Reputational Feedback Systems and Consumer Rights: Improving the European Online Redress System

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Reputational Feedback Systems and Consumer Rights:
Improving the European Online Redress System

Abstract: The European Union Single market needs to tackle an outstanding issue to boost competitiveness and growth: a trust-based redress framework that ensures the effectiveness of consumers’ rights. The current disparities in terms of quality among dispute resolution mechanisms, added to the fact that in practice many do not guarantee effective solutions due to a number of reasons –namely, lack of traders participation or cost of legal enforcement- represent a serious obstacle to the effectiveness of consumers rights and also the reasons why many consumers refrain from making purchases beyond their countries’ borders. The recognition and integration of certain dispute avoidance tools drawn on reputation added to the regulation of some common enforcement mechanisms are key issues in the field of consumer protection. The goal of this paper is to offer some insights and ideas within the context of the European Union legislative proposals aimed at improving the current redress system.

JEL Classification: K12, K13, K15, K41, K41, K42.

Keywords: reputational feedback systems, consumer’s protection, dispute resolution, ADR, ODR, enforceability, e-commerce, European redress system small claims.

1. Introduction
In the field of ecommerce and consumers conflict resolution one outstanding challenge is to secure the effectiveness of consumers’ rights and the satisfaction of their needs in an increasingly globalised market. Internationally, this pressing issue has been tackled by the market itself, through the idea of trust in terms of reputation, concept that has a direct impact upon consumers’ purchasing intentions. The online market has recently experienced rapid growth in Europe thanks to the emergence of highly innovative and highly sophisticated tools in the electronic environment, whose ultimate goal is to build trust among users. They incorporate very heterogeneous digital mechanisms of qualification, recommendation or punctuation of goods or services, in addition to chargebacks and blockings of accounts in case of non-compliance of a trader. Electronic feedback, reputation and private execution systems are complementary ancillary tools that provide significant added value to webs and digital intermediary platforms as they play an essential role in creating the necessary trust and credibility. In turn, they empower consumers and enable them to decisively influence trader’s behaviour. They have become essential dispute avoidance tools.

The idea or belief that an individual person or legal entity will meet expectations in an economic transaction will depend, firstly, upon previously obtained personal knowledge and experience, references from other users in similar circumstances and in their absence, upon the possibility of having funds returned by the credit card company. Information on the professional rating of a supplier, good or service is a crucial aspect in today’s market: it confers transparency, something that, in turn, creates trust in the trader benefitting from it. This is why mechanisms based on referrals, ratings from members of a community or chargebacks have also been so warmly welcomed by the market and are regarded as a collective measure of trustworthiness.
Even so, disputes can arise and there is an inevitable clash of interests in a context in which trust has been affected. In such a scenario, conflict resolution schemes (ADR/ODR)\(^1\) may play a crucial role since resorting to the courts to resolve consumer issues is not always the most adequate forum for low-value issues.\(^2\) In addition to this, if the dispute resolution scheme chosen is non-adjudicative –namely, mediation, conciliation- some kind of mechanisms that guarantee the effectiveness of the outcomes are needed in case of non-compliance.

This paper will analyse some existing tools and mechanisms and will provide insights in order to overcome current concerns, aiming at improving the functioning and effectiveness of consumer protection.

2. Reputation feedback systems as dispute avoidance tools

A number of alternative ways to gain trust for traders and effective redress for consumers has emerged in the online market by means of innovative electronic tools, which allocate trust and improve voluntary compliance, avoiding the need for judicial enforcement mechanisms. Soft security mechanisms –namely reputation/feedback tools- use collaborative methods for assessing the behaviour of participants and making possible to identify who cares about satisfaction of users, to sanction those who breach the norms, and to recognise and reward those who adhere to the norms. The rationale behind this is that in the online and often cross-border environment these tools stimulate quality, provide incentives for good behaviour and integrity of sellers and purchasers.

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\(^1\) Which are anglo-saxon acronyms to identify the modalities of out-of-court dispute resolution (ADR) and online dispute resolution (ODR).

\(^2\) See P. Cortes “Conclusion” at The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Edited by Pablo Cortés, Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 454.
and avoid disputes because the consumer’s expectations are better managed by their enhanced information on the sellers.\(^3\) Transactions can seldom rely on judicial enforcement systems which are not suitable for resolving low-value disputes\(^4\) because courts are not sufficiently user-friendly and cost-effective.\(^5\) Instead, the digital market is increasingly developing tools that empower consumers with information about the reliability of traders.

A. Trust and online reputation. Trust is a term with a variety of meanings and, as academic commentators note, two main interpretations are to view trust as the perceived reliability of something or somebody, called “reliability trust”, and to view trust as a decision to enter into a situation of dependence, called “decision trust”.\(^6\) Gambetta adds that this is a particular belief predicated not on evidence but on the lack of conflicting evidence – a feature that makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction. In contrast, distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience. Once distrust has set in it soon becomes impossible to know if it was ever in fact justified\(^7\).

The concept of reputation, closely linked to that of trust, is the overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general.\(^8\) The first reputation systems to arise in the field of online B2C commerce were the trustmarks, alongside rating systems. The former are quality labels in the form of logos that companies display to demonstrate their compliance with certain quality standards in the carrying on of their business. The

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\(^6\) See A. Josang, op. cit. p. 3.

\(^7\) See D. Gambetta “Can We Trust Trust?” Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2000), 213-237.

\(^8\) A. Josang op. cit. at 12–13.
later provide the opinions of other users or consumers regarding their experience of the product or service sold over the Internet. The initial form in which they appeared – websites created by users themselves and open to anyone wishing to express their opinion – coexists alongside sophisticated rating tools included today on e-commerce intermediary platforms or on the traders’ websites, to allow users to express their degree of satisfaction, experiences, and to rate the product or service received. Designed to win a potential of user’s trust with regard to a product or service, these tools provide a powerful incentive for traders, keenly aware of the adverse impact that a negative review might label the trader as a ‘risky’ vendor. The creation of online reputations has thus become an almost unavoidable activity accompanying the marketing and sale of products and services. Businesses have seen that finding out users’ wishes, being sensitive to their behaviour patterns and needs, and meeting them, leads to success.9 Ratings, recommendations, referrals and collaborative filtering systems help to set marketing strategies and to improve sales margins.

Online traders are more concerned than their offline counterparts in securing the satisfaction of customers’ expectations and they often have to accept the adoption of generous redress measures to prevent negative reviews. The objective is to improve consumer trust and satisfaction levels and, consequently, their competitive position, which has a knock on effect in the number of future sales.

These reputation mechanisms operate as conventional incentives for better compliance that may work either separately or embedded into dispute resolution processes, thus avoiding users from the need of resorting to judicial enforcement. Their aim is to ensure self-compliance with contractual and settlement agreements, which

means that the parties will have no need to resort to the courts. Accordingly, the United Nations -through Working Group III of its Commission on International Trade Law- has carried out some work in collating and listing these tools into the so-called ‘private enforcement mechanisms’.¹⁰

B. Trustmarks. Also called trust seals, they are quality labels –namely stamps or logos– used by companies in their establishments and on their websites to demonstrate compliance with certain quality standards in the carrying on their business. The e-commerce is characterised by a high degree of informational asymmetry and a low level of personal interaction between consumers and traders. The seal issued by an independent, neutral third party certifies that the trader complies with certain conduct standards. Internet users that recognise the trust mark will identify the holder as a secure trader. Accordingly, a seal’s value will depend on how recognisable it is to users.

