

A Review of UNMISS and the Peacebuilding Space in South Sudan

Master Thesis in International Affairs and Diplomacy



Student name: Marinus Jochemsen

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Juan Luis Lopez Aranguren

Date: February 23, 2022

Abstract

This study investigates the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and explores the contextual determinants that have influenced the effectiveness of the mission. A case study of UNMISS was conducted to assess mission effectiveness by comparing its mandated tasks to its results. To establish the contextual determinants for successful peacebuilding in South Sudan, we applied the 3 dimensions of the 'Peacebuilding Triangle' to the South Sudanese civil war and thereby determined the shape of the peacebuilding space. Our case study shows that UNMISS has been effective in implementing most of its mandated tasks, but its efforts have not led to either sovereign or participatory peace. Our qualitative analysis of the dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle for South Sudan show that the country has a high level of hostility between the factions, an almost non-existent level of local capacity and a medium-high level of international capabilities. The high level of hostility and low level of local capacity help explain why a stable peace has not yet been achieved after the end of the civil war. Our study also demonstrates how peacekeeping missions are not solely constrained by the peacebuilding space as defined on the peacebuilding triangle, but are also actors with agency, capable of expanding the peacebuilding space through interventions on the ground.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding Triangle, South Sudan, UNMISS

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my family and many friends.

First, to my maternal grandparents, Reijer and Gerrie, for all their love and warmth. Although you are no longer with us, your memories continue to steer my life. Next, to my parents, Jaap and Petra, for supporting my choice of an international career, despite the fact that I cannot see them as much as I would like. I also dedicate this thesis to my sister, Mareije, who is in many ways my moral compass, her partner Rick, and their two beautiful daughters, Sophie and Milou.

To Rene, Sonja and Samrat, for sharing this journey in New York together. Thank you for all the great memories and experiences, with undoubtedly many more to come. I also dedicate this thesis to Greg, Cathy, Andrew, and Jorge for being my family away from home. My life here would not have been the same without you. To Jonas, Joakim, and Ulises, for being the brothers I never had. To Sam, for all her humor and support. And to my colleagues at the United Nations, whose selfless commitment in the service of humanity has inspired me to pursue this degree.

Finally, to you, dear reader. Assuming you are reading this line last, you read at least one page of my thesis. Thank you.

Table of Contents

A Review of UNMISS and the Peacebuilding Space in South Sudan	1
Abstract:	2
Dedication	3
Table of Contents	4
List of Tables and Figures	6
List of Abbreviations	7
Acknowledgements	8
Chapter 1: Introduction	9
1.1. Research Problem	9
1.2. Significance	9
1.3. Literature Review	10
1.4. Research Questions	12
1.5. Methodology	13
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Peacebuilding	16
2.1. Liberalism, Institutionalism and Conflict Resolution theory	16
2.2. Civil War Theory	19
2.3. Peacekeeping: Legal basis and evolution	21
2.4. Success Factors for Peacebuilding	25
2.5. The ‘Peacebuilding Triangle’	27
Chapter 3: Historical Context of the Conflict in South Sudan	30
3.1. Early history and British colonial rule	31
3.2. Two civil wars and the road to Southern independence	33
3.3. The South Sudanese Civil War	37
3.4. The Role of External Actors	40
3.5. Current Political Situation	42
Chapter 4: Peacebuilding as a pillar of UNMISS	44
4.1. Mission Mandates and Objectives	46
4.2. Protection of Civilians (PoC)	49
4.3. Enabling the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance	52
4.4. Supporting the Implementation of the Peace Agreement	54
4.5. Monitoring and Investigating Human Rights	56
4.6. Discussion: Assessing the effectiveness of UNMISS	58

Chapter 5: Analysis: Applying the ‘Peacebuilding Triangle’ to South Sudan	62
5.1. Hostility of the factions	62
5.2. State capabilities	65
5.3. Level of international assistance	67
5.4. Discussion	69
Conclusions and Recommendations	73
References	76

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. Summary of civil conflicts in the Sudans	31
Table 2. South Sudanese refugees in regional countries by June 30, 2021	41
Table 3. UN Peacekeeping missions in Sudan and South Sudan	44
Table 4. UNMISS personnel numbers by category	45
Table 5. Top 5 troop contributors to UNMISS	45
Table 6. Assessment of the determinants for sovereign and participatory peace	60
Table 7. Summary of the dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle in South Sudan	70
Figure 1. Changes in mandates of Peace Operations	23
Figure 2. The Peacebuilding Triangle	27
Figure 3. Personnel numbers of currently active UN Peacekeeping missions	67
Figure 4. South Sudanese Peacebuilding Space on the Peacebuilding Triangle	71

List of Abbreviations

AU - African Union

CPI - Corruption Perceptions Index

CTSAMVM - Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan

CRSV - Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations

FSI - Fragile States Index

GA - General Assembly

HDI - Human Development Index

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IR - International Relations

OCHA - (United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PBA - Peacebuilding Architecture

PoC - Protection of Civilians

R2P - Responsibility to Protect

RJMEC - Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

RoLAS - Rule of Law Advisory Section

SC - (United Nations) Security Council

SPLA - Sudan's People's Liberation Army

SPLA-IO - Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (rebel forces)

SSPDF - South Sudan People's Defense Forces (government forces)

UN - United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNPK - United Nations Peacekeeping

UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan

WFP - World Food Programme

Acknowledgements

This Master thesis has been both an interesting and challenging experience, which I could not have successfully completed without the help of several people. I would like to express some words of thanks to them. First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Juan Luis Lopez Aranguren, for his great advice, insights, and encouragement, as well as for the freedom he gave me during this project. As this thesis marks the end of my time as a master's student at the UOC, I would also like to thank all the UOC staff, for their dedication to the students, and for giving me a new perspective on the field of International Affairs and Diplomacy. I also thank my fellow master's students for the thought-provoking discussions and debates, which truly broadened my horizons. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Di Salvatore at the University of Warwick, for allowing me to use and reprint her brilliant visualization of the evolution of peacekeeping mandates.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter presents a brief introduction to the research problem and its relevance, the current state of the literature, the research questions, and the research methodology.

1.1. Research Problem

United Nations peacekeeping operations remain one of the primary tools for the international community to manage conflict. However, their effectiveness has been much debated. The goal of this study is to establish whether the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been successful, and which contextual factors of the South Sudanese civil war have impacted its ability to be successful. The contextual factors that we aim to establish may offer broader insights into international peacebuilding interventions in general.

1.2. Significance

July 9th, 2021 marked the 10 year anniversary of South Sudanese independence, making South Sudan the world's youngest nation. After a long history of foreign subjugation, slavery, and colonization, South Sudanese independence was supposed to be the start of a new era of optimism. Instead, the country descended into a prolonged civil war characterized by hundreds of thousands of deaths, gruesome violations of human rights and a series of volatile peace accords.

UN peace operations play a critical role in international conflict management. Given the enormous stakes, the role and effectiveness of peace operations is a constant point of debate in academic circles as well as for policymakers. In this study, we will examine one such peacekeeping operation: the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which is tasked with building lasting peace in South Sudan. The concept of peacekeeping has evolved

significantly since its original conception as it adapted to the changing dynamics of international conflict. By better understanding the contextual factors that contributed to the successes and failures of UNMISS in the domain of peacebuilding in South Sudan we aim to refine our understanding of peacebuilding in the context of civil wars and draw lessons for future missions as well as contribute to an incremental academic understanding of this evolving phenomena.

1.3. Literature Review

Since the inception of the United Nations there has been much public debate about its role in managing conflicts (Szasz, 1983). As conflicts shifted from inter-state wars to intra-state civil wars, there has been much academic debate about the legal *right* and *responsibility* to intervene (Bellamy, 2010). The international community responded to this change in the dynamics of conflict with the development of the multidimensional peacekeeping doctrine, which combines traditional peacekeeping activities with new responsibilities in the realm of institution building, monitoring human rights, and facilitating political dialogue (Puechguirbal, 2010). This expansion of responsibilities of peacekeeping missions coincided with a post-cold war reinterpretation of the right to intervene under Article VII of the UN Charter (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011). Enforcement interventions thus became more common and broader in scope. An important pillar of the work of these *multidimensional* interventions is political peacebuilding (Beardsley, 2013). The UN Brahimi report defined Peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (2000). Peacebuilding thus constructs a functional state that can defend its own interests (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011). When the General Assembly endorsed the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding at the 2005 World Summit this led to high hopes, but there is now a broad

agreement that the peacebuilding architecture failed to live up to its expectations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011; Hearn, Bujones and Kugel, 2014). There is an apparent gap between the ambitions of the international community and the outcomes achieved. Lambourne and Herro question the ‘blind focus’ on ‘liberal democratic peace’ without considering its appropriateness in the local cultural context (2008) and De Cooning suggests that this era of liberal interventions is coming to an end as new approaches to peacebuilding are emerging (de Cooning, 2018). Autesserre found that international programs supporting local peacebuilding efforts often operate based on flawed assumptions and a better understanding of the elements that shape effective international action is necessary (Autesserre, 2017). Hazen further suggests that international actors should reconsider their role and approach to peacebuilding (2007). However, in a review of the relevant literature, Walter et al found broad support for the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the reduction of violence, but also noted that there is no consensus on *why* it is effective (Walter, Howard and Page Fortna, 2021). There has been much interest from scholars who tried to better understand these causal relationships between peacebuilding policy and successful interventions. Doyle and Sambanis explain that a sustainable peace in the context of a civil war requires the reconstruction of legitimate state authority (2000, p. 779). National-level state authority may be insufficient however, as Chopra and Hohe point to the need for participation from civil society (Chopra and Hohe, 2004) and Autesserre shows the importance of local initiatives (Autesserre, 2017). Hazen explains that peacekeeping missions have generally not been successful in addressing the root causes of conflict (Hazen, 2007). Woodward perceives this focus on ‘root causes’ as wrong, as it prevents careful research on the relation between practices and outcomes through specific case studies (2007, p. 145). Doyle and Sambanis agree with this assessment and found that the determinants for ongoing or recurring conflicts may be different from the original root causes of the conflict. They suggest an alternative model: a ‘peacebuilding triangle’, in which success is determined

through (a) the degree of hostility between factions, (b) the level of local state capabilities and (c) the level of international assistance. In a separate article, Doyle later found that the peacebuilding triangle can explain successful outcomes in about 75 percent of cases but is not accurate in the other 25 percent (Doyle, 2007). Further studies are thus necessary to better understand the limitations of the model. Steinert and Grimm also found that case analyses are necessary to understand the causal mechanisms behind peacebuilding and democratic transformation in post-conflict states (Steinert and Grimm, 2015). Such case analyses can help us understand why some peacebuilding efforts fail where others succeed. Indeed, UN peacebuilding theory, like the phenomena it describes, is constantly evolving. Much is still unknown about the role of international actors in successful interventions as well as the local contextual factors which contribute to success. This study aims to contribute to this field by applying the ‘peacebuilding triangle’ as described by Doyle and Sambanis to the peacebuilding efforts of UNMISS. Doing so, we will gain a better understanding of the contextual factors that determine the capability of the mission to achieve a sustainable peace, as well as validate the Peacebuilding Triangle to assess its relevance in studying current peacebuilding dynamics as well as uncover potential gaps in the existing theory.

1.4. Research Questions

The following research questions were formulated based on the stated goal:

- How effective is UNMISS in facilitating the peacebuilding process in South Sudan?
 - What are the mandated goals of the mission to support the peacebuilding process and what activities has the mission undertaken to achieve these goals?
 - What has been the effectiveness of these activities?
- What are the contextual determinants for successful peacebuilding in South Sudan?

1.5. Methodology

The research method for this study will be a case study of UNMISS, focusing primarily on its peacebuilding activities. Gerring defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (2004, p. 342). This choice of research method has several benefits and limitations, which we will briefly discuss in this section. Bennett and Elman state that studies in the IR space involve the interaction among “many structural and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction” (2007, p. 171). International peacekeeping in the context of a civil war is a perfect example of such complexity, involving multiple agents such as warring factions and their leaders, civilians, external nation states and international institutions. Such complexity cannot be reduced to a small number of variables. A case study allows us to examine the contextual factors of this social phenomena with greater depth (Gerring, 2004). George and Bennett confirm the benefits of analytical depth, explaining how it leads to greater conceptual validity (2005, p. 27). They also point out that case studies have a powerful advantage in identifying new variables as well as causal relationships which can lead to the formation of hypotheses. This is especially important in a complex mission such as UNMISS, which operates at part of a network of many actors. For practitioners, this large number of variables makes causality difficult to establish when evaluating the match between resources, mandated objectives, and results. A single case study allows us to achieve enough depth to adequately address this complexity.

