument.17

It is not accidental that modern man writes “with” the typewriter and “dictates” [Dichten] “into” a machine. This “history” of the kinds of writing is one of the main reasons for the increasing destruction of the word. The latter no longer comes and goes by means of the writing hand, the properly acting hand, but by means of the mechanical forces it releases. The typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand, i.e., the realm of the word. The word itself turns into something “typed.” Where typewriting, on the contrary, is only a transcription and serves to preserve the writing, or turns into print something already written, there it has a proper, though limited significance . . . . Mechanical writing deprives the hand of its rank in the realm of the written word and degrades the word to a means of communication. In addition, mechanical writing provides “this advantage,” that it conceals the handwriting and thereby the character. The typewriter makes everyone look the same.

—Martin Heidegger

In the center of the image we find a typewriter.

—Edwin Carels19

Notes:


2. ibid.


10. ibid.


17. ibid.

18. ibid.

Thomas Zummer’s artworks have been exhibited worldwide, with a retrospective of his works at Pacific Northwest College of Art, Portland, in 2012. Zummer has taught at Brown; New York University; The New School; Transmedia, Brussels; Transart Institute, Linz, Austria; and the Tyler School of Art at Temple University. He is currently Faculty in Philosophy at the Europäische Universität für Interdisziplinäre Studien/European Graduate School (EUFIS/EGS), Saas-Fee, Switzerland; Associate Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Graphic/Information Design at Central Connecticut State University; and Professor in the Graduate Studies Division and Digital + Media Department at the Rhode Island School of Design. He is also a Doctoral Professor at Koninklijke Academie voor Schone Kunsten (KASK), Ghent, Belgium. Thomas Zummer holds a PhD in Philosophy and Media Studies and currently lives in Brooklyn, New York.