One potential problem arises from the fact that there are several trust marks operating in the market and each have different scope and focus parameters. While some are concerned with guaranteeing compliance with specific privacy policies, others focus on guaranteeing compliance with standards covering internal company processes, or securing that the technology employed is safe. And users are frequently unaware of these parameters and the actual reputation of each seal.

Traders’ commitment to participating in ODR procedures may be granted with a trust mark. Such trust mark is kept –or lost– based on the degree of compliance of the trader with the agreements, resolutions or recommendations issued from the ODR procedures arising from a dispute. To give just some illustrative examples, Norton

Secured,\textsuperscript{11} BBB Accredited,\textsuperscript{12} or TRUSTe\textsuperscript{13} are internationally-recognised trust marks for dispute management and resolution of disputes and show that the companies displaying them comply with certain codes of conduct and adhere to participate. In Europe, the Ecommerce Europe Trustmark\textsuperscript{14} incorporates a mediation process for disputes with EU companies and also a code of conduct by virtue of which companies have a duty to provide clear information on a number of subject matters.\textsuperscript{15} In Spain, Confianza Online,\textsuperscript{16} a not-for-profit association founded by Adigital, Autocontrol and Red.es, offers companies a trust mark linked to a code of conduct\textsuperscript{17} and a binding resolution process that is free for consumers.

Consumers consider less risky and more trustworthy those websites that display a recognisable quality seal\textsuperscript{18}. It should nevertheless be noted that there are still no empirical studies that help us to identify the market impact of these seals. Another problem arises from the possibility of conflict of interest arising from the fact that a trader selects and pays for the seal provider as well as for the ODR service provider. Similarly, an expert’s neutrality could be indirectly affected to the extent that the service providers and said experts are at the service of one of the parties. These formal obstacles could be overcome if the grantor of the trust mark is independent from the ODR provider.

\textsuperscript{11}Available at https://support.symantec.com/en_US/mysymantec.html
\textsuperscript{12}See BBB website available at https://www.bbb.org/consumer-complaints/file-a-complaint/get-started
\textsuperscript{13}Dispute Resolution Manager: https://www.truste.com/business-products/dpm-platform/dispute-resolution-services/
\textsuperscript{14}Available at https://www.ecommercetrustmark.eu/
\textsuperscript{15}Traders shall be transparent and provide clear information on identity, address, email, telephone number, description of the products and services offered, including photographs, final price, shipping costs if any, information on the existence of a legal warranty, and order confirmations. They also have to provide the ability to download contracts and secure means of payment.
\textsuperscript{16}More information available at: https://www.confianzaonline.es/consumidores/publicaciones/?publication_type=&description=&yr=Todos&mn=&buscar-btn=Buscar&page-num-results=&&pagina=1
\textsuperscript{17}Ethical Code of Conduct that was recognized by the Spanish Data Protection Agency in a resolution dated 7 November 2002 (CT / 0004/2002) and granted the public trustmark by the National Consumer Institute on 15 July 2005, after analyzing the content and verifying that the dispute resolution mechanism fulfilled the requirements established in Recommendation 98/257/EC, available at http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/cod_confianzaonline.pdf
\textsuperscript{18}The effectiveness of these seals will be highly dependent on the reputation of the scheme and on its becoming known by a critical mass of participants. See J. P. Cortes and F. Esteban in “Building a Global Redress System for Low-Value Cross-Border Disputes”, (2013) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 02, April, at 422.
C. Rating systems. These are tools allowing users to express opinions on their degree of satisfaction with a specific product or service. They are a widely-employed practice in online trade and are commonly used in the form of scores or grades. Based on scores for service providers, services and goods stemming from user opinions and assessments, they provide specific information on concrete indicators. It uses algorithms to dynamically calculate such reputation indicators on the basis of the opinions and ratings received.\textsuperscript{19}

Consumer review mechanisms may take the form of standalone sites that have as a function the collection of user’s feedback or be embedded within websites that have as a primary function the sales of goods or services.

Both in the emerging collaborative economy (P2P) and in online consumption (B2C), these reputation systems are crucial. Typically based on centralized or distributed architectures they collects all the ratings for the performance of a given merchant from users who have had direct experience with that merchant.

The greatest difficulty for users is to judge the quality, robustness and the reliability or vulnerability of reputation systems. Some studies have suggested certain criteria for evaluating them\textsuperscript{20}. To wit, systems should be capable of the following: (i) reflecting confidence in a specific rating and able to distinguish between a new entity of unknown quality and a known one; (ii) indicating recent trends in the entity’s performance; (iii) resisting cyber-attacks and attempts by entities to manipulate reputation indicators; (iv) preventing the simple addition of any indicator from, in itself, significantly influencing the score as a whole.

\textsuperscript{19} Collaborative filtering systems (CF) have similarities with reputation systems, however the assumptions behind CF systems is that different people have different tastes, and rate things differently according to subjective taste. See A. Jøsang op. cit. p. 13.

The importance of reputation has now reached the point that people are now beginning to consider the so-called ‘reputation banks’ capable of aggregating all the information gathered in the different databases on the worldwide web to create online reputations that can be managed as capital. In this regard, it is known that a trader’s good reputation on certain e-commerce platforms such as eBay helps them increase not only the number of sales but also the price of their products. To encourage users to give ratings, some platforms have even introduced a ‘reward’ system in the form of points that can be exchanged for advantages. Additionally, the same platforms provide benefits for users/traders with high ratings, for example allowing them to be more selective with their potential customers.

A range of studies on e-commerce and user behaviour indicate that purchasers prefer websites that distribute products known to them, that are familiar or whose manufacturers they know. Online reputation has a positive association with trust and the idea that transactions with reputable participants are likely to result in more favourable outcomes than transactions with disreputable participants.\(^{21}\) It is also known that a negative reputation has a much greater impact upon consumers and users than a positive one and also that the appearance of improper behaviour by a trader is associated with the idea of a potential risk in the future.\(^{22}\)

With a rating system market agents can build their own ‘brand’. Some e-commerce platforms offer advice on how to build this reputation (for example, by using the technique of providing a free gift for a certain period of time, accompanying the user throughout the purchasing process, with messages conveying their desire to resolve any incidents that may arise, accepting that they might lose sometimes even when it is not

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\(^{21}\) See A. Jøsang, op. cit. at 20.

their fault, applying discounts, accepting returns or taking care to negotiate highly competitive shipping rates).

Such mechanisms are vulnerable to some kinds of attacks, such as the so-called ‘sybil’ attack, consisting in the fraudulent practice of creating false identities (with pseudonyms, for example) to harm a user/trader by damaging its reputation. Consequently, and in parallel, systems have emerged and been developed to prevent this, as have strategies to enhance the reputation of users/traders. False comments are easily traceable these days and search engines like Google have resources to locate them.

One question raised by rating systems concerns the hosting of these scores and their management, as well as the way in which the public is made aware of them. Another issue that must be considered is the subjective nature of some scores and the low response rates, which may lead to negative ratings that do not reflect the reality of a situation. Another problem that needs to be tackled by this system is that of the threat caused by the potential activity of fraudulent players, who may conceal their identity and give false scores.