George and Bennet also identified several limitations of the case study method. These are: (1) potential biases in the case selection, limited generalizability, indeterminacy (multiple possible explanations for an observed phenomena) and a lack of representativeness (2005, p. 31). Case studies also face a challenge to demonstrate how they contribute to an incremental understanding of a social phenomenon (Bennett and Elman, 2007, p. 172). In other words, to

add value in the academic space, the case study must be thoughtfully connected to existing theory. For this purpose, sufficient attention must be paid to the theoretical framework.

George and Bennet provide detailed practical guidance on the design and execution of case studies, in their widely cited book on the subject (2005). The authors point out the importance of clearly defining the class of phenomena which will be studied through a case. In our study, this class will consist of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. They also point to the need of a well-defined research objective and research strategy (2005, p. 61). In this study, the objective is to better understand the determinant factors for successful peacebuilding as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. We will achieve this by exploring the role of UNMISS in the complex case of South Sudan, which has witnessed a series of fragile peace agreements. This makes the current research design a heuristic case study, aimed at inductively identifying the causal paths between contextual factors of the Peacekeeping mission and its ability to successfully facilitate the political peace process. Although a single case may not allow us to make strong inferences about the wider population of current and future peacekeeping operations, it could lead to new hypotheses that could be tested in subsequent studies. The authors also describe two characteristics of case studies which allow for a cumulative understanding of a phenomena and make a useful contribution to the literature. These are *structured* and *focused*. By ensuring our case study is both structured and focused, we prevent the common pitfall of conducting a case study that may offer interesting insights on its own rights but does not accumulate to existing theory. This study will be focused due to its relatively narrow theoretical scope of international peacebuilding - which is only one dimension of today's multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. The study will be structured by examining it through the lens of existing theory. We will analyze the case of UNMISS using the “Peacebuilding Triangle” as formulated by Doyle and Sambanis (2011), which consists of three

determinant factors for sustainable peace: (1) The degree of hostility between the factions, (2) the extent of local capacities remaining after war, and (3) the level of international assistance. This analytical model has been applied to several UN peacekeeping missions by the authors of the triangle, as well as other researchers (Belloni, 2005; Doyle and Sambanis, 2011; Bakare, 2015). Adopting this existing model as the basis for our case study will enhance its comparability to other such case studies and thus enhance the extent to which our findings will accumulate to the existing literature. We will discuss the “Peacebuilding Triangle” in more detail in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Peacebuilding

The following section presents a conceptual framework for peacekeeping operations and introduces their role within international peacebuilding efforts. We will start with a brief overview of the relevant International Relations theory: liberalism, institutionalism, and conflict resolution theory. We will then look at the historical evolution of peacekeeping missions, discuss success factors for peacebuilding and review the Peacebuilding Triangle, which will be our primary tool of analysis in this case study.

2.1. Liberalism, Institutionalism and Conflict Resolution theory

When conceptualizing the fundamentals of international peacebuilding we can draw from international relations theory, and in particular the school of liberalism. The liberal view of international relations consists of four key assumptions, which contrast it to realism (Viotti and Kauppi, 2019). First, key international actors are not limited to states, but also include international organizations, Non-Government Organizations and Multinational Corporations. This fundamental assumption can help us explain the role of the UN as an international actor. Second, the state is not a unitary actor and state behavior is formed through a complex web of internal factors. This also means state interests are malleable and can be adjusted through collaboration with other actors. Third, economic or cultural interdependence has a moderating effect on the relations between states, an idea which was largely pioneered by Keohane and Nye (1973). Their theory explains how in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, state interaction shifts from conflict to cooperation. Finally, liberalists put much focus on the relations between state and society. Whereas realists often view international relations from the perspective of “high politics”, liberalists adopt a wide-ranging agenda. Related to the school of liberalism is also “democratic peace theory” which posits that democratic countries do not

go to war with other democratic countries. There is, however, an ongoing discussion on the validity and causal relationship between democracy and peace. For example, are democratic countries less likely to go to war with each other? Or does democracy follow peace? Another facet of liberalism is the extent to which international institutions, or regimes, can form international norms and structures which constrain the behavior of states and help form the conditions for cooperation within an anarchical system. Keohane, in his work on liberal institutionalism explains how such institutions can help bring peace and security (1995). This was a response to realists, who posited that institutions would only be formed in areas of agreement - not conflict. Liberal theories such as those described above can help us understand peacekeeping concepts such as the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). Under the R2P doctrine, UN Member States adopted an obligation to intervene in situations where a failed state is no longer able to provide safety and security to its internal civilian population. In that scenario, the responsibility to protect that population instead falls on the international community. This doctrine contains several liberalist ideas. First, it recognizes the role of the UN as a legitimate international *actor*. Second, it recognizes both the possibility and the need for UN Member States to *cooperate* to manage conflict. And third, it recognizes an international *obligation* to protect civilians across state borders, which reflects the broad scope of the liberalist perspective.

Conflict resolution theory describes the processes by which parties to a conflict come to a peaceful solution, often helped by a third-party. In an early work on conflict resolution, Burton describes how deep-rooted conflicts are often not a result of conflicting interests, but a result of conflict values and needs (1990). He argues that interests-based conflict can be resolved in negotiation, but values are not negotiable. The author describes conflict resolution as a practice that provides the parties to the conflict with opportunities to analyze their relationship, clarify their goals and discover the possible outcomes. This view makes clear the

role of the mediator in managing conflicts. At the international level, this mediator role can be taken up by various parties, including individual states, regional organizations, and the United Nations. A common taxonomy of such third-party interventions consists of six types of activities (Fisher, 2007):

- *Conciliation* - The third-party provides an informal means of communication to lower the tension between the parties.
- *Consultation* - The third-party works to facilitate the parties as they try to find creative solutions.
- *Pure Mediation* - The third-party uses reasoning and persuasion to facilitate a negotiated settlement.
- *Power Mediation* - Enhances pure mediation with coercion using threats or rewards. May involve the third-party becoming a guarantor/enforcer to the agreement.
- *Arbitration* - The third-party provides an outside, binding judgment which is deemed fair and just.
- *Peacekeeping* - The third-party provides military personnel to monitor and enforce a ceasefire.

In addition to the role of third-party mediators, recent studies also point to the important role of local actors in successful conflict resolution, which is an area still underserved by studies on peacekeeping (Smidt, 2020). The next section will describe a particular type of conflict, which is now often associated with UN peacekeeping: civil wars.

2.2. Civil War Theory

Compared to inter-state wars, civil wars come with their own set of challenges and complexities. Whereas in interstate conflicts, the parties are nation states and thus easily defined, civil wars often have a complex web of factions which are parties to the conflict. These factions may have informal command structures, with local military commanders who do not necessarily follow commitments by their political wings. There are also differences in the dynamics of such conflicts. Whereas inter-state conflicts often end with a decisive military victory and subsequent reconstruction phase, civil wars are often trapped in cycles of conflict, especially in fragile states that are inadequately equipped to address complex root causes. The need to address these conflicts has led to academic interest in both the causes and resolution of civil wars. This section will provide a brief overview of civil war theory. We will adopt the definition of civil war as proposed by Doyle and Sambanis as “an armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state” (2011). Civil wars often have complex origins, with socio-economic, ideological, ethnic, or religious dimensions. A review of the economic and political theories of civil wars shows that states with limited capabilities and high levels of political fragmentation are more at risk of recurrence of civil war (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011). Local capabilities are thus an important factor to consider when formulating a peacebuilding strategy.

Civil wars can destabilize regions, create failed states which harbor bad actors, and the parties of the conflicts may be supported by various external states and groups. There is thus an international dimension to civil war. However, IR theory provides only limited explanations for civil wars. Realism sees states as unitary actors and does not explain civil conflict within states. Liberalism takes a broader range of non-state actors into account but does not help us understand the relations between the state and the various religious, ethnic, and ideological

factions within the state. However, it does explain the mechanisms for international interventions and institutions, as well as the incentives for external actors to try and manage civil conflict in other states. If we perceive the parties to the conflict as rational actors, they will be incentivized to continue fighting as long as the cost of fighting is lower than the cost of peace. International peacebuilding operations can help tip this scale, by imposing an additional cost on continued fighting by deploying military personnel and lowering the cost of peace by being a guarantor of a potential peace agreement. In cases where civil conflict has resulted in a lot of killing, the wounds in society may be so deep that the only way to stop conflict is by an external intervention and through peace enforcement. Civil war theory can help us draw lessons for international interventions. One such lesson is that a pure focus on the military dimension is insufficient. Such an approach raises the cost of conflict but does not necessarily lower the cost of peace. As the resolution of civil wars requires rebuilding public trust, it is also important to address the political dimension by facilitating the political peace process and monitoring and enforcing peace agreements. Doing so will raise the cost of non-cooperation by the parties. In the next section we will discuss the legal foundations for peacekeeping operations and how they have evolved over time, from a tool to manage inter-state conflicts to intra-state civil wars.

2.3. Peacekeeping: Legal basis and evolution

The previous chapter established a theoretical basis for the involvement of the international community in managing cross-border conflict. One of the primary tools for the international community to manage international conflicts is UN Peacekeeping. There have been 71 peacekeeping operations since 1945, with 12 currently active operations with 86 thousand personnel. The annual peacekeeping budget currently stands at around \$6.3 billion (UN, 2021b). The legal basis for UN Peacekeeping operations lies in the UN Charter, which has been signed by all UN member states (UN, 2008). Although the charter does not specifically mention the concept of peacekeeping, it does give the UN Security Council the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security and gives it legal provisions to take measures to do so, including the creation of peace operations. Of primary importance are the following chapters of the charter: (1) Chapter VI on the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”: This chapter was originally associated with observer missions, although the security council has never directly referenced it in its resolutions. (2) Chapter VII on “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”: This chapter is associated with modern, ‘robust’ peacekeeping mandates which allow for a greater use of force in defending the mission mandate and (3) Chapter VIII on “Regional Arrangements” which allows for the collaboration between the Security Council and regional bodies such as the African Union (United Nations, 1945).

Since its inception, peacekeeping has been based on three fundamental principles, which have remained relevant today. These are: (1) consent of the parties, which requires all the parties to the conflict to accept the peacekeeping operation and its mandate, (2) impartiality, which means the peacekeeping operation executes its mandate in a neutral fashion without favoring any single party to the conflict. and (3) non-use of force except in self-defense or the defense of the mandate, which means force should only be used as a last resort (UN, 2008).

Note that today's robust peacekeeping mandates allow for a greater use of force in “defense of the mandate”.

The concept of Peacekeeping has evolved significantly since its original inception. First, because of the changing dynamics of conflict, which have shifted from interstate to intrastate. Second, the end of the cold war released the security council from its prior state of deadlock which enabled it to authorize an increasingly large number of missions with increasingly broader mandates. Doyle and Sambanis have identified three generations of UN Peacekeeping operations (2011).

1. The *first generation* of peacekeeping operations or “traditional operations” were formed in response to interstate conflicts and consisted of lightly armed forces tasked with monitoring peace agreements. This generation is often associated with the provisions of Chapter VI of the charter. They are strictly bound to the principle of consent and have very limited provisions for the use of force.
2. The *second generation* of peacekeeping operations introduced the concepts of multidimensional peacebuilding which involves building the foundations for a stable, lasting peace. Peacekeepers in these missions are usually involved in police and civilian tasks in addition to more traditional military tasks. It is here where mission tasks evolved from *peacekeeping* to *peacemaking*.
3. The *third generation* of peacekeeping consists of *peace enforcement*, which involves a much more robust use of force, generally mandated by explicit reference to Article VII of the charter. Such missions can range from imposing order in the absence of consent by the conflicting parties, to the enforcement of a peace agreement from which one of the parties has decided to defect. These missions often have a focus on human security and the protection of civilians and were developed in the ‘Brahimi Report’ (Brahimi, 2000).

The evolution of peacekeeping mandates, as well as the increase in number of missions since the end of the cold war is visualized in Figure 1. The figure shows a clear increase in both the frequency of missions as well as the breadth of their mandates from 1990 onwards. Whereas previous missions generally focused on Military and monitoring tasks, these new missions have been given increasingly broad mandates including the protection of civilians, supporting elections, building institutions and law enforcement tasks.




