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http://hdl.handle.net/10609/8752
Title: ZigBee/ZigBee PRO security assessment based on compromised cryptographic keys
Author: Radmand, Pedram
Carlsen, Simon
Petersen, Stig
Talevski, Alex
Arnedo Moreno, Joan  
Singh, Jaipal
Domingo Prieto, Marc
Keywords: Zigbee;security;Zigbee;Zigbee;seguretat;seguridade
Issue Date: 4-Nov-2010
Publisher: IEEE Press
Citation: Radmand, P.;Domingo, M.;Singh, J.;Arnedo, J.;Talevski, A.;Petersen, S.;Carlsen, S.. (2010). "ZigBee/ZigBee PRO security assessment based on compromised cryptographic keys". A:.Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on First International Workshop on Securing Information in Distributed Environments and Ubiquitous Systems (SIDEUS'10).Fukuoka.IEEE Press . Pág. 465 - 470.
Series/Report no.: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on First International Workshop on Securing Information in Distributed Environments and Ubiquitous Systems (SIDEUS'10)
Abstract: Sensor networks have many applications in monitoring and controlling of environmental properties such as sound, acceleration, vibration and temperature. Due to limited resources in computation capability, memory and energy, they are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. The ZigBee specification based on the 802.15.4 standard, defines a set of layers specifically suited to sensor networks. These layers support secure messaging using symmetric cryptographic. This paper presents two different ways for grabbing the cryptographic key in ZigBee: remote attack and physical attack. It also surveys and categorizes some additional attacks which can be performed on ZigBee networks: eavesdropping, spoofing, replay and DoS attacks at different layers. From this analysis, it is shown that some vulnerabilities still in the existing security schema in ZigBee technology.
Language: English
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10609/8752
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