In some sectors -such as the hotel industry- consumers use reviews not only to filter hotels but rather to decide amongst a smaller choice set already from a prior search. A survey of 2,500 users where 35 per cent of respondents use online reviews early on to identify hotels to consider, while 28 per cent use them to narrow down predetermined choices.23 Furthermore, the number of comments with content created by users has grown to such an extent that it has brought about a real revolution in the provision of hotel services and in users’ booking decision-making process.

Holidaymakers are placing increasing trust in the comments and ratings made online by other customers, to the point that it has become a core part of the search process.\textsuperscript{24}

Studies are currently being carried out on how to integrate this web-sourced information into traditional hotel rating processes.\textsuperscript{25} This makes it clear how a rating system is capable of providing a service to consumers in their choices before acquiring a product or service, but also to companies, which often manage to achieve higher scores in comments than the actual administrative rating itself, which is better, as a 1 per cent higher rating by customers means 1 per cent higher RevPAR (revenue per available room). This means that, in users’ decisions, greater importance is attached to trust and meeting of needs than even price.

Some findings confirm the fact that, as the number of ratings received by suppliers of goods or services increases, their worth or positivity is also enhanced, because it dilutes the weight of negative ratings. This is why these operators are concerned with securing broad-based user participation.

Rating systems have become so important that they have given rise to parallel lines of business. By way of example, on a worldwide scale, the Global Review Index (GRI) is a standard index for measuring the online reputation of both companies and also products on the web at their service, to improve and manage said reputation. Also the Better Business Bureaus (BBB), a non-profit organization not affiliated with any governmental agency is focused on advancing marketplace trust, consisting of 112 independently incorporated local BBB organizations in the United States and Canada, coordinated under the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB).\textsuperscript{26} This entity serves

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See UNWTO, p. 27. See also: QualityMark Norway Classifications, quality assurance and guest communication in the hotel industry in Norway and Europe: A report on the different schemes and methods used by the hotel industry in Norway and in Europe in their quality assessment and on guest communication, 2013;
\item https://www.bbb.org/council/about/vision-mission-and-values/
\end{enumerate}
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as an intermediary between consumers and businesses, collects and provides free business reviews, and also handles consumer disputes against businesses. Accredited Businesses are allowed to use its trademarked logo. To avoid bias, the BBB’s policy is to refrain from recommending or endorsing any specific business, product or service. Nevertheless, the organization has been the subject of controversy, particularly related to its alleged practice of giving higher ratings to businesses that pay a membership fee.

Furthermore, companies have appeared to ‘repair’ online reputations on e-commerce sites. And it is in the activity of reputation recovery in which ratings once again have importance. Traders needing to ‘repair’ their online reputation resort to satisfied users to carry out new transactions and provide positive messages. Participation in blogs and forums also helps achieve recognition.

Nowadays, carrying out promotional work and trading on the Internet necessarily entails the maintenance of a good reputation. Online comments and ratings are the Internet’s ‘word of mouth’ (WOM) and affect consumers’ purchasing decisions. Recent studies also suggest that the impact of consumers’ comments on online sales also depends on other factors beyond the product and its characteristics. The impact is greater when the means of acquiring information are relatively scant. Another aspect that is beginning to take form is cutting the cost of searching for opinions. Given that the marketing directors of online companies are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of word of mouth, they try to facilitate users’ access to said information, for example by using more visible symbols on their websites to indicate the rating achieved by a product or by making it easier to read comments associated with a specific rating level. To make this process easier for consumers,

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specific websites have been developed\(^\text{28}\), which collate consumer perceptions recorded on different websites, reviews and ratings, to arrange all this data in a single system that, using metrics, gives the trader an overall score from 1 to 100. The quality of these rating systems needs to be subjected to comparative evaluative testing to guarantee the transparency and quality of their processes and ensure that they constitute valid, objective tools for consumers and users.

Some platforms associated with dispute resolution services offer reputation repair services: if a trader manages to resolve a problem with a user, it obtains as compensation the deletion of the negative ratings associated with the dispute, but still retains the messages or comments published. Yet, transparency is the bone of contention: some platforms are not transparent on how they manage the reviews and whether or not the removal is subject to a payment.

The European Union is considering regulating this sector. The Results of the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and The Collaborative Economy ran from 24 September 2015 until 6 January 2016 reveals that most business and citizens consider that platforms should be more transparent and also that no clear view emerges on whether online reputation systems and trust mechanisms guiding consumer choice are reliable. This inconclusiveness persists for consumers and businesses. Many stakeholders refer to the following potential improvements to rating systems: (i) ensure that reviews are based on actual customer experience and avoid fake reviews; (ii) establish a charter of good practice for reviews and reputational systems; (iii) ensure the accuracy and reliability of statistical information resulting from reviews when it may influence buyer behaviour; (iv) for branded products find ways to ensure that reviews

do not relate to counterfeits; (v) and ensure that comparison tools are impartial and transparent about their methodology. Respondents realise the risk of manipulation of consumer opinion via fake reviews or misrepresented statistics. The majority of citizen and online platforms respondents considered that the above mentioned problems consumers or suppliers perceive could be best addressed by a combination of regulatory solutions, self-regulatory and market dynamics. Nevertheless, there is consensus that rating systems and trust mechanisms are beneficial because they allow consumers to read other consumers' opinions.29

In the arena of digital intermediary platforms, the European Union has become aware of the importance of effective private enforcement mechanisms and, given the cross-border nature of many transactions and the fact that the final destination is often a consumer, such implementation requires not only harmonization but also articulation of means for cooperation between competent authorities. This implies, on the one hand, macro-data analysis tools allowing to obtain detailed information on the ecosystems of online platforms and, on the other hand, instruments of private and public compulsion of obligations. With this new approach the first challenge for the European Union is to assess whether the existing regulatory framework is still appropriate, as standards designed for a traditional service delivery model may not be effective in a virtual environment. At this stage, self-regulation and co-regulation based on principles, codes of conduct and other tools may also be useful to ensure the application of legal provisions and the adoption of the most appropriate control mechanisms. Such measures can ensure a fair balance between predictability, flexibility and efficiency.

The European Union considers today that reputational tools in the market play an essential role in creating the necessary trust and credibility. Reputational systems are

a powerful tool to discourage harmful behaviour of market participants and to reduce the risks arising from the information asymmetries of the parties. As the European Commission acknowledges, this can contribute to improving the quality of services and potentially reducing the need for certain regulatory provisions as long as the quality of reviews and ratings can be relied upon and are free from any bias or manipulation. Enhancing confidence in these tools - the vast majority created by collaborative platforms or specialized third parties – helps and empowers consumers.

The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market expresses the need for these tools to be transparent so that users can understand how the information is filtered, configured or customized. The correct information provided about the nature of the products they see or consume online contributes to the efficient functioning of markets. That is why existing EU consumer and marketing regulations require online platforms to be transparent and not to mislead users. A number of academics claim the need to harmonize the legal framework of reputational feedback tools currently provided by online intermediary platforms. Where a platform embeds a reputational feedback system, it shall provide information on the modalities for collecting, processing and publishing ratings and reviews. Furthermore, the reputational feedback system should comply with a number of standards, namely: (i) The online platform shall take reasonable and proportionate steps to verify that the reviews are based on a confirmed transaction. (ii) If a review has been requested in exchange for a benefit, it must be indicated. (iii) The reviews must be published without undue delay and, if a review is rejected, the reviewer must be informed without undue delay of the rejection and the

30 Conversely, false reviews and comments cause a loss of confidence that can undermine the business model of the platform itself and generate generalized mistrust.
reasons for such rejection. (iv) The order in which the reviews are presented by default should not be misleading. Platform users should be able to see reviews in chronological order. (v) If the reputation feedback system excludes previous revisions, this should be indicated to the users of the platform. The exclusion period should be reasonable and not less than 12 months; And, finally (vi) If reviews are consolidated into a global rating, the total number of reviews on which the rating is based should be indicated.