Figure 1. Changes in mandates of Peace Operations. Reprinted from (Di Salvatore, 2017) with permission.

To make the UN fit for its expanded role in international peacebuilding, the 2005 World Summit introduced the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and the Peacebuilding Fund. These new organizational entities were intended to bring coherence to the peacebuilding efforts of all the UN institutions (Hearn, Bujones and Kugel, 2014).

As mandates have expanded, there also has been a shift in focus from military to political peacebuilding efforts. In 2015, the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations introduced the ‘primacy of politics’ as an essential shift for peace operations, meaning that lasting peace is achieved through political solutions - not military ones (UN, 2015). The latest peacekeeping reform initiative is Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) which was launched by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres in 2018. The declaration document for A4P reaffirms the ‘primacy of politics’ in the conflict resolution (UN, 2018). These politics play out on 2 different levels. First there is the need for political alignment between the international peacekeeping stakeholders, such as Security Council members, Peacebuilding Commission members and major troop contributors. Second, there is a need to engage in politics on the ground, working with civil society and the conflicting parties to come to a political solution. When the political world of UN Headquarters does not align with the political world on the ground, the mission is hampered (Gowan, 2019). In the next section we will describe some of the success factors in peacebuilding operations.

2.4. Success Factors for Peacebuilding

The rapid increase in number of missions and in mission scope after the end of the cold war also led to increased academic interest in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The enormous human cost of peacekeeping failures such as in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Somalia demonstrate the importance of effective peacekeeping. As described in the previous section, the UN's internal Brahimi report called for several enhancements to the peacekeeping doctrine to make it better suited to address civil conflicts. These include “robust” missions under Article VII and a renewed focus of protection of civilians in the absence of state capability to do so.

The increasingly broad set of peacekeeping responsibilities as part of multidimensional operations complicates the measurement of effectiveness. As peacekeepers are mostly deployed in conflict or post conflict environments, the reduction of violence has traditionally been a key metric for the assessment of peacekeeping effectiveness (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017). However, contemporary peacekeeping missions have a broader range of functions including economic reconstruction, electoral assistance, and state building. To measure mission effectiveness, these activities should also be included in the indicators. Di Salvatore and Ruggeri recognize that there is no consensus on a “gold standard” for assessing peacekeeping missions in the literature - nor is it clear whether such a standard is necessary as the local context of each mission is different (2017). Doyle and Sambanis suggest that the success of peacekeeping missions should be assessed based on (1) the extent that the mandate was implemented and (2) the extent to which peace was achieved (2011). The effectiveness of peacekeeping missions on successful peacebuilding is also difficult to assess, because it is determined by a range of other factors, such as the role of regional organizations and neighboring countries. Natural disasters, or pandemics such as COVID-19 can also change the conditions on the ground.

The factors that induced the mission deployment, differ in each individual case and should be considered when evaluating effectiveness (Sandler, 2017). In addition to indicators focused on “negative peace”, or the absence of violence, positive indicators such as a reduction of the number of internally displaced people could serve as a potential measure for the *quality* of peace. Call (2008) distinguished four indicators for successful peacebuilding, based on four different perspectives:

- Security perspective: No war recurrence, or in other words a reversion of armed conflict. Considered to be the minimal standard for peacebuilding.
- Social perspective: Root causes of conflict addressed. This is considered the maximalist standard of peacebuilding and is complicated by the fact that underlying causes are often difficult to correctly identify.
- Political perspective: Reconstruction of state authority through participation and democratization leading to a more legitimate and effective state.
- Economic perspective: A focus on economic recovery. Poverty is correlated to civil war, but the causality between poverty reduction and lasting peace is still unclear.

While not providing a set of specific metrics, these perspectives allow us to broaden the evaluation of peacekeeping success, while allowing for context-specific analysis. Now that we have established some of the possible perspectives and indicators for peacebuilding success, the next section will describe the Peacebuilding Triangle as a tool for analysis of peacebuilding strategies.

2.5. The ‘Peacebuilding Triangle’

As described in the previous section, peacebuilding strategies and success markers must be tailored to the specific context of the conflict they try to address. However, we can identify broad parameters that fit most conflicts. In the case of civil wars, Doyle and Sambanis propose three dimensions which must be addressed in successful peacekeeping strategies (2000) These are: (1) local sources of hostility, (2) local state capacities and (3) the degree of international commitment to assist change. The authors conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle, the area of which is the effective capacity for building peace, as shown in Figure 2. As the area is a function of all three dimensions, one dimension can compensate for another. For example, a high degree of international commitment can substitute for a low level of local capacity. Given the role bestowed upon the international community by international law and norms, the model assumes a purely positive level of international support. In other words, the international community is assumed to act in ways that *increase* the peacebuilding space.




Figure 2: The peacebuilding Triangle

Using proxy variables for these three dimensions, Doyle and Sambanis tested the triangle through a quantitative study of 124 civil wars and found that these dimensions are a statistically significant predictor of peacebuilding success (Doyle, 2007). In their 2011 book “Making war and building peace” the authors further explore the fundamental theory behind the Peacebuilding Triangle and apply it to several case studies of civil wars. The triangle also visualizes the relationship between the three dimensions. Conflicts with a high degree of hostility and a low degree of local capacity will require extensive international intervention, whereas a low degree of hostility of greater local capacities will require less extensive international efforts.

As the peacebuilding space is determined by all three dimensions, one dimension can thus compensate for another. This relationship is important when formulating peacekeeping mandates as some conflict will require a more intrusive foreign presence than others. For example, parties to a conflict with a high degree of hostility may not be willing to coordinate a peaceful resolution and must thus be persuaded or coerced into cooperation through a more robust level of peace enforcement. In conflict with a less hostility, where the factions can coordinate a peace agreement on their own, an observer mission may be sufficient to create trust and transparency and raise the cost of breaching the peace agreement. The more difficult it is for the parties to cooperate, the more authority the international peacebuilding mission must wield.

The authors suggest several indicators for the level of hostility in a civil war. The first is the *type of war*, and whether the war constitutes an ethno-religious war, as hostility is easily mobilized across ethnic lines. The second indicator is the number of deaths and displacements (refugees and IDPs) to measure human misery as a consequence of war. War duration was also tested but found not to be a significant determinant for successful peacebuilding. To measure local capacities, the authors found that the development level of the state, measured as per

capita energy consumption, is a significant predictor of peacebuilding success. That is, more developed states have a higher chance of peacebuilding success. Another measure for local capacities is the level of dependency on exporting natural resources. As such economies are less diversified, they are generally less developed, and the economic importance of natural resources makes them a valuable resource to fight over. Peace implementation is thus difficult in countries with a large amount of lootable resources (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011). The final dimension, international capabilities, is measured by different types of international engagement. The first is the level of international aid. Higher levels of net aid transfers per capita are associated with a higher probability of peacebuilding success. The second measure is the presence and level of authority of UN peacekeeping operations as the primary measure of international capacities. This level of authority is derived from the Peacekeeping mandate bestowed upon it by the UN Security Council.

The authors found that multidimensional enforcement missions, in other words those with a more intrusive mandate, had a much greater chance of peacebuilding success than traditional missions or observer missions. Especially in difficult conflicts with a high degree of cooperation dilemmas, traditional peacekeeping missions and observer missions prove to be highly unsuccessful. In situations with low levels of hostility and high levels of state capabilities, observer missions can however be successful. multidimensional operations are found to be the most effective overall. Overall, the authors find that UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on resolving civil wars, and a great level of international involvement can compensate for high levels of hostility of low state capabilities. The peacebuilding triangle suggests that peacebuilding efforts have the greatest chance of success when focusing on all three dimensions. In the analysis part of this thesis, we will apply these 3 dimensions in depth to the peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan.

Chapter 3: Historical Context of the Conflict in South Sudan

As we established in the previous chapters, peacekeeping missions are deployed under a variety of different contexts and local factors play an important role in determining successful outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a level of political, cultural and historical context to understand the civil war in South Sudan, from its history of subjugation and road to independence in 2011 to the current political situation. Within the scope of this chapter, we will not be able to do full justice to the complex history of South Sudan, but nevertheless a basic contextual understanding will provide us with the foundations for the analytical part of our case study. For this chapter we will draw heavily from the excellent book “First Raise a Flag” by BBC journalist and subject matter expert Peter Martell (2019).

Given the complex history of civil conflicts in the unified Republic of Sudan and subsequently Sudan and South Sudan, there is a need to distinguish between different conflicts, as presented in Table 1. The subject of this case study is the 2013-2018 South Sudanese Civil War (shown in bold), which formally ended in a 2018 peace agreement, but could be considered ongoing, due to residual communal violence, as well as armed resistance in the Equatoria region. This is further discussed in Chapter 4.

Conflict	Period	Description
First Sudanese Civil War	1955-1972	See Chapter 3.2
Second Sudanese Civil War	1983-2005	See Chapter 3.2
South Sudanese Civil War	2013-2018* *Can be perceived as ongoing.	See Chapters 3.3 through 3.6
War in Darfur	2003-present	Conflict between the state of (northern) Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Table 1. Summary of civil conflicts in the Sudans

3.1. Early history and British colonial rule

South Sudan is the world's youngest nation state, gaining independence from (northern) Sudan in 2011. The history of its people, however, starts much earlier. With its 644 thousand square kilometers, South Sudan is roughly the size of France. A vast land, but also distant and remote. The swamps in the region that is now South Sudan have long blocked access to outsiders from the North. When emperor Nero sent a roman force to explore the White Nile in 61 AD, they came as far as current day Malakal, at which point they were unable to continue due to the vast marshes they encountered (Martell, 2019). These marshes are what we now know as the Sudd, a vast swamp along the White Nile, which has long proved to be a natural barrier for southern Sudan. When European explorers came to find the source of the White Nile, they faced the same obstacles as the Romans did 2 millenniums earlier, with many explorers either starving to death or getting eaten by crocodiles as they tried to traverse the vast swamps (Martell, 2019). Due to this geographical isolation, even as the world was starting to be divided into nation states, the Nilotic peoples of South Sudan were still living in tribal communities. These include

the Nuer and Dinka which are today the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan. Other large tribes are the Shilluk, the Bari and the Zande. Things changed in the 19th century when Ottoman commander Muhammed Ali came to Cairo and took control over Egypt. From there he launched a large-scale invasion of Sudan, looking for gold, ivory, and slaves. This is the start of a period of conflict in the Sudans. Local tribes were able to mount little resistance to the slave raids, which started in 1826. While in West Africa, the Atlantic slave trade was finally coming to an end, with Britain abolishing slavery in 1833, the Arab slavers in Sudan were just getting started. By the late 19th century, they were enslaving tens of thousands of people each year, the horrors of which are described in detail by Martell (2019). The slave raids also created deep divisions between Northern and Southern Sudan as well as between the tribes living in the South.

Britain seized control of Egypt in 1882 and with it, gained control of Sudan. Slave merchants in Khartoum rebelled against orders from Europe to end the slave trade and the British soon found themselves fighting over a territory they had no strategic interest in. The rebels rallied behind Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah, known as 'the Mahdi' and in 1885, after a nearly year-long siege, the Mahdist rebels captured Khartoum, killing the British governor Charles George Gordon. This led to a period of Mahdist rule, until a British-Egyptian army recaptured Sudan in 1898. At this time, the scramble for Africa was in full swing, and the British set out to consolidate their control over Sudan. They ventured further south and decided to split up Sudan into Northern and Southern administrative areas, with special documentation required for those who wanted to cross from one into the other. Their effort to block the spread of Islam and the Arabic language to the South became known as the 'Southern Policy' (Mayo, 1994). There is an open debate about whether this policy contributed to the division of the Sudanese people, as years of slave raids had already led to a hostile environment between Arab northerners and black southerners. The British may have intended to protect the

South from exploitation by the North, but the resulting isolation of Southern Sudan also meant the South stagnated whereas the North developed (Martell, 2019). This further exacerbated the feeling among Southerners that they had been exploited and formalized the pillars of a split identity between the different groups.