Another issue that should be refined at this point is how to ensure that platforms integrate free and reliable complaint mechanisms for both traders and users, if there is any concern about the authenticity of a review.

Furthermore, in order to preserve those review as a reputational capital of the supplier, platforms should facilitate means to transfer those reviews other platforms in a structured, commonly used and readable format.

There is little doubt that reviews are a primary pillar for the prevention of disputes fully integrated in the commerce because, on the one hand, users consult and nurture them systematically and spontaneously before, during and after a transaction is completed and, on the other, companies have embraced these tools and will continue to empower them to the extent that it gives them a competitive advantage in the market. Therefore, it is paramount to advocate for a regulation that responds to the needs of both, traders and consumers.

D. Blacklists. Blacklisting is a naming and shaming approach consisting in publishing a list of people or groups regarded as unacceptable or untrustworthy and often marked down for punishment or exclusion. This is another enforcement mechanism by means

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32 See Oxford dictionary definition available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/blacklist
of which a non-compliant trader becomes part of the listing of, and statistics for, traders who are risky to users.

Recently, they have been successfully adopted by certain public electronic platforms associated with consumer dispute resolution. Worthy of particular note is British Columbia’s initiative Consumer Protection BC,\(^{33}\) which consists in providing consumers with web-based access to a computerised search system of opened, ongoing, and closed cases against companies that have received complaints, indicating the number of complaints accepted and publishes the full decisions taken.

Within the sphere of the European Union, noteworthy a number of initiatives, namely: (i) The Sweden’s Allmänna reklamationsnämnden (National Consumer Complaints Office, ARN), which publishes a weekly listing of companies that do not comply with the obligations arising from the outcomes of the ADR procedures it has managed and which conclude in a non-binding recommendation or judgement based on law.\(^{34}\) (ii) Italy’s consumer financial sector, the Arbitro Bancario Finanziario (the Banking and Finance Arbiter, ABF) -reporting to Banca de Italia\(^ {35}\), the country’s national banking authority- owns a system for publishing the legally-based but non-binding decisions it issues, consisting in the publication on the ABF website of a news update disclosing the company in question’s non-compliance.\(^ {36}\) (iii) The Czech Republic holds the Office of the Financial Arbitrator (FA),\(^ {37}\) which organises arbitration with binding decisions that are published to inform consumers. (iv) The Austria Internet

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\(^{33}\) Available at https://www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/

\(^{34}\) See “Rad & Ron” magazine owned by the Swedish consumer organization available at http://www.radron.se/. See also P. Cortes and F. Esteban de la Rosa, “La normativa europea de resolución de conflictos de consumo y su transposición en España: una oportunidad para mejorar los derechos de los consumidores aprovechando las experiencias positivas en el derecho comparado” (2016) ADICAE (in press).

\(^{35}\) Article 128 bis of Legislative Decree 385/1993 and Legislative Decree 130/2015 transposing EU Directive 2013/11.

\(^{36}\) ABF website: https://www.arbitrobancariofinanziario.it/intermediari/inadempienti

Ombudsman provides a watch list with information of fraudulent sites, scams, and non-compliant traders.\textsuperscript{38}

At a global level, also trustmark organisations and other non governmental entities turn to the usage of blacklists for the general public to assess the trustworthiness of a trader.\textsuperscript{39}

Yet, the lack of transparency in the policies applicable to some blacklists, the misleading decisions and even pressure on companies to adhere to and pay a fee may question their usefulness.

E. Account suspension or blocking. Another mechanism that has become popular on the internet -in the case of traders providing goods or services through ecommerce intermediary platforms- is the suspension or blocking of their accounts to prevent them from operating in the future in said virtual markets, either provisionally or even definitively. In this regard, digital intermediary platforms frequently reserve in their terms and conditions of the company’s policies, certain rights associated with remaining on their platform. Generally, these terms include some waiver releasing the intermediary platform from any content-related liability, stating that they have no obligation to monitor the information or communications carried out by traders.\textsuperscript{40} They also stipulate that under no circumstances do they guarantee or make any undertaking that all the content published or uploaded by providers on their services and/or goods will be definitively published, as publication will not occur in the case that the provider

\textsuperscript{38} See Austria Internet Ombudsman website available at https://www.watchlist-internet.at/


\textsuperscript{40} With regard to limits to install a system for filtering, see Case C-360/10 CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, paragraph 53, on which grounds, the European Union Court of Justice rules that EU Directives 2000/31/EC, 2001/29/EC and 2004/48/EC must be interpreted as precluding injunctions against a hosting service provider which requires it to install a system for filtering information which is stored on its servers by its service users, which applies indiscriminately to all of those users as a preventative measure and exclusively at its expense for an unlimited period, which is capable of identifying electronic files with a view to preventing breach of rights.
in question has acted in bad faith or to prejudice a consumer. So, the terms contemplate that, should any illegal, fraudulent or prejudicial act be detected, the intermediary platform may be entitled to take the following actions: (i) Delete, suspend, edit or modify the content at its sole discretion, including, amongst others, user publications, at any time, without prior notice and for whatever cause or to delete, suspend or block any service user publication. (ii) To access and disclose any information that they deem reasonably necessary to comply with any law, regulation, legal process or request from a legal authority. (iii) to prevent and manage fraud-related, technical or security issues. (iv) and to respond to consumers requests for assistance. The most severe measure for a trader is, undoubtedly, blocking the access, either provisionally or definitively.

F. Contact information, personalised attention and feedback. Another strategy used to improved trust levels is to provide users with telephone or email contact details on the website. It is known that one of the most frequent complaints of users/consumers is the lack of information of this type, or the fact that it is difficult to find, thereby preventing them, in practice, from contacting the trader. A second complaint is with regard to the lack of response when contact has been established. Not providing a proper or timely (within 24 hours) response to contact can entail, in many online markets, a negative rating that will impact upon a site’s reputation.

Feedback between user and trader is another technique for enhancing one’s reputation. This can be achieved by means of, amongst other methods, brief surveys inviting users to evaluate the service, the trader’s response capacity, the product, delivery, etc. In this way, positive comments can be gathered, as can (perhaps more importantly) concerns, which will allow for the correction and prevention of errors in the future.
Nevertheless, at times, disputes cannot be avoided. In such cases, said platforms provide advice on how to tackle them to ensure the least impact possible on the trader: by satisfying the consumer. Instead of entering into an open dispute leading to negative public feedback, the best remedy is to offer private feedback with the customer with the goal of resolving their problem professionally, negotiating and speaking with customers by telephone when there is a dispute. It has been shown that, although emails can be useful, a less impersonal tool, such as providing a telephone number and having a conversation, can be very effective.

G. Chargebacks and escrow accounts. Alongside reputation systems, other mechanisms have emerged to guarantee the effectiveness of Internet users’ rights in online transactions, linked in this case to forms of payment. We are referring here to the reimbursement systems or chargebacks and escrow accounts offered by some payment intermediaries.