During World War 2, British rule of Sudan was challenged by Italian forces, but a local Sudanese defense force was able to repel the Italian offensive. The British empire, however, was coming to an end. In 1946 the Southern Policy was lifted. As the British were preparing to leave, they started a process of “Sudanisation” to create a consolidated nation state. A scramble to rapidly develop Southern Sudan laid bare the enormous developmental difference with the North, and Southerners started to fear being dominated by Khartoum once again. In 1954, as the transitional period towards independence began, 250 Southern leaders called for an independent Southern state, unanimously voting to be autonomous from both Cairo and Khartoum. Their wish never came to pass. In August 1955, a Southern revolt was quickly suppressed by forces loyal to Khartoum and in December 1955 the Sudanese parliament in Khartoum declared independence, which was recognized by Britain and Egypt on January 1st, 1956. In a wave of independence movements across the African continent, Sudan was now an independent state, but the South was still being ruled from Khartoum and had failed to achieve autonomy. It would take another 60 years, 2 civil wars and enormous suffering and bloodshed for Southerners to gain their independence.

3.2. Two civil wars and the road to Southern independence

Although the 1955 uprising by Southern members of the military was quickly suppressed, the survivors fled into rural areas from where they started to plan an insurgency. This was the start of the First Sudanese Civil War, which would last for 17 years until 1972. In the years after the British left, the foreign presence in Sudan greatly decreased. For a few years, foreign

missionaries still provided schooling and healthcare in the South, but by 1962 lawmakers in Khartoum had restricted their activities. As the situation in the South worsened, the insurgency started to gain steam. By 1963 general Joseph Lagu started to raise an army of Southerners to oppose the North, a group that would become known as the Anyanya, or “snake venom”. As it was the height of the cold war, foreign actors tried to prop up whichever side they saw as favorable in the moment. The CIA supplied southern fighters with weapons for a while but stopped when Khartoum eased its Soviet ties. The rebels were outgunned as Khartoum was receiving aid from both the West and the Soviets - each trying to keep Sudan in their fold. The tables turned once more for the rebels when the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad decided to provide them with weapons. The rationale being that if the Sudanese army was caught up fighting in the South, they would not be able to assist Egypt in its conflict with Israel. Regional powers such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya provided aid to the rebels to counter the strength of the Sudanese army. Although the rebel force gained sizable numbers, they were unable to force the Northern troops out of the South and the war was reaching a stalemate. President Nimeiri in Khartoum had faced two coup attempts and realized that fighting a guerrilla uprising in the South meant he could not consolidate his power in the North. Meanwhile, Israeli support for the South was ebbing away. Both sides decided they could not keep fighting indefinitely and in 1972 signed the Addis Ababa agreement to end the war, which according to Martell caused between 500.000 and 1 million deaths (2019). The agreement established the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region, which gave the Southerners a degree of autonomy. A period of peace followed, but tensions between the North and South remained.

The discovery of oil would also change dynamics on the ground. By the mid 1970s, oil exploitation began in the North and in 1979 oil company Chevron discovered enormous oil reserves in the South. Oil proved a new source of government revenues, but it also exacerbated the political instability in Sudan. Although most of the oil fields were situated in the South, it

was the government in Khartoum that had control over the exploitation of the oil fields and that took the bulk of the profits. To enforce control over the oil fields, northern soldiers were being sent back to the South. There was now an economic aspect to the conflict between the North and the South. Tensions rose even further when the government in Khartoum decided to dig the Jonglei Canal to divert water from the Southern swamps to the North to provide water for Egypt. The growing sense of exploitation among southerners would help push the country back to war. Skirmishes started to break out, with Southern forces fleeing across the border to Ethiopia. Ethiopian president Mengistu had his own conflict with the government in Khartoum and decided to help Southern general John Garang set up the Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983. Publicly, Garang announced that he was seeking a democratic, unified Sudan - not an independent South Sudan. There were many among his ranks however who disagreed, which led to fighting among different factions within the SPLA. While training in Ethiopia the SPLA started to conduct small-scale raids on police outposts in the South. When president Nimeiri announced Sharia law would be enforced across Sudan, Southerners viewed this as a religious war by the Arabs against the South, leading many to join the ranks of the SPLA. Just as in the first Sudanese Civil war, foreign actors were supporting whichever side favored their geopolitical interests. Nimeiri was supported by Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan as well as the United States, whereas the Southerners were supported by Ethiopia, the Soviets and Libyans. As the rebels started to amass a more capable force, they also started to attack oil fields to disrupt this source of income for Khartoum. In 1985, the war had led to significant financial struggles in Sudan, and president Nimeiri was deposed by prime minister Sadiq. As Sadiq formed a new alliance with Libya, Libyan support for the Southern rebels dried up. In 1989 Sadiq was also deposed. His successor was Omar Al-Bashir, who would be president of Sudan for the next 30 years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union started to disintegrate, which in turn meant that the Ethiopian president lost his foreign backing. The SPLA lost Ethiopia as its base

of operations. Rivalries within the SPLA reached a boiling point in 1991, when Nuer leader Riek Machar and Shilluk leader Lam Akol announced their coup intent against John Garang, a Dinka. Southerners were now fighting other Southerners, mostly split along ethnic lines. The resulting violence would pit the different ethnic groups, which had coexisted and intermarried for generations, against each other.

By 1995 the tide of the conflict turned again. After Soviet support for the South ended, the door was now open for the United States, which decided to send weapons to the South through Uganda. As Khartoum supported the Kony rebel group in Uganda, the Ugandan president Museveni decided to support the Southerners by sending military units to push back the Sudanese army. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought the attention of the Bush administration to the region. The United States now demanded from the Sudanese government that it would find a political solution to the conflict. By 2002 there was a renewed momentum in the South, as Machar and Garang made peace and combined their forces. Under US, British, Norwegian, and Egyptian leadership, the peace process was started. Negotiations moved slowly, but incrementally and under enormous international pressure, a new peace deal was made: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2005. The agreement called for both sides to withdraw their forces, oil profits would be shared, and the South would be allowed to keep its own military forces. Most importantly, the agreement stipulated that a referendum on Southern independence would be held after 6 years, in 2011. Shortly after the peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) force was established to safeguard the peace agreement. After 21 years of fighting and 2 million deaths, the Second Sudanese Civil War was now over (Martell, 2019).

Six months later, John Garang died in a helicopter crash and SPLA leadership was taken over by Salva Kiir, Garang's second in command and a member of the Dinka ethnic group. Kiir was a strong proponent of independence and spent the next years heavily investing in the

southern military, increasing the SPLA numbers from 40.000 in 2005 to 200.000 in 2011 (Martell, 2019). Although the peace between the North and the South was upheld, conflict between different factions of Southerners started to break out based on old rivalries. Rather than forcing an end to these conflicts, the Southern government armed factions it perceived as loyal, and the country was too vast for the UNMIS peacekeeping mission to effectively patrol. In 2010, Kiir won the presidency of the South, which at that point was still a region within unified Sudan. Former rival Riek Machar became the vice-president and Kiir started to hand out some of the oil income to the leadership of rival militia to unite the South before the independence vote. These leaders were given positions as generals in the Southern military, and army units were being established along ethnic lines. A new clientelist elite was exploiting the national resources, this time not from Khartoum, but from Juba in the South itself (Pinaud, 2014). Rather than building a state, the elite was enriching itself. International backers of independence kept quiet, fearing that drawing attention to this nepotism would risk the independence vote. In Januari 2011 the independence vote happened, and 98.83 percent of voters chose secession (McDoom, 2011). On July 9th, 2011, after 2 civil wars and millions of deaths, South Sudan would become the world's youngest nation. The atrocities committed over 50 years of struggle and the nepotism of the new ruling elite, however, would set the stage for a new civil war within the South.

3.3. The South Sudanese Civil War

South Sudan was now a country and independence was followed by a brief period of optimism, but a new conflict was on the horizon. First, there were continued tensions between the South and the North. Both states claimed the oil rich Ayei region, and a new UN peacekeeping force (UNAMID) was deployed to maintain the peace. Inside the South, president Kiir could no longer afford to pay off the clientelist elites and old enemies started to resurface. New states

often end up in a domestic struggle over political control, and South Sudan was no exception (Wimmer, 2013). Riek Machar announced he would challenge Kiir in the next elections causing a rift within the SPLA. Some of the Dinkas, the largest ethnic group, rallied around Kiir, whereas others viewed him with suspicion. Many of the Nuer, the second largest ethnic group, rallied around Machar. As Kiir felt increasingly threatened, he rallied the forces loyal to him and started to recruit a Dinka militia force. In December 2013 fighting broke out in Juba between Dinka forces loyal to Kiir and Nuer forces loyal to Machar. After the Nuer forces were defeated, the Kiir loyalists went door to door, looking to round up any Nuer they could find. Hundreds of people were killed. Kiir claimed that Machar had tried to stage a coup, whereas Machar claimed Kiir had staged the violence to justify a crackdown and consolidate power. Neither could be independently confirmed. Meanwhile, most of the UN peacekeeping troops were deployed in remote regions, with little capacity in the capital. The fighting spread from the capital across the country. A Nuer militia called the “White Army” was formed, attacking Dinka communities in revenge. International leaders called for an end to the bloodshed, but Kiir and Machar had little control over the conflict that was now unleashed. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled from the violence and sought protection in the UN compounds. Kiir called for help from Uganda and the Darfuri rebels in the North. In the absence of state capability to provide security, people rallied among communal lines to provide collective security. An African Union inquiry into the violence documented unthinkable atrocities, including mutilation, torture, sexual abuse of minors and forced cannibalism (African Union, 2014). A UN survey showed that 70 percent of women in the Juba Protection of Civilians (PoC) camps reported having been raped (Sooka, 2016). The brutality of the conflict destroyed the fabric of society itself (Martell, 2019). In 2015, an internationally brokered peace deal, the “Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”, reinstated Machar as vice president as part of a transitional government (IGAD, 2015). By July 2016 the

agreement fell apart, as fighting broke out in the presidential palace between government forces and troops loyal to Machar. Fighting rapidly escalated and Machar fled Juba once again. Soldiers did not only target each other, but also civilians and international aid workers. The aid community got shaken when a group of government soldiers raped foreign aid workers staying at the Terrain hotel in Juba (Beaubien, 2016). It became obvious to the international community that foreign workers were now part of the conflict. With the war back in full force, the government provided arms to Dinka cattle herders, who conducted cattle raids on Nuer territory. As armed groups of Dinkas pushed further south and occupied the Equatoria region, the “national” army increasingly became a tribal army. The war may have started as a political conflict between two elites, but the atrocities committed along tribal lines and lack of central control now meant it was a conflict of anarchy and revenge. Even within tribal communities there were deep divisions, with Dinkas fighting other Dinkas and Nuer fighting Nuer. Political deals made in Juba meant little for communal struggles on the ground. Due to the fighting, oil production slowed down, and the economy was in a free fall. Ironically, the only thing that kept the state from total collapse was the billions of dollars the UN was pouring into its peacekeeping mission, thereby propping up a government that had become one of the latest perpetrators of human rights violations in the conflict (Martell, 2019). The deliberate killing of civilians by both the government and the rebels was recognized as a crime against humanity and the UN Human Rights commissioner for South Sudan warned of a repeat of Rwanda (Miles, 2016). By 2017, food security had gotten so bad that a famine was declared. There were international suggestions of forcing the government out of power and establishing a UN trusteeship to stabilize the country and organize elections. A series of peace deals were agreed on but quickly broken. Different factions within the ruling Dinka started to unite in rebellion against the government and the United States managed to pass an arms embargo against the South Sudanese government in the UN Security Council. This combination of internal and

external pressures brought Kiir and Machar back to the negotiation table and in September 2018, under leadership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, they signed the “Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan” (IGAD, 2018). Salva Kiir remained president and Riek Machar would be reinstated as a vice-president. While this deal has been largely upheld until now, many of the provisions of the deal, such as forming a new national army and forming a new national legislature have not yet been implemented. We will discuss the current political situation in more detail in Chapter 3.5.

3.4. The Role of External Actors

External actors have had a significant influence on the situation in South Sudan. This includes both individual states, state groupings, NGOs, and the international community under the auspices of the UN. The political peace process has been led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is a trade bloc in East Africa consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda (IGAD, 2010). IGAD supported the 2005 peace agreement between the SPLA and Khartoum. They also facilitated the 2015 and 2018 peace agreements between Kiir and Machar.