A chargeback is the technical term used by international card schemes to name the refunding process for a transaction carried out by card following the violation of a rule. This process takes place between 2 members of the card scheme, the issuer of the card and the acquirer. The final customers of these 2 schemes members, the cardholder for the issuer and the merchant for the acquirer, do not have any direct relationship in the chargeback process. Chargebacks allow users to recover amounts from traders when their expectations of a transaction are not met. They can be put into practice when the financial transaction has been carried out with certain payment methods (Visa,
MasterCard, PayPal, etc.) or by depositing the price into a third-party account. The intermediary in these payment systems can exercise very effective de facto control.\textsuperscript{41}

In a ‘chargeback’, a complainant may requests the reimbursement of an amount paid to a trader via an intermediary when certain conditions are met. By way of example, these include: services not provided or goods not received, a recurring transaction cancelled, goods not as described or defective, fraudulent multiple transactions, falsification, authorisation rejected, no authorisation, card expired, late submission, unrecognised transaction, account number not matching, incorrect transaction amount or account number, duplicated processing or payment by other means. The process triggered in case of non-conformity on the part of the trader is first one of pre-arbitration followed, as the case may be, by arbitration administered by the payment intermediary itself. This measure’s scope will depend upon the rules applied by the companies in the country in question. For this, some States require that the purchaser be defrauded. In others, it is enough for there to have been absence of or defective compliance.\textsuperscript{42} Additionally, the financial intermediary has its own decision-making process and this is not always transparent: it asks the purchaser to support the chargeback request before making a decision. It should be borne in mind that reimbursements are in any case limited in scope, given that they are only applied in


cases of credit card payments and outcomes do not affect the validity of the contract which could be challenged in court.  

Escrow accounts have a broader scope of application than reimbursements, as they do not depend upon the issuing of a credit card: the purchaser deposits the payment in a third-party account and, after a certain period of time has passed and if there have been no complaints or if it has been verified that the goods were received as expected, the money is released to the trader. Just as with the traditional escrow, the Internet escrow account works by consigning a financial sum to the control of a third party that safeguards consumer and vendor rights in a transaction. When both parties have confirmed that the transaction has been concluded in accordance with the agreed terms, the third party disburses the money to the vendor. If, on the other hand, a conflict arises, the intermediary offers a resolution mechanism that will decide upon and enforce the outcome.

Problems may arise if a fraudulent trader creates a false escrow account. To prevent improper use of these forms of payment, the European Union passed Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market, which governs and authorises the use of this kind of services, which are today mostly administered by banks. As the Directive notes, low value payment instruments should be a cheap and easy-to-use alternative in the case of low-priced goods and services and should not be overburdened by excessive requirements. Even so, it should be borne in mind that, in order to reduce the risks and consequences of unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transactions, the parties

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44 The first company in the field authorized to operate was Escrow.com.

should inform the payment service provider as soon as possible and by a deadline about any complaints they may have. Once a user has informed a payment service provider that its payment instrument may have been fraudulently used, the former should not be held liable for any subsequent losses that may be caused by unauthorised use of the instrument. In order to assess possible negligence by one of the parties, all of the circumstances should be taken into account and the degree of alleged negligence should be evaluated according to national law. Contractual terms and conditions relating to the provision and use of a payment instrument, the effect of which would be to increase the burden of proof on the consumer, should be considered null and void. Furthermore, these systems are designed so that trader users should be able to rely on the proper execution of a complete and valid payment order if the payment service provider has no contractual or statutory ground for refusal. Nevertheless, according to the Directive, legal disputes arising within the relationship underlying the payment order should be settled only between the payer and the payee. In this regard, it also provides that, to guarantee the fully integrated straight-through processing of payments and for legal certainty with respect to the fulfilment of any underlying obligation between payment service users, the full amount transferred by the payer should be credited to the account of the payee. Accordingly, it does not authorise the making of any deductions from the amount transferred in the execution of payment transactions, beyond the deduction of any agreed payment service provider charges.

3. Existing consumers ADR/ODR

Once a conflict has arisen, conflict resolution mechanisms may take on a key role, given that studies have in recent years repeatedly made it clear that resorting to the jurisdiction
of the courts is not the best option, particularly when there are cross-border and consumers are increasingly reluctant to exercise their rights as a result of a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the diverse redress mechanisms made available to them.\textsuperscript{46} The barriers to obtaining effective redress constitute a significant source of vulnerability for consumers.\textsuperscript{47}

In its Communication of 13 April 2001 on the Single Market Act, the European Union included legislating on ADR as one of its twelve priorities, and its different Resolutions\textsuperscript{48} have stressed that any global focus must prioritise simple, affordable, quick and accessible resources. Nevertheless, emphasis has still not been placed on one aspect that is crucial for ensuring that the necessary trust is placed in the system: its effectiveness, in terms of the enforcement and satisfaction of consumer rights, above and beyond the contents of the principle of effectiveness included in Article 8 of Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (‘the Consumer ADR Directive’).

Under the terms of said Directive, the principle of effectiveness requires Member States to ensure that: the procedure is available, easily accessible and free of charge or at a symbolic fee for consumers; the consumer is aware of and receives the documentation; and that the outcome is made available within a reasonable period of time (90 days). However, this does not guarantee the effective exercise of their rights if traders do not participate or the outcomes of the procedures are not respected and

\textsuperscript{48} Resolution of 25 October 2011 on alternative dispute resolution in civil, commercial and family matters (2011/2117(INI)) and Resolution of 20 May 2010 on delivering a single market to consumers and citizens (2010/2011(INI))
consumers are not provided with the proper channels for their enforcement. This is because effectiveness arises from the real application of a right by its beneficiaries and depends upon two factors: that the beneficiaries voluntarily or spontaneously accept the conduct provided for by the regulation and that the regulation is enforced by judges and other competent bodies. This has to do with behaviour and requires conformity with, or non-opposition to, the regulations. With good reason, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal”. This principle of effective remedy before a tribunal is a general principle of EU law, which arises from the constitutional traditions common to Member States and which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the Charter. Community Law could govern this specific matter to harmonise or unify criteria but, given that it fails to do so, it falls to the domestic legal systems of each Member State to designate the bodies and arrange the resources designed to ensure that this right is safeguarded, and it is their responsibility to guarantee, in each given case, effective protection of these rights.

Focusing once again on non-adjudicative methods, negotiation, mediation and conciliation have reached the greatest implementation in EU Member States for reasons that go beyond the scope of this study. Closely linked to the principle of freedom which

50 Proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice, as amended on 12 December 2007 in Strasbourg, OJ C 303, p. 1, entitled “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”.
51 According to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Community law. See Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, [2007], ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, paragraph 37; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECLI:EU: C:2008:461, paragraph 335; Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling v Dervis Odemis and Others [2009], ECLI:EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 47.
52 Case C-268/06 Impact [2008], ECLI:EU:C:2008:223, paragraphs 44 and 45.
ensures that consumers are not deprived of their right to resort to the judicial system,\textsuperscript{53} the effectiveness of their outcomes is key to conflict resolution procedures. Analysis of specific mechanisms to obtain effectiveness requires, firstly, that we distinguish between: (i) the effects of commencing a negotiation, mediation or conciliation procedure, and (ii) the effects of any settlement that may be reached by the parties.