The United States was a major supporter of Southern independence and exerted significant influence on Khartoum to accept the results of the referendum. After independence, it became the largest donor to the new government in Juba. When the South Sudanese civil war broke out, the United States, together with Britain and Norway formed ‘the troika’, which supported the work of the IGAD (Mutasa and Virk, 2017). Although the US is still a major donor to South Sudan, relations have deteriorated due to lack of progress on political reform. Another major investor in capacity building projects in South Sudan is the European Union.

China's relationship with South Sudan started rather cold, as Beijing supported the regime in Khartoum prior to independence. Over time China has become more invested in the

country, both by the deployment of Chinese nationals as peacekeepers as well as through significant oil investments in South Sudan. Neighboring states, many of whom are represented in the IGAD formation, also have a significant stake in the conflict. Over 2 million South Sudanese refugees are hosted in the region, as shown in Table 2. Uganda has played an active military role in supporting president Kiir and has also played a diplomatic role in the peace process. South Africa has also been actively engaged in supporting IGAD in the political peace process.

Country	South Sudanese refugees
Uganda	923.565
Sudan	772.313
Ethiopia	667.730
Kenya	123.921
Democratic Republic of the Congo	55.819

Table 2: South Sudanese refugees in regional countries by June 30, 2021 (UNHCR, 2021)

The African Union (AU) has been engaged in the South Sudanese conflict under its “African solution to African problems” philosophy (Rudnicová, 2018). It established a commission of inquiry of the South Sudanese civil war in 2013 to investigate human rights violations. The Peace and Security Council has expressed its support for the UNMISS peacekeeping mission and declared that violations of the peace agreements could lead to sanctions. The AU also declared that in the case of ongoing human rights violations, an AU armed force could be deployed as a last solution under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. A proposal was made to complement the UNMISS mission with an AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), but this has not yet materialized. Although the 2018 peace agreement was primarily negotiated by IGAD, the AU formally endorsed the agreement and serves as a guarantor.

The United Nations has provided South Sudan with significant material support. This includes capacity building projects across the country under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), support for refugees and IDPs by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as well as the UNMISS peacekeeping mission, authorized by the Security Council. We will discuss the UNMISS mandate and its peacebuilding role in South Sudan in more detail in Chapter 4.

3.5. Current Political Situation

10 years after independence, the death toll of the South Sudanese civil war is over 400,000, with millions of people still displaced. The latest peace deal signed in 2018 has largely been upheld as President Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar formed a unity government. However, this means that the same 2 men that were responsible for the political breakdown which unleashed the civil war are still in power. Both men have spent most of their life in the armed forces and are biased towards the use of force and coercion as a source of authority, rather than deriving authority from legitimacy. There have been no elections since independence and thus there has been no civilian administration that was elected by popular vote. There is also a significant delay in the implementation of the peace deal and political institution building has been slow. South Sudan has been governed under a transitional constitution since independence in 2011, and it remains so today. In October 2021 a new bill was adopted on a constitution-making process, which is currently pending debate in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Although the legislative assembly was finally reconstituted in August 2021, it has made virtually no progress in setting up its specialized commissions due to disagreements among the parties (UNSC, 2021). Several state assemblies are also not yet reconstituted. Institution building in the country has been slow and ineffective. In the absence of credible institutions, power is consolidated at the executive level and there is little transparency around political decision making, which in turn makes accountability

difficult to achieve. State resources are still being allocated based on personal relations, rather than on national interests (Al Jazeera, 2021a). Corruption in the country is rampant. According to the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, political elites have stolen millions of dollars from public coffers since 2018 (OHCHR, 2021).

In the area of security, the unification of the national army has not been achieved, complicating efforts to provide security across the country. There has been an increase of local and intercommunal violence, sometimes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces (Al Jazeera, 2021b). The Western Equatoria region has seen a recent spike in violence. Equatorians are demanding greater autonomy from Juba, and leader of Equatorian rebel group National Salvation Front Thomas Cirillo did not sign on to the 2018 peace agreement (Boswell, 2021).

The civil war has also come at an enormous economic cost, with millions of people now being in a food emergency (IPC, 2020). With no major road networks, infrastructure is also lacking and access to education for South Sudan's young population is limited. For most basic services, such as schooling, medical supplies and food, the state has little to no domestic capabilities and is dependent on foreign aid agencies. The UN noted that in 2021, South Sudan remains one of the most dangerous places to work for aid workers (UN, 2021c). Despite years of foreign aid and capacity building programs, the South Sudanese state has developed only very limited capacity of its own. Post-independence relations between South Sudan and Sudan have improved in recent years since Sudan's leader Al-Bashir was deposed in a coup (DW, 2019). However, it is unclear how the relationship between the two Sudans will develop after the military takeover in Khartoum in October 2021 (Walsh, Dahir and Marks, 2021).

Chapter 4: Peacebuilding as a pillar of UNMISS

In the previous chapter we discussed the historical context of the South Sudanese civil war. We described the parties to the conflict, the events that took place, and the role of the international community. In this chapter we will zoom in on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, or UNMISS. We will discuss its mandated objectives and describe how these evolved during the course of the conflict. We will also discuss activities undertaken by the mission and the outcomes of its work. Finally, we will do a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the mission based on the extent to which it successfully implemented its mandate, and the extent to which its efforts built a sustainable peace. Given the complexity of conflict in the region, in Chapter 3 we delineated the South Sudanese Civil War from other conflicts in (South) Sudan. Similarly, table 3 delineates UNMISS from the other peacekeeping missions in the region.

Mission	Period active	Description
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005-2011	Predecessor of UNMISS. Created to enforce the 2005 peace agreement.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	2011-ongoing	Created to provide peacebuilding support in South Sudan after independence in 2011.
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	2011-ongoing	Enforces the peace in the disputed Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan.
United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007-2020	Hybrid UN-AU mission to enforce the peace in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Table 3: UN Peacekeeping missions in Sudan and South Sudan.

As of November 2021, UNMISS has 17,982 deployed personnel in South Sudan, including 13,254 peacekeeping troops and 1,411 UN police force members (UNMISS, 2021a).

Mission	Personnel Type	Personnel count
UNMISS	Civilians	2,268
	Experts on Mission	222
	Police	1,411
	Staff Officer	425
	Troops	13,254
	UN Volunteers	402
	Total UNMISS	17,982

Table 4: UNMISS personnel numbers by category.

93% of its uniformed personnel is male, and 7 percent is female (DPPA, 2020). The 2021-2022 budget of the mission is \$1.13bn, which is a 4.3 percent reduction from the previous period (UN General Assembly, 2021). The top five troop contributors as of October 2021 are as follows (UN, 2021a):

Country	Troops contributed
Rwanda	2,644
India	2,375
Nepal	1,762
Bangladesh	1,642
Ethiopia	1,521

Table 5: Top 5 troop contributors to UNMISS.

4.1. Mission Mandates and Objectives

On July 8th, 2011, The UN Security Council voted for resolution number 1996, establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, or UNMISS (UNSC, 2011). The next day, on July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became an independent state. UNMISS was tasked to consolidate peace and security in South Sudan, and help the government develop the necessary state capacity to govern effectively and democratically. The mission was originally created with 7.000 military personnel and 900 civilian police personnel. These numbers were projected to be reduced after the first year. The following is a summary of the original mandated mission tasks (UNSC, 2011):

- A. Support peace consolidation to foster state-building and economic development through: (1) the provision of good offices which provide advice on the political transition and governance, and (2) promoting public participation in the political process, including an inclusive constitutional process, and holding constitutional elections.
- B. Support the South Sudanese government in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and protection of civilians through: (1) facilitating the anticipation, prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflict, (2) the establishment of early warning capacity, (3) monitoring and reporting on human rights, (4) advising the government on security matters in compliance with human and refugee law, (5) deterring violence through active deployment and patrols in high risk areas where the government cannot provide security, and (6) providing security for United Nations and humanitarian personnel to safely implement their mandated tasks.
- C. Develop state capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the justice sector through: (1) developing strategies for security sector reform, (2) implement national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, (3) strengthening

the police services, (4) developing a military justice system, (5) facilitating a protective environment for children, and (6) supporting de-mining activities.

With a multidimensional, robust mandate invoking chapter VII of the charter, UNMISS was given the authority to use “all means necessary” to facilitate the peace process, protect civilians, deter violence, and protect UN staff. We can see that the original mandate, especially sections B and C were very much concerned with capacity building activities for the new South Sudanese state. We should also note that the UNMISS mandate was limited to activities related to South Sudan. A separate mission, UNISFA, was tasked with maintaining the peace on the border between South Sudan and Sudan in the north. When the South Sudanese civil war broke out in 2013, the Security Council was forced to revise the UNMISS mandate, replacing most of these capacity building activities with a more focused set of activities in the realm of peace and security, such as the Protection of Civilians (PoC). Within days of the South Sudanese Civil War breaking out, the Security Council passed resolution 2132, raising troop levels to 12,500 (UNSC, 2013). As the South Sudanese government of president Kiir was a party to the conflict, UNMISS could not count on the support of the host government (World Peace Foundation, 2017). A few months later, as the new security context of South Sudan became clear, the Security Council passed resolution 2187, transforming UNMISS from a multidimensional state building mission to a mission focused on (1) the protection of civilians, (2) monitoring human rights, (3) supporting humanitarian assistance, and (4) supporting the political process to end hostilities (UNSC, 2014). If resources were limited, priority was to be given to the protection of civilians.

The idea of peace consolidation through state-building was largely abandoned. The original UNMISS mandate had sought to improve state capacity by institutionalizing the processes needed for state governance to enhance state legitimacy. Despite its ambitious

efforts, this enhanced state legitimacy never materialized, leading to the political conflict that started in 2013 (Hutton, 2014). Hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese civilians fled the violence and sought protection in the UNMISS bases. Although UNMISS failed in the original consolidation of the peace, opening its gates for civilians fleeing from violence saved thousands of lives (World Peace Foundation, 2017). Meanwhile the relations between UNMISS and the government of South Sudan deteriorated. Government forces were one of the parties that civilians sought protection from in the UNMISS bases and Salva Kiir objected to what he saw as UNMISS efforts to set up a parallel government (BBC News, 2014).

Although UNMISS now had a stronger mandate in the security domain, it took a backseat in the political domain, partly due to its deteriorated relationship with the South Sudanese government. Instead, regional actors would become the key international peace brokers. Soon after the violence broke out, the ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) began negotiations between the South Sudanese government and the SPLM-IO forces led by Riek Machar. Although it would be a key implementing partner to any peace agreement, UNMISS was not part of these negotiations. In fact, the Security Council mandate did not give UNMISS any direct role in the peace negotiation. This meant that it would be implementing its mandate in parallel to peace negotiations that were led by another entity. After the 2015 peace agreement, UNMISS was given an incrementally larger role in the political peace process, as the Security Council mandated it to support the implementation of the agreement (UNSC, 2015). A year later, as the peace agreement fell apart, the Security Council again saw itself forced to adapt the mandate according to a worsening security situation. Due to increased attacks on the Protection of Civilian sites, they decided to increase troop numbers to 17.000 (UNSC, 2016). The renewed peace agreement in 2018 once again opened the door for a greater political role for UNMISS. Finally, the mission had a peace to keep, and the mission mandate was adjusted to add another pillar: supporting the

implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the Peace Process through the usage of the organization's good offices and ceasefire monitoring at the national and sub-national levels (UNSC, 2019). The mission's new Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), David Shearer, used his good offices to carve out additional political space for UNMISS, brokering peace negotiations between different commanders in the field (Hunt, 2020). Although the mission mandate has been primarily focused on the protection of civilians since 2013, the mission thus found an incremental role for itself in the political space, especially at the local level.

Its mandate was last renewed on March 12th, 2021, through Security Council resolution 2567. The current mandate focuses on four pillars: (1) The protection of civilians, (2) assisting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, (3) supporting the implementation of the peace agreement and (4) monitoring and reporting on human rights violations. We will discuss the activities undertaken to implement these mandated tasks in the following sections.

4.2. Protection of Civilians (PoC)

The first mandated task in the current UNMISS mandate is the Protection of Civilians (PoC). The mandate specifies a number of activities which should be implemented to achieve the PoC: (1) protecting civilians under threat of physical violence, with specific protection for women and children, (2) deter violence against civilians through proactive deployment and patrolling, (3) maintain safety and security within the PoC sites, (4) prevent and respond to gender-based violence, (5) prevent intercommunal conflict through mediation and engagement by the good offices, (6) support third-party initiatives for community violence reduction, (7) support capacity building in the justice sector, (8) supporting the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), (9) maintain free and safe access to and around Juba, and (10) to promptly engage any actor which prepares or engages in attacks against civilians.

This mandated task emerged when violence escalated in 2013 and 2014, and hundreds of thousands sought refuge in the UNMISS bases. These bases have since evolved into PoC sites which host over 200.000 people. There is a widespread consensus that these camps have saved thousands of lives and have possibly prevented a genocide - especially against the non-Dinka populations that sought refuge in the camps (Day *et al.*, 2019). The centrality of PoC in the UNMISS mandate and the establishment of such large-scale PoC sites make the mission stand out against other peacekeeping missions. However, there have also been several instances in which UNMISS was unable to provide security for civilians in and around the PoC camps due to dereliction of duty by UN troops (Cammaert, 2016). In response, the mission set up the Operational Coordination Committee, which reports to senior management and ensures adequate responses to the early warning system.

There have also been reports of high crime rates and failures to guarantee internal security within the PoC sites, which are essentially small cities housing thousands of people. However, the fact that most IDPs have not left the sites is evidence that the security within the PoC camps is still perceived to be better than that outside, in part due to the mandated efforts of UN police to keep order in the camps. In the 2019-2020 period, the mission conducted 259.599 police unit person days in around the PoC camps (UNGA, 2020). However, since the PoC sites only house around 10% of the 2 million IDPs within South Sudan (in addition to another 2 million in neighboring countries), we could wonder whether the large number of resources committed to the PoC sites is the most effective way to protect civilians overall. Indeed, it is the remote areas away from the PoC sites where the mission is facing a challenge to deter violence, as troop concentration around the PoC sites leaves fewer troops available to be deployed in remote areas. To address this situation, by late 2020, UNMISS had started to re-designate some of its PoC sites as conventional displacement camps for IDPs under the control of the government, including in Juba, Wau and Bor (UNMISS, 2020). UN Police

officers have meanwhile been involved in capacity building exercises to train a local police force. This allowed UNMISS to redeploy its troops from static locations that are relatively stable, to more remote locations which are hotspots of conflict. Meanwhile, the largest PoC camp in Bentiu, as well as the most vulnerable in Malakal remain under UNMISS control. In the 2019-2020 performance period, the mission conducted 615.581 mobile troop patrol days outside of its bases and 449.944 static troop days for the protection of its PoC sites (UNGA, 2020). Although the number of mobile days exceeds the number of static days, the ratio is roughly 1.4:1, whereas it was planned to be 10:1. The mission thus falls significantly short on its targeted mobile presence. In the same period, the mission also conducted 1.195 air patrol hours and removed 27.546 suspected explosives.

After the 2018 peace agreement, large-scale political violence has largely been shifted towards localized, communal violence. Much of this violence is driven by disputes over land and resources, including the prevalence of cattle raids (International Peace Institute, 2020). UNMISS has responded to this shift towards localized violence by organizing local reconciliation efforts, such as dialogues between different communities and brokering local resolutions. The 2019-2020 performance report demonstrates this focus on local efforts, with 1036 meetings organized at the local level to promote awareness of the mission versus 24 meetings at the national level. In the same period, the mission organized 275 reconciliation meetings at the community level (UNGA, 2020). The mission also organized 110 meetings between the national government and community leaders.

In its current state, it is difficult to ascertain how durable the 2018 peace agreement is and to what extent the forces controlled by the South Sudanese government could pose a threat to the civilian population, as they have during previous outbreaks of violence. If a similar situation were to occur, it is unclear whether the UNMISS forces would be able to adequately

respond to a threat by state actors, especially now that the control of several PoC sites has been returned to the government.

Another task which is part of the UNMISS PoC mandate is the assistance of the safe and voluntary returns of IDPs. In the long term, the mission aims to create conditions under which large-scale voluntary returns are possible, leading to the eventual closure of the PoC camps. In order to identify concerns regarding potential returns, the mission has organized consultation sessions with IDPs. The mission has also held consultations with local authorities and host communities to address challenges related to safe returns. As there is a perception that many IDPs stay in the camps not for security-related fears, but to be able to access the services provided in the camps, such services are now being set up in areas of potential return (Day *et al.*, 2019). This includes the construction of primary schools, boreholes, markets, and maternity wards (UNGA, 2020). The mission has several dilemmas to deal with regarding returns and relocations. Many of the non-Dinka IDPs are afraid to return home to Dinka-majority areas, as they do not feel that the government can provide them with sufficient security. In many cases, these people's properties may have been taken over by others. However, relocating these people to other areas where they are part of the ethnic majority, and may thus feel safer, risks further balkanising the country. If ethnically mixed areas cease to exist, the South Sudanese identity will likely suffer as well, planting the seeds for potential future conflict.

4.3. Enabling the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance

The second pillar of the UNMISS mandate is the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The mandate specifies the following activities to implement this pillar: (1) Provide the security conditions necessary for humanitarian actors to deliver humanitarian assistance, and (2) to ensure freedom of navigation for UN personnel and secure its installations and equipment.

To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, UNMISS pursues several strategies to reduce insecurity across South Sudan, such as through its support for the national peace process and the support for local conflict resolution. As discussed in the previous section, the consolidation of many vulnerable people in PoC camps has helped humanitarian agencies to serve communities in an efficient manner. However, this consolidation of resources has also meant that fewer resources were available to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance in remote areas away from the PoC sites. In addition to the PoC sites, UNMISS has also established temporary bases in places such as Yei and Leer which served as access hubs for civilian workers of humanitarian agencies. Despite the mission's efforts to protect civilian workers, South Sudan remains one of the world's most dangerous places for humanitarian workers to operate. In the 2019-2020 performance period, the mission reported 563 security incidents concerning humanitarian personnel, including the deaths of 7 humanitarian staff members (UNGA, 2020).

In the field, UNMISS has provided security services to humanitarian agencies to ensure their civilian workers have access to high conflict areas. The mission has also contributed to infrastructure projects, such as improvements of the road network as well as deployment of its air assets to enable more efficient delivery of humanitarian aid. However, much of its military capability to protect humanitarian actors is concentrated around its major bases. The mission is also somewhat handicapped by the need to request flight clearances from the government and lack of government support in general. Especially in the period prior to the 2018 peace agreement, government and SPLM-IO forces were the primary impediment for UNMISS to facilitate humanitarian delivery (Day *et al.*, 2019). UNMISS played a considerable role in negotiating humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas at the peak of the conflict.

The need for humanitarian assistance has become even more acute due to intense flooding in 2020 and 2021, putting additional pressure on an already vulnerable population

(Ward, Swails and McWhinnie, 2021). The World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that more than 850.000 people have been affected by the flooding, of which the agency has been able to support around half (WFP, 2021b). The agency notes that its access to many regions including Western Equatoria and Warrap State remain limited due to the security situation. There have also been cases of looting of WFP warehouses and detainment of WFP staff members in refugee camps under government control, where UNMISS has limited access (WFP, 2021a). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in addition to its pressure on vulnerable populations, the recent flooding has also affected the ability of aid agencies to reach these affected populations (OCHA, 2021b). Despite these challenges however, UNMISS continues to play an important role in facilitating humanitarian access through the protection of convoys and providing flights to parts of the country that are difficult to access. In the 2019-2020 period, 5.649 kilometers of patrol escorts were provided to humanitarian actors (UNGA, 2020).

4.4. Supporting the Implementation of the Peace Agreement

The third mandated task in the current UNMISS mandate is the support for the implementation of the peace agreement through (1) the usage of good offices to provide advice, technical assistance, and coordination with regional actors, (2) assisting all the parties in the peace process with conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, (3) supporting the work of CTSAMVM, RJMEC and other implementing mechanisms and (4) support the mechanisms of the peace agreement. As we can see, these mandated tasks in support of the peace agreement are defined quite broadly, and as with the negotiation of the peace agreement, the mission operates within a crowded space in which multiple actors are active. When looking at the role of UNMISS within the political landscape, we should distinguish between national and local politics.

As we have established in the previous sections, the process that led to the 2018 revised peace agreement was largely organized by parties other than UNMISS such as the High-Level Revitalization Forum under IGAD. To ensure the IGAD members could effectively monitor and oversee the implantation of the peace agreement, they also established the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) under Chapter VII of the agreement (IGAD, 2018). The RJMEC reports to the heads of state of the IGAD members. In addition to monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement, the RJMEC is also tasked with breaking political deadlocks within the South Sudanese government and regularly publishes reports on the progress of the implementation. To monitor the cessation of hostilities by the parties to the conflict, IGAD also constituted the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM). The personnel of CTSAMVM are posted in some of the most conflict-affected areas of the country and have a more narrow function than RJMEC, focusing on the monitoring and reporting on deteriorating security situations and compliance to the ceasefire. CTSAMVM reports to the IGAD council of ministers and the RJMEC. The role of UNMISS in the implementation of the peace agreement is rather peripheral, as it is not a guarantor of the agreement. Although UNMISS has no formal role in either CTSAMVM or RJMEC, it is mandated to support the work of both these bodies through the provision of security and logistical support. This is reflected in the fact that a key performance indicator of the mission in this pillar is the facilitation of RJMEC meetings. The mission also planned for technical assistance and national level workshops in support of a new permanent constitution but has been unable to make much progress due to delays in the formation of the National Constitutional Review Commission.

At the local level, UNMISS has been able to carve out a more distinct role for itself, facilitating dialogue between local commanders towards rapprochement, which has helped translate commitments made at the national level to local realities. Its political activities have

been led by its good offices whereas area security and logistical support have been facilitated by the UNMISS military wing. Given the ongoing conflicts at the local level, where national political actors often only have limited influence on local commanders, make these activities a critical component of a sustainable peace.

4.5. Monitoring and Investigating Human Rights

The fourth mandated task is monitoring, investigating, and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, through (1) monitoring and reporting on human rights violations, (2) monitoring and reporting on rights violations against women and children, in particular sexual violence, (3) monitor and report on hate speech and incitement of violence, and (4) support other agencies that monitor and report human rights violations.

Much of the work of UNMISS in the Human Rights pillar is conducted through its Human Rights Division which also represents the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UNMISS plays a key role in reporting on human rights violations in South Sudan, both through the periodic status reports of the Secretary General as well as through its specialized human rights reports. Such reporting highlights the complicated relationship UNMISS has with the South Sudanese government, which it has named as a human rights violator and which at the same time is a key partner for the implementation of the peace agreement. The mission views the reports as a deterrent for abusive behavior from all parties to the conflict (Day *et al.*, 2019). Reports on human rights abuses often also form the basis for Security Council decisions on embargoes against violators.

A major human rights issue in South Sudan is the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. The Q3 2021 quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians, issued by the UNMISS human right division, shows that the number of civilians affected by all types of violence in

this period is 37 percent lower than in the same period in the prior year, but the number of civilians affected by conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) increased by more than 50% (UNMISS, 2021b). The work of UNMISS in the human rights pillar is strongly connected to its work in the peacebuilding pillar. As we learned from the peacebuilding triangle, the level of hostility is one of the three key dimensions of the peacebuilding space. The use of sexual violence as weapon of war reflects an extreme level of hostility and the horrors of sexual violence must be resolved if a sustainable peace is to be achieved. Part of this process consists of holding perpetrators accountable. With the absence of credible national institutions to enforce the rule of law, it is difficult to end impunity. Under the PoC pillar of its mandate, the mission does have a limited responsibility to support capacity building in the justice sector. Although the mission abandoned most nation-building activities, it retains a small Rule of Law Advisory Section (RoLAS) and since 2018 has worked with the government to set up mobile courts to prosecute perpetrators in rural areas (Gilder, 2021). To reduce sexual violence the mission also conducts awareness raising workshops at both the national and local level (UNGA, 2020).

Overall, the UNMISS mandate in the human rights pillar is largely based on monitoring and reporting activities and when assessing its effectiveness, it is unclear to what extent we should judge the mission based on addressing the root causes for these abuses as well. For example, one of the key performance indicators of the mission in this pillar is the “number of confirmed abuses and violations of human rights” (UNGA, 2020). It is unclear however, if this indicator is supposed to reflect the human rights situation in South Sudan, or whether it reflects UNMISS’s ability to document and confirm such cases. Its own performance assessment seems to imply the latter. E.g., a higher number of confirmed cases reflects increased effectiveness by the mission, rather than a deteriorating human rights situation. The establishment of objective facts regarding human rights abuses have been valuable in drawing the attention of

the international community and putting pressure on perpetrators as well as the South Sudanese government to improve the human rights situation (Day *et al.*, 2019).