With regard to the former point, one should first note the positive socioeconomic effects that are caused by the mere fact of attempting an ADR/ODR procedure, in that this helps avoid escalating the dispute and also, in part, in many cases, to cut the workload of the courts in reducing the amount of litigation they have to deal with.\textsuperscript{54} It has been seen how the simple fact of commencing a dispute resolution procedure results, in a significant number of cases, in the avoidance of escalating this dispute. However, it is true that, on occasion, agreements cannot be reached for a number of different reasons: differences between the two parties are irreconcilable; one or both of the parties exercise their entitlement to deem the procedure concluded in advance; the maximum agreed or legally established deadline for the duration of proceedings has passed; or a cause for termination of the proceedings has arisen.

With reference to the later -the effects of any agreement that may be reached by the parties- there are no econometric studies allowing us to establish the percentage of successfully administered cases that are subsequently escalated and whose enforcement is requested because the agreements reached have not been respected. What we do know, however, is that the costs of judicial proceedings greatly exceeds those of any

\textsuperscript{54} Namely, the empirical study on the benefits of Green Paper the Commission of the European Communities, \textit{Green paper on alternative dispute resolution in civil and commercial law}, 19.04.2002, COM (2002) 196 final. Also, regarding the evaluation of cost and time benefits, see ADR Center, \textit{The Cost of Non ADR - Surveying and Showing the Actual Costs of Intra-Community Commercial Litigation}, June 2010.
out-of-court one, something that in itself explains the adoption of measures to encourage the later.

A. The mediation attempt. The Study on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs for the Directorate-General for Internal Policies (PE 493.042)\textsuperscript{55} shows that mediation is still underused (in less than 1% of disputes). Even though the study fails to identify the specific reasons for such a low uptake, it does list some specific measures that seem to have been effective in implementing it,\textsuperscript{56} for example: establishing compulsory mediation in certain types of cases; holding compulsory mediation information sessions; referring by the courts; granting tax incentives for parties opting for mediation\textsuperscript{57}; sanctioning parties that do not attend compulsory mediation. Following a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks existing in the 28 Member States, it has been noted that only a degree of compulsion in the use of mediation leads to a significant increase in the number of mediations. Indeed, the introduction of a compulsory mediation attempt in some spheres has given rise to positive effects, even in voluntary mediation. One example of this is been provided by Italy, where mediation attempts were obligatory between March 2011 and October 2012 and, during this period, the number of voluntary mediations increased significantly. The Italian paradigm shows that certain legislative policies can lead, as a whole, to positive outcomes. Additionally, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters\textsuperscript{58} establishes an obligation aimed

\textsuperscript{55} Rebooting The mediation Directive: assessing the limited impact of its implementation and proposing measures to increase the number of mediations in the EU, European Parliament, January 2014, Brussels, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies

\textsuperscript{56} It is interesting to note that other measures to promote mediation, such as reinforcing the protection of confidentiality, increasing the number of invitations to mediation by judges and courts, or a more demanding system of accreditation of experts have not generated, by themselves, the expected results.

\textsuperscript{57} See Report of the General Directorate for Internal Policies, 2014 Rebooting the Mediation Directive, assessing the limited impact of its implementation and proposing measures to increase the number of the mediations in the EU.

at Member States so that, by means of policies focused at encouraging mediation, they effectively ensure that the use of such mechanisms achieves a balanced relationship with judicial proceedings, which entails making greater endeavours to this end.

Yet, it should be stressed that the right of access to courts must be always preserved and thus, limitations upon access must not be excessive. Noteworthy is the Case of Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA\textsuperscript{59} which posed the question whether a provision that required consumers to use an out-of-court process before having access to a court may breach Article 6 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Justice found that this provision was compatible with the requirements of the European Union legal framework provided that the mandatory process should not only be available on the Internet and also that it should not cause excessive delay.\textsuperscript{60}

B. Fighting against fraudulent practices. The European Union, committed to bolstering the internal market and promoting cross-border transactions, has adopted some measures to boost consumer confidence and prevent fraudulent practices. In this regard, it has recently presented a proposal for review of the Consumer Protection Regulation, in the aim of granting greater powers to national authorities to immediately shut down websites committing frauds and to request information from domain registrars and banks to find out the identity of the trader responsible, all to boost consumer confidence in e-commerce. Article 21a of Regulation 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (‘the CPC

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\textsuperscript{60} Currently the Court of Justice of the European Union is studying a preliminary question from The Tribunal Ordinario di Verona (Italy) in Case [C.75/16] Livio Menini and Maria Antonia Rampanelli v. Banco Popolare – Società Cooperativa, asking whether the requirement of mandatory mediation with legal representation in consumer matters is compatible with the ADR Directive.
Regulation’\(^{61}\) established that the Commission shall assess the effectiveness and operational mechanisms of this Regulation and thoroughly examine the possible inclusion in the Annex to the Regulation of additional laws that protect consumers’ interests. Accordingly, this Regulation provides a legal basis for extending national procedural regulations such that they can be applied to cross-border situations when trader malpractice occurs, such as unfair trading practices; use of unfair contract terms; infringement of consumer *ius cogens* or of compulsory warranties; violation of laws governing e-commerce, ADR, e-privacy, of sector-specific legislation on passenger rights or consumer credit, to give some examples.

According to the Proposal’s preamble, there continues to be a high degree of non-compliance with consumer regulations. The top five grounds for complaints noted are, in order of importance: (i) non-delivery; (ii) defective products; (iii) problems with contracts; (iv) goods or services not in conformity with the order; (v) unfair trading practices.

Between October 2013 and February 2014, the Commission held a public consultation. Stakeholders were invited to give their views on how to improve the functioning and effectiveness of the CPC Regulation. In total, 222 responses were received that were overall sufficiently representative of all stakeholders directly involved in consumer e-commerce (public authorities, consumer associations, ECCs, businesses and individual consumers). More than 50% expressed support for giving explicit powers against infringing traders, as well as the power to request penalty payments to cover illicitly obtained gains and to require interim measures. 88% of respondents supported the possibility of introducing common procedural criteria and introducing standards authorising the publication of enforcement decisions, access to

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documents, the collection of evidence and the investigation of websites. Furthermore, almost all enforcement authorities supported the idea of developing and improving surveillance mechanisms and the majority of European Consumer Centres (83%), consumer associations (75%) and businesses (62%) called for more mechanisms to signal infringements via alert systems or tools.

Lastly, the European Union has established a general regulatory framework for ADR/ODR\(^\text{62}\) systems and has promoted the creation of a Union-level consumer ODR platform to handle domestic as well as cross-border complaints arising from online transactions to provide the necessary more detailed regulatory cover for resolution procedures. In this regard, also worthy of note is the work begun in 2010 by UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, whose efforts to secure an international instrument to facilitate the online resolution of disputes that involve small claims arising in the context of cross-border online B2B and B2C transactions, has given rise to some technical notes or guidelines (the *Technical Notes on Online Dispute Resolution*) an upcoming descriptive and non-binding document that contemplates the principles and elements that should be included in ODR procedures. It proposes an open formulation of the description of ODR, to provide future coverage for other technologies that may be developed for the same purposes.

Nevertheless, little has been achieved to date with regard to the effectiveness of consumer's rights, and less still in terms of what should be their ultimate goal: the satisfaction of their interests. Unlike the case of service providers, in online transactions, consumers do not generally know who they are dealing with, nor do they know what they will receive in the end, as they are unable to see and check the product.

before acquiring it, meaning they cannot judge the quality of the product or service, important factors when making a purchasing decision. This asymmetry of information in online commercial relations affects and damages trust and is an added factor in consumer disputes.