4.6. Discussion: Assessing the effectiveness of UNMISS

As discussed in chapter 2, the literature describes several different ways to assess peacebuilding success for UN peacekeeping missions. Doyle and Sambanis describe 2 different approaches. The first is the extent to which the peacekeeping mandate was implemented and the second is the extent to which peace was achieved (2011). Let us first assess the mandate implementation by discussing the effectiveness of the mission in each of the four pillars.

In the PoC pillar of the UNMISS mandate, it has taken impressive and unprecedented steps in the establishment of large-scale PoC sites hosting hundreds of thousands of people, which is recognized to have saved many lives. This commitment to the PoC sites, however, has also meant that the mission has fewer resources available to address hotspots of violence in remote regions. As the 2018 peace agreement has seen the conflict shift from national political actors to communal groups, this local role becomes more important. Although largely absent from the political arena at the national level, it is the local level where UNMISS has found a political role for itself in leading reconciliation efforts.

The delivery of humanitarian assistance depends largely on the reduction of insecurity, and in this sense is strongly related to other mandated goals, such as the protection of civilians and the support for the peace agreement. Despite remaining challenges to the delivery of humanitarian services, including recent flooding, the protection and logistical support provided by UNMISS continue to be an important aspect of humanitarian assistance. By establishing order in the areas around its perimeter and by brokering access with local political actors, the mission is a key enabler of humanitarian delivery. Similar to the Protection of Civilians however, there are questions about the utilization of UNMISS resources, which are largely

concentrated around its main bases and therefore limit the ability of the mission to facilitate humanitarian assistance in more remote places.

When it comes to its political work in supporting the implementation of the peace agreement, the mission operates in a complex web of international, national, and local actors. At the national level, the mission is limited to a supportive role, facilitating the work of the RJMEC and CTSAMVM. While it provides certain capacity building services at the national level, it is the local level where the mission has carved out a key role for itself by facilitating dialogue between national and local authorities as well as between communal leaders. One of the weaknesses of the 2015 failed peace agreement was its lack of inclusivity and these local efforts of the mission helped to foster buy-in and inclusivity at the local level.

In the Human Rights pillar of its mandate, the mission's primary focus is on monitoring and reporting. This creates an important set of objective data regarding the human rights situation in South Sudan, which helps direct the attention of the international community and puts pressure on national and local authorities to improve the human rights situation. Although the mission may only have limited direct influence on the human rights situation, these efforts are critical to end impunity, lower the level of hostility between different factions and build a sustainable peace.

Across the four pillars, UNMISS has made significant contributions to the peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan. Especially in the Protection of Civilians, the mission has played and continues to play a crucial role, providing security to hundreds of thousands of IDPs. In the areas of humanitarian assistance and human rights, the mission plays more of a supportive role, supporting and enabling other actors to provide critical services. The political peacebuilding pillar is perhaps where UNMISS has struggled most to carve out a clear role for itself. At the national level, the process is led by multiple other actors and UNMISS largely

takes a backseat. It is at the local level that the mission has been able to play a crucial role in reconciliation efforts to support the overall peace agreement.

Now that we have examined peacebuilding success from the perspective of mandate implementation, let us discuss the second perspective: the extent to which a stable peace was attained. Doyle and Sambanis define two definitions of peace (2011):

- *Sovereign Peace*, which requires an end to the civil war, undivided sovereignty of the state over its territory and no significant residual violence
- *Participatory Peace*, which requires sovereign peace plus a minimum level of political openness.

Doyle and Sambanis propose coding both types of peace two years after the end of the civil war. In the case of the South Sudanese peace agreement, which was signed in September 2018, this means from September 2020 onwards. Sovereign peace is measured by three variables. To achieve participatory peace, a fourth condition must be met. Table 6 below presents our assessment of these four variables in the case of South Sudan.

Determinants for effective peace	Assessment for South Sudan
1. Civil war has ended	Success
2. No significant residual violence (>200 deaths per year)	Failure
3. State sovereignty over entire territory	Failure
4. A minimum level of political openness	Failure

Table 6: Assessment of the determinants for sovereign (1-3) and participatory (1-4) peace.

The first variable is that the civil war has ended. Given the fact that the peace agreement between Kiir and Machar has largely been held, we will count this as a success. The second variable is the absence of residual violence. Although the number of deaths due to violence has decreased since signing the peace agreement, residual violence still far exceeds the maximum

200 deaths proposed by Doyle and Sambanis (Al Jazeera, 2020). Although I believe that a proportional measure defined as number of deaths per capita would be more appropriate than the static number proposed by Doyle and Sambanis, the thousands of deaths by violence cannot be counted as an absence of residual violence. The third variable is government sovereignty over the entire state territory. This is also counted as a failure, given the residual insurgency in Equatoria and the fact that the leader of the Equatorian rebels, Thomas Cerillo, is not a signatory of the peace agreement (ICG, 2021). The final variable, required for participatory peace, is a minimum level of political openness. Given that the current national government has been rejected by several factions within the country, as well as the fact that South Sudan has never held an election post-independence, we will also rank this as a failure. As measured through the four variables determined by Doyle and Sambanis, South Sudan has thus neither achieved *sovereign* nor *participatory* peace.

Ultimately, peacebuilding success in South Sudan is not determined by UNMISS alone. The mission is only one piece of the larger peacebuilding puzzle. It operates within a crowded space of international, regional, and local actors. External factors such as extreme flooding and the Covid-19 pandemic have further complicated its work. According to the theory, UNMISS's ability to contribute to a successful peacebuilding effort is ultimately determined by the "peacebuilding space", which we will examine in the next chapter as we apply the Peacebuilding Triangle to South Sudan.

Chapter 5: Analysis: Applying the ‘Peacebuilding Triangle’ to South Sudan

In chapter 2 we established the theoretical basis for international conflict resolution, UN peacekeeping missions, and the concept of the “Peacebuilding Triangle” as introduced by Doyle and Sambanis. The triangle describes how the capacity for successful peacebuilding, or the “peacebuilding space” is determined by a combination of three factors: (1) the level of hostility between the factions, (2) the capabilities of the state and (3) the level of international assistance. Chapter 3 discussed the historical context of the South Sudanese Civil War, as well as the current political situation, providing the foundation of our analysis on the hostility and state capabilities. Chapter 4 discussed the mandate, activities, and effectiveness of the UNMISS peacekeeping mission, providing a foundation for our analysis of the level of international assistance. In this chapter, we will build on these prior chapters by applying the Peacebuilding Triangle as a framework of analysis on the South Sudanese civil war. The following sections will discuss the three dimensions of the triangle and finally present a qualitative assessment of the peacebuilding space.

5.1. Hostility of the factions

South Sudan suffers from many drivers for violent outcomes, such as a high degree of residual hostility after the civil war, power struggles between political elites, a history of cattle raiding and communal conflict, resource scarcity and the proliferation of small arms. Together, these drivers accumulate to a high level of hostility between the factions, which has proven difficult to overcome.

Competition between different ethnic communities intensified when in 1991 the SPLA split along ethnic lines. Acts of extreme violence, as described in chapter 3, rapidly increased

the level of hostility between ethnic groups. After the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005, the South was no longer united against a common enemy in the North, and these old conflicts further intensified. Doyle and Sambanis identify the level of ethnic fractionalization as a key determinant for the level of hostility. A challenge for South Sudan is that as the world's youngest state, its national identity is not yet embraced, and there is no collective identity to unite the heterogeneous people of South Sudan (Kulang and Chidiebere, 2020). There are over 60 ethnic groups in the country and a significant portion of the population can only communicate in their local language, which makes it difficult to relate to others. At 35%, South Sudan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world (UNESCO, 2018). This presents enormous challenges for the need to reintegrate hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants and IDPs.

South Sudan suffers from a history of cattle raiding due to the centrality of cattle in pastoralist cultures, as well as competition over pastures and wells. This is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms after the end of the independence war (Kahl, 2013). A major contributor to the level of hostility between factions in South Sudan is the national power struggle between political elites. Drawing from Elite Manipulation Theory, Kulang et al explain how Kiir and Machar have utilized ethnic tensions to acquire and maintain political power. Rather than being national unifiers, these national political elites are incentivized to leverage ethnic tensions to ensure their political survival (Kulang and Chidiebere, 2020). This also helps explain the difficulties faced in forming a unified army command. Another cause for intercommunal conflict is the competition over local resources such as grazing land and water (Hartwig and Ong'ondi, 2014). This competition has deepened due to natural disasters such as extreme flooding. Because of the circulation of weapons in the civilian population, existing inter-communal tensions now escalate much quicker and lead to more violent outcomes. UNMISS has played a role in arms control but suffers from a low willingness from local

communities to hand over weapons (Stalin Gebreselassie, 2018). There has also been a decreasing role of local chiefs and elders, who used to play a key role in brokering agreements in intercommunal conflicts (Martell, 2019). Instead, the independence war led to the rise of a new, younger generation of elites who rose through the rebel ranks and have learned to rely on violence to resolve disputes. Authority has thus shifted from chiefdoms to SPLA and army commanders (Hartwig and Ong'ondi, 2014). Violence is also linked to development. Zambkari found that the least developed states in South Sudan were also the ones with the highest levels of violence (2013). This demonstrates how the 'hostility' dimension interacts with the 'state capabilities' dimension.

A focus on tribal competition and cattle raiding does not do full justice to the complexity of Dinka-Nuer relations, however. Johnson did an extensive study of Nuer-Dinka relations between 1860-1976 and found a complex web of feudal raids, combined with periods of peaceful coexistence and intermarriage (1982). Nuer migration to Dinka lands was primarily driven by ecological changes and population pressure, not to raid the Dinka. We must thus be careful not to oversimplify tribal relations in South Sudan as a perpetual tribal conflict, a mistake often made by Western scholars studying the African continent. The different factions within South Sudan showed an impressive capacity to unite under John Garang when faced with a common adversary in the North, and the current hostile relations between some of the tribal groups are not as much a 'natural' outcome of competition over resources as it is an effect of the tribal mobilization by political elites.

In summary, South Sudan suffers from a high level of hostility between the different factions. This is partly the result of pre-existing levels of hostility from a tradition of cattle raiding, further enhanced with ethnic mobilization in the context of power struggles by political elites. This high degree of hostility and distrust significantly reduces the peacebuilding space

as we will see in chapter 5.4. However, historical periods of peaceful coexistence are a hopeful sign that the current level of hostility could be overcome.

5.2. State capabilities

The South Sudanese state is one of the weakest and least capable in the world, and scores very low on all development indicators. The 2021 Fragile States Index (FSI) ranks it at place 4th most fragile out of 179 assessed countries (Fund for Peace, 2021). It scores especially poorly on indicators ranking state security, the state capability to provide government services and the huge numbers of IDPs and refugees. The 2020 Human Development Index shows a very similar story, placing South Sudan at place 185 out of 189 (UNDP, 2020). At 35%, South Sudan also has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world (UNESCO, 2018). It further lacks good infrastructure, skilled labor, is heavily dependent on the export of oil and suffers from high levels of corruption.

The South Sudanese government does not have full control over the entirety of the state's territory and is unable to provide security for its citizens. The weakness of state institutions has further deteriorated public trust in the government and led to communities arming themselves in self-defense (Zambakari, 2013). This further exacerbates the issue of limited government authority and lack of government control over the entirety of its territory. Many communities cannot feel the government security presence and still pursue their own system for law and order. Others have sought protection in UNMISS PoC camps. International capacity building efforts have led to the construction of something that may look like a state on paper but does not perform anything like it. South Sudan passes the juridical dimension of statehood, but in the empirical dimension could be seen as a failed state (Okeke *et al.*, 2021).

In part due to the “Southern Policy” under British colonial rule, Southern Sudan never developed key infrastructure and credible government institutions. This largely continued

under the unified Sudan, and when the country became independent in 2011, it essentially had to be built up from scratch. Ambitious nation building programs were drafted up, but with the outbreak of the South Sudanese Civil War, these were scrapped. After a decade of independence, the South Sudanese state is still incapable of providing even the most basic services to its citizens and relies largely on international aid for schooling and the provision of medical care. UNOCHA estimates that 8.3 million people in South Sudan need humanitarian aid (2021b).