C. Harmonising the European Union’s redress system. By virtue of Article 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the current Consumer ADR Directive has proposed the establishment of a general regulatory framework for out-of-court mechanisms, both traditional and online, aimed at consumers, whose goals include, firstly, the establishment of minimum EU-wide quality values and standards and, secondly but no less importantly, to harmonise and coordinate national legislations to do away with disparities in terms of the coverage, quality and understanding of ADR.

In this regard, on the one hand, it gives its seal of approval to certain principles already included in the preceding Recommendations of 199863 and 2001,64 making them binding in nature. On the other, it opts for a minimum level of harmonisation of dispute resolution schemes, and leaves up to Member States numerous issues in order to embed the already existing schemes and the different legal traditions within the European Union. In addition to this, the Directive authorise Member States to increase the level of protection afforded to their consumers. To this latter end, the consumer ADR Directive itself provides that, to ensure a greater level of consumer protection, Member States may maintain or introduce rules that go beyond those laid down by the Directive.

Therefore, a legal instrument that was initially conceived as a means to prevent disparities has become a new obstacle to harmonisation, because, as noted in the

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Explanatory Memorandum itself, these differences -and inconsistencies- constitute obstacles to the internal market and refrain from purchasing. Currently, we can find a myriad of diverse mechanisms offered among EU Member States, namely: (i) Adjudicative schemes of dispute resolution, whilst the vast majority have favoured the implementation of non-adjudicative models. Each type follow diverse procedural tracks which results in to great difficulties for consumers. (ii) It has also been left up to each Member State to establish a system of compulsory or voluntary participation or adhesion by businesses. (iii) Additionally, penalties applicable to certain infringements by businesses depend mainly in each Member State internal regulation. (iv) Many different ways of funding ADR/ODR entities, some of them clearly controversial since allow private dispute resolution schemes be financed by business entities. (v) The thresholds for accessing ADR/ODR schemes also vary significantly from country to country and member States may add new grounds of non-eligibility. In addition to this, some schemes are free of charge for the consumer and others charge the costs of the proceeding and there is no a common criteria among Member States. (viii) Accredited and non-accredited dispute resolution entities may coexist under the same umbrella. (ix) Finally, binding enforceable outcomes are clearly the exception among Member States.

65 Although voluntary participation is the mainstream criteria -and companies refuse to participate- some Member States have standardized the attempt to mediate as a requirement before filling a court proceeding (Italian model). In some Member States membership to certain associations or chambers obliges them to be affiliated to a resolution system, which increases the participation rate of companies (v. gr. UK): others, like France, require business to participate in a mediation process when asked by a consumer; others, like Norway use complaint boards that process consumer complaints even when traders have not agreed to participate. See C. J. S. Hodges, I. Benöhr, N. Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Pub., 2012) 25–354. See also, J. P. Cortés, The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Oxford University Press, 2016).

66 A number of countries authorize private entities financed by companies or its associations to administer ADR/ODR processes, as is the case of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, or the United Kingdom. See C. J. S. Hodges, I. Benöhr, N. Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ... op. cit. 25–354.

67 For example, in Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, at the Air Passenger Rights sector the procedure is free of charge for consumers, who will only bear their own costs. Conversely, in Belgium and Denmark consumers have to pay a submission fee which will be recovered if the consumer wins the case or the case is dismissed. And in Cyprus the consumer must pay a submission fee depending on the claim and if the case is lost a supplementary fee depending on the value of the complaint. See “Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Air Passenger Rights sector” (ECC-NET Joint Project 2012) p. 14.
A number of Member States have legislated to equip themselves with specific resolution bodies in strategic or regulated sectors (energy, telecommunications, transport, insurance, finance and banking, travel agents, etc.). Such is the case of Germany, Belgium, France, Holland and the United Kingdom, which have mostly adopted the figure of the Ombudsman scheme. Nevertheless, not all of them have established a system of compulsory adhesion for businesses operating in said sectors, such that, in some Member States -namely Italy, Belgium, the UK, Holland, Romania, Austria and Portugal- businesses are legally compelled to participate, whilst in others adhesion is voluntary, resulting in very low business participation levels. Moreover, in few cases are the outcomes of these ADR/ODR binding upon businesses,\(^6^8\) such that, if the system is not bolstered by the incorporation of certain reputation tools like name and shame schemes\(^6^9\), the level of non-compliance is extremely high.\(^7^0\)

Whilst some Member States have created platforms that serve as ‘online helpdesks’ to guide consumers towards existing accredited entities arranged by sector - as is the case of Portugal, the UK and Sweden- and others have created an integrated e-platform to handle online complaints\(^7^1\), in the vast majority of Member States, it is the consumer him/herself who must work out in each given case which of the entity that should solve the claim.

Finally, some countries have set up certain reputation mechanisms to ensure that businesses voluntarily adhere and participate in ADR schemes -namely by means of

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\(^6^8\) Namely, Italy (ABF), France (The Médiateur de RATP for public transportation), United Kingdom (The Communications & Internet Services Adjudication Scheme, CISAS; the Ombudsman Services, OS), Czech Republic, Denmark (Civil Aviation Authority, NEB), Latvia (Civil Aviation Authority, NEB CRPC) or The Netherlands (SGC, Geschillencommissie).

\(^6^9\) As is the case of Denmark, Finland, Sweden or Latvia. See “Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Air Passenger Rights sector”, (2012) ECC-NET Joint Project,18-19.

\(^7^0\) This is the case for example of Spain, at the banking and financial sector. The Ombudsman's Resolution of 17 July 2014 described this fact and stated that in order to strike a balance between the two sides of the relationship, bank and client, where there is conflict, it is essential the effectiveness of the results and the effectiveness of the control mechanisms offered to users of financial services. Citizens, who make a claim and obtain a favorable decisions from the Claims Services fail to see their rights protected effectively because banks are not formally obligated to comply with such results.

public quality trademarks\textsuperscript{72} - or voluntarily comply with proceedings’ outcomes –public blacklists of non-compliant traders- although the vast majority have not yet included rules establishing mandatory participation of traders and enforceability of outcomes, giving rise to a significant uncertainty in terms of effectiveness.

4. Compliance of agreements and enforceability of settlement outcomes

On a legal level, once an agreement between a consumer and a trader is reached, the law enforcement effects attached to the outcome becomes a new concern. Indeed, in consumer conflict resolution the vast majority of ADR/ODR schemes are self-composite –namely, mediation or conciliation- and thus parties settle their conflict for themselves by means of a new agreement. This outcome produces the novation of the previous existing contract, takes on binding effects and, when applicable, also enforceability.

Taking into consideration the second effect, enforceability, the vast majority of Member States are granting the outcomes the same authority as a judicial decision when the agreement complies with certain legal requirements or “filters”. To briefly summarise, two traditional set of filters can be identified: Firstly, the recognition of the agreement reached after a referral by a Court -which is most common in Spain, Portugal, Austria, Slovakia, Norway, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Italy and Romania; Secondly, the involvement of a public Notary, consisting in the conversion of the agreement into a public deed that embeds enforceability–namely, Spain, Poland,

\textsuperscript{72} Like for example, Spain, with its public seal: “El distintivo de Arbitraje de Consumo”, available at: http://www.aecosan.msssi.gob.es/AECOSAN/web/consumo/detalle/distintivo.htm
Germany, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Croatia or Romania.\textsuperscript{73} However, these ‘filters’, once again, make the outcome dependent upon the intervention of the judiciary, which has a negative impact on achieving the initial goal - the effectiveness of the rights in a reasonable time and at a cost proportionate to the amount claimed. Looking at the case of Spain, for example, enforcement of the agreements arising from mediation must be converted into a public deed pursuant to the terms of the Law on Mediation and processed afterwards in accordance with the Law on Civil Proceedings.\textsuperscript{74}

Other flexible and expeditious tracks to make a mediation outcome enforceable have been implement by countries from the European economic sphere: Firstly, mediation outcomes signed by the parties and their lawyers who certify that it complies with and respects the law and public policy (v. gr. Italy).\textsuperscript{75} (ii) Secondly, mediation outcomes from certified mediators (Belgium); Thirdly, mediation outcomes containing a declaration of parties authorising enforceability - “enforceability clause” (Croatia).

An additional concern regarding mediation outcomes may be the myriad of possible defences to the enforcement of settlement agreements. Even when the terms of a mediation outcome meet the formal requirements for its enforcement, potential grounds for opposition may prevent the agreement from eventually being enforced and enforced.


\textsuperscript{74} The regulatory framework in Spain is established by Law 5/2012, of 6 July 2012, of mediation in civil and commercial matters and also by Law 1/2000, dated 7 January 2000, of Civil Procedure. Both legal texts require that the mediation agreement comply, in addition to natural formal requirements. Namely, (i) in writing; (ii) stating the identity and address of the parties and mediator. (iii) As well as the place and date on which it is subscribed. (iv) Relating the set of obligations assumed by each party. (v) Indicating that the mediation procedure has been followed in accordance with the provisions of the Law. (vi) And finally, signed by the parties or their representatives. Specific procedural formalities: both parties must submit it before a notary for it to be converted into a public document, accompanied by copies of the proceeding’s opening and concluding sessions. The notary then checks compliance with the requirements set by the Law on Mediation and that its content is not contrary to the law. Execution must be carried out before the court competent therefore, which shall be the Court of the First Instance of the place in which the mediation agreement was signed. When the mediation agreement must be enforced in another Member State, the requirements included in any international conventions to which Spain is a party and the rules of the European Union must also be added. Finally, if the mediation process is the result of judicial referral, for it to be regarded as an enforceable title, it must be judicially approved, and the court competent for the execution shall be that which approved the agreement.

each country has its own regulations in this regard. Differing laws governing the filters that have to pass to become enforceable has led the international community to start work on correcting, in part at least, legislative inconsistencies. By way of example, at international level, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration that provides legal grounds for opposition to awards that may contain settlements. Furthermore, the last initiative of this body consisting on a draft Model Law for enforcing trade-related settlement agreements, providing for direct execution and possible defences or grounds for refusing enforcement. At European level, Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Brussels Regulation) provides the grounds for the non-recognition of a decision.

5. Some concluding insights

This article has identified some existing efficient tools to secure the effectiveness of consumers’ rights and the satisfaction of their needs, which is a pending issue in conflict resolution into the European Union. The attractiveness of this approach is that it

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77 It includes any commercial operation of supply or exchange of goods or services, distribution agreement, representation or commercial mandate, transfer of credits for factoring, leasing of equipment with leasing, construction works, consulting, Engineering, licensing, investment, financing, banking and insurance. It has been preferred to exclude from its scope transaction agreements involving consumers.
78 (A/CN.9/861, paragraph 93). As to the possible categories of defences, reference was made to: (i) Those pertaining to the genuineness of the settlement agreement (reflecting the parties’ consent, not being fraudulent). (ii) Those pertaining to the readiness or validity of the settlement agreement to be enforced (being final, not having been modified or performed, binding on the parties). (iii) Those pertaining to international public policy. (iv) It was also argued that other defences that could be used include fraud, public policy and where the subject matter of the settlement agreement is not capable of being settled through a conciliation process, or when one party to the agreement has not signed it or does not consent to being bound by it and when the agreement does not reflect the conditions agreed by the parties. It was also agreed that some categories of defences might also be considered by the enforcing authority at its own initiative (A/CN.9/861, n. 97).
provides a comprehensive view of this particular topic not falling into the trap of focusing on one piece of the jigsaw only disregarding other important and interconnected issues.

Highly innovative and sophisticated mechanisms in the ecommerce based in reputation of traders in order to build trust among users have emerged spontaneously and have opened new venues to empower consumers and ensure compliance of traders: trust marks, ratings, blacklists and escrow accounts have become essential dispute avoidance tools.

Consumers place their trust in products, services and businesses that are familiar to them or on which they have accurate information from other consumers with regard to their degree of satisfaction. They attach importance to other consumers’ prior experiences. Beyond the protection offered by regulations, consumers place more trust in businesses that have been scored by other consumers, meet their needs and resolve problems quickly and efficiently. These mechanisms allow potential purchasers to familiarise themselves with traders, products, or services and learn to trust them.

The former were the first to emerge at businesses’ own initiative although their value depends to a great extent on the level of user recognisability of their logo and the perception of independence they manage to create. Rating systems have been incorporated into the market very successfully on a massive scale since they meet users’ needs for accurate information. Nevertheless, they are vulnerable to certain fraudulent practices and require uniform policies that avoid misleading practices and guarantee that the information is accurate. Blacklists allow to obtain a high degree of compliance from business due to fear of appearing in a list of risky or non-compliant traders. Connected with some public ADR schemes provide very satisfactory results. The visibility of the lists is a key issue for their efficiency. These reputational feedback tools alongside
private enforcement measures—namely, chargeback mechanisms and escrow accounts—are becoming the driving forces behind the new digital economy. It is therefore worthwhile advocating that Member States regulate and promote their implementation in certain sectors—notably strategic or regulated ones—and interconnected to accredited conflict resolution entities (ADR/ODR).

Furthermore, Europe’s experience to date has made clear three primary results: Firstly, that the existence of reputational tools in the market—which play an essential role in creating the necessary trust and credibility—reduce the number of consumers claims; Secondly, although consumers have access to Courts, litigation is a last resort; Thirdly, only a certain degree of business participation lead to positive outcomes.

There is thus little doubt as to the need to rethink the Consumer protection in the aim of: (i) incorporating a minimum standardized legal framework for dispute avoidance tools that defines principles and legal requirements to ensure transparency and transferability of data alongside interoperability of such tools with any consumer public authority or other public bodies; (ii) incorporating compulsory participation of businesses from strategic or regulated sectors,80 in conflict resolution schemes that incorporate such dispute avoidance tools, which have been a success in those Member States that have implemented them to provide protection to consumers in need of quick, low-cost and effective solutions. This entails as well removing obstacles such as difficulties in making contact and communicating with the businesses and avoiding unnecessary formalities when making complaints.

This article has also shown the value, in the long run, of being more decisive in making consumer affairs agreements enforceable. One plausible track might consist in introducing quick and expeditious mechanisms for direct judicial approval of

80 See also P. Cortés, op. cit. at 458.
agreements reached. A process that could be carried out by conflict resolution entities themselves (ADR/ODR) for the purposes of speeding up enforcement whether necessary and preventing ‘resisting’ attempts to avoid enforceability by one of the parties involved in a conflict.

Again, given that making outcomes enforceable by simply standardized processes entails the adoption of more in-depth European Union legislative policies, dispute avoidance tools may play an essential role in the short and medium term, encouraging self-compliance with agreements and outcomes, and thus reducing very significantly the number of disputes.