With a GDP per capita of 275 USD, South Sudan has one of the lowest economic outputs in the world (IMF, 2019). The South Sudanese economy is almost entirely dependent on oil exports with 98 percent of the government budget funded by oil (Benjamin Takpiny, 2021). Doyle and Sambanis defined reliance on primary commodity exports and oil export dependence as key indicators of weak local capacities, explaining that such reliance on oil exports is associated with underdeveloped institutions and high levels of corruption (Doyle and Sambanis, 2011). In the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), South Sudan is ranked at the very last place out of 179 countries (Transparency International, 2020). Meanwhile the physical infrastructure is one of the worst in the world. Out of the 17.000 km of roads in South Sudan, only 192 km is paved (OCHA, 2021a). Two thirds of these roads become inaccessible during the rainy season and less than one third of the population has access to electricity. According to World Bank data, South Sudan ranks second-last in the world in energy consumption per capita with 44 KWh. Furthermore, there is no mobile network coverage in most remote areas.

Overall, South Sudanese state capabilities are largely non-existent. The government is unable to provide even the most basic services and is strongly dependent on foreign aid. The government budget is almost entirely funded by oil exports, the state suffers from high levels of corruption and weak institutions. These problems are further exacerbated by ongoing violent conflict and natural disasters such as extreme flooding.

5.3. Level of international assistance

Since the period leading up to its independence in 2011, South Sudan has received much attention from international organizations, donors, and NGOs. There is a wide range of actors present in the country, working on diverse issues such as humanitarian assistance, political facilitation, capacity building, and security. In chapter 4 we explored the evolving mandate of UNMISS, starting in 2011 with a range of nation-building activities which transformed during the civil war into a much more narrow PoC focused mandate. Although the mission abandoned most of its nation-building activities, it innovated by transforming UNMISS bases into impromptu PoC camps. The changing security dynamics due to the civil war also led to rising troop numbers. Despite recent reductions, UNMISS is still one of the largest UN Peacekeeping missions by personnel numbers as shown in figure 3.




Figure 3: Personnel numbers of active UN Peacekeeping missions in 2021.

Doyle and Sambanis suggest that the type peacekeeping mandate (see chapter 2.3 for an overview of mandate types) can be used as a proxy for the mission strength, and therefore as a

measure for the international capacity (2011). To code peacekeeping mandates as a proxy for mission strength, they group missions into two broad categories. First there is the *monitoring* category, which consists of observer missions and traditional peacekeeping missions. Second, there is the *transformational* peacekeeping category, which combines multidimensional and enforcement missions. These have a more “robust” mandate and suggest a higher level of international capacity. As discussed in Chapter 4, UNMISS thus falls into this latter category of *transformational* peacekeeping missions.

In addition to the UN peacekeeping and humanitarian agencies on the ground, there are also several groupings of nation-states that serve as facilitators of peace negotiations and guarantors of the peace agreement. Central to this process is the IGAD as well as the CTSAMVM. The Troika and the African Union also play a role in the political process. Many UN agencies have a presence in the country such as the FAO, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMISS, UNOPS, UNWOMEN and the WFP. In addition to UN-affiliated organizations, there are also many NGOs active in South Sudan. According to the World Bank, South Sudan receives almost 2 billion of net official development aid annually (2019). This makes it one of the largest aid recipients in the world, especially when taken as a proportion of the total imports of goods, services, and primary income, which in South Sudan stands at 43%.

Given the plurality of international actors present in South Sudan, as well as the different operational dimensions in which they are active, it is a challenge to provide an absolute assessment of the level of international capacity. We have seen in this chapter that South Sudan is one of the largest aid recipients in the world, and the UNMISS peacekeeping mission has one of the largest troop numbers. However, since UNMISS dropped most of its mandated capacity-building tasks and other international actors are primarily focused on

providing immediate humanitarian relief, South Sudan no longer receives the same level of nation-building attention as it did at the time of independence.

5.4. Discussion

In the previous chapters we made a qualitative assessment of South Sudan along the three dimensions of the Peacebuilding Triangle. We will now combine our assessment of these three dimensions to theorize the shape and size of the peacebuilding space in South Sudan. We found a high level of hostility between the factions, due to a history of cattle raiding between different ethnic groups which has been leveraged by political elites to split society along ethnic lines. Atrocities committed during the civil war and the large number of small arms in civilian possession further exacerbates the level of hostility. There is, however, also a history of peaceful coexistence as well as unified resistance against the North during the time of John Garang. Overall, we consider the level of hostility as high, but not necessarily insurmountable. When it comes to local capacity, we must conclude it is virtually non-existent. Since independence, South Sudan has never had a functional government and has suffered from high levels of corruption. Its economy is almost entirely dependent on oil exports, lacks infrastructure, has no credible institutions, no unified army and is almost entirely dependent on humanitarian agencies to provide services. Indeed, the level of international capacity is significantly larger. UNMISS is one of the largest UN missions, with a robust peacekeeping mandate. South Sudan is also one of the largest aid recipients in the world and a plethora of agencies is active on the ground. In addition, there are several high nation state groupings such as the IGAD and the Troika which are engaged in its political process. However, since the civil war, these international actors have been largely concerned with the protection of civilians as well as providing humanitarian assistance, but less so in local capacity building. Overall, we

rank the level of international capabilities as medium-high. Our final assessment of the three dimensions is summarized in table 7.

Dimension	Summary of Assessment
Hostility Between Factions	<i>High</i> , due to high level of ethnic fractionalization, lack of national identity and the legacy of brutal inter-communal violence.
Local Capacity	<i>Largely non-existent</i> . The state relies on international aid to provide even the most basic services.
International Capabilities	<i>Medium-high</i> . One of the largest UN Peacekeeping missions in history, but with only a limited nation-building mandate.

Table 7: Summary of the dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle in South Sudan.

Doyle and Sambanis discuss several potential proxy variables to measure each of these dimensions, which shows us the difficulty of assessing these complex phenomena. There is no single measure that can encapsulate all the complex factors on the ground when estimating the level of hostility, local capacity, or international capabilities. For example, we can question how useful the type of peacekeeping mandate is as a proxy for measuring mission strength in determining the level of international capacity, as peacekeeping missions have often suffered from a gap between the mandate objectives and the realities on the field. Expressing a robust international response through a multidimensional peacekeeping mandate is one thing, but it does not guarantee that adequate resources are supplied, or the political will exists to effectively follow through, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. A qualitative assessment like the one conducted in this study allows us to take local contextual complexities into account, while still following a structured approach in analyzing the peacebuilding space, along the three dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle. For example, we have complimented the peacekeeping mandate perspective with other indicators, such as the level of international aid received, to form a better understanding of the international capabilities. As with all qualitative studies, this comes as the

cost of comparability. A quantitative approach, using purely numerical indicators would offer greater opportunities for comparison across cases. Although our assessment of the peacebuilding space is not quantitative, we can visualize it by plotting the dimensions on the peacebuilding triangle using the qualitative assessment above. Figure 4 below gives us an idea about the shape and size of the peacebuilding space in South Sudan.




Figure 4: Visualizing our qualitative analysis of the South Sudanese Peacebuilding Space on the Peacebuilding Triangle

The shape of the peacebuilding space allows us to compare the peacebuilding conditions across different conflicts to look for similarities. For example, the shape of the peacebuilding space that we identified for South Sudan looks like that which Doyle and Sambanis compiled for Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. A major difference is that UNMISS has a much more robust PoC mandate and troop presence than UNAMIR had in Rwanda. It is impossible to tell how the conflict in South Sudan would have played out had UNMISS not been deployed, but lessons from the past suggest that the outcomes could have been far worse.

What Figure 4 does not show us, is how the three dimensions interact. As discussed in chapter 2.5, the dimensions do not exist independent of each other. International capacity

building efforts have the potential to enhance local capabilities, for example by helping to build credible institutions and develop technical expertise. Local reconciliation efforts such as those conducted by UNMISS also have the potential of reducing the level of hostility between the factions. Paradoxically, international aid may also exacerbate the level of hostility and the low level of local capabilities. Since the warring factions have been able to manipulate the flow of aid, they have been able to use these aid flows to enhance their own legitimacy. Furthermore, dependency on international aid has allowed the South Sudanese government to sustain itself, focusing on military expenditures without developing the necessary local capabilities (Washburne, 2013). It is therefore critical that international aid is provided in conjunction with building local institutional capacity. This is another example of the intricate complexities that are key to any study of peacebuilding efforts. The peacebuilding triangle can be a useful tool of analysis to understand the high-level determinants of successful peacebuilding, but it does not capture all the relevant conditions on the ground.

In Chapter 4 we studied the mandate and operations of UNMISS and used two different methodologies to determine whether the mission had been successful in its peacebuilding efforts. We found that the mission has been largely successful in executing its mandate and has a clear positive impact on the ground. However, its efforts have not led to the establishment of either sovereign or participatory peace as defined by Doyle and Sambanis. Our analysis of the peacebuilding space in South Sudan helps us understand this outcome. As shown by the peacebuilding triangle, sustainable peace will require developing state capacities and reducing the level of hostility. Despite its important work, UNMISS is likely not well positioned to make considerable progress in these domains, as most nation-building tasks have been stripped from its mandate.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study set out to establish whether the peacebuilding efforts of UNMISS in South Sudan have been successful, and to identify which contextual factors of the South Sudanese civil war have influenced the effectiveness of the mission. To establish whether the mission has been successful, we applied two different perspectives: first, the extent to which the mission mandate was successfully implemented and second, whether the criteria for either *sovereign* or *participatory peace* as defined by Doyle and Sambanis have been met. The UNMISS mandate is formulated across four pillars: (1) Protection of civilians, (2) enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid, (3) supporting the implementation of the peace agreement and (4) monitoring and reporting on human rights violations. Based on a qualitative case analysis of the mandate and related activities, we found that the mission played a key role in the protection of civilians, supporting other agencies with the delivery of humanitarian aid, and monitoring the human rights situation. Despite political challenges at the national level, UNMISS carved out an important role for itself in facilitating reconciliation dialogue at the local level. Overall, it can be concluded that UNMISS has made major contributions in all four pillars of its mandate. However, our application of the success criteria for peacebuilding as defined by Doyle and Sambanis shows that despite these efforts, South Sudan has not achieved either *sovereign* or *participatory peace*. Although the civil war officially ended with the 2018 peace agreement, the government does not have full sovereignty over the entire state territory and there is still significant residual violence. Based on our qualitative application of the Peacebuilding Triangle on the conflict in South Sudan, we were able to identify the contextual factors which determine the capacity for successful peacebuilding in the country. The results indicate a high level of *hostility*, an almost non-existent level of *local capacity*, and a medium-high level of *international capacity*. These results suggest that to increase the peacebuilding space, and

therefore the capacity for successful peacebuilding, it is critical to reduce the level of hostility and develop local state capabilities.

Our findings further suggest that there is a two-way relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and the peacebuilding space as defined on the peacebuilding triangle. First, the size of the peacebuilding space determines the probability of mission success, and the narrow peacebuilding space in South Sudan helps us understand why UNMISS has not achieved either sovereign or participatory peace, despite the successful implementation of its mandated tasks. On the other hand, the mission is also an actor with agency to actively shape the peacebuilding space. Our study shows, for example, how UNMISS has conducted extensive local reconciliation efforts to reduce the level of hostility, as well as organized capacity building programs to enhance local state capabilities. This research clearly illustrates how a UN peacekeeping mission can influence all three dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle but raises the question of the extent to which it is able to do so. Our study also confirms how notoriously difficult it is to establish success criteria for peacekeeping missions, as our two perspectives, mandate-implementation, and peacebuilding-success, show very different results.

While the fact that this is a single case study limits the generalizability of our results, this study does provide new insights into the peacebuilding space of South Sudan and allows us to make some recommendations to both scholars and practitioners. First, our study suggests that the extent to which a mission has expanded the peacebuilding space, and therefore the chances of peacebuilding success, could be a viable measure for peacekeeping effectiveness. To better understand the ability of peacekeeping missions to expand the peacebuilding space, further research could be conducted into the relationship between peacekeeping missions and each of the three peacebuilding dimensions. Furthermore, a multiple-case study, applying the peacebuilding triangle as a qualitative tool of analysis, could help define a generalizable set of qualitative coding standards for ranking the dimensions of the triangle. Doing so would

enhance the structured comparability of future studies. For practitioners, our study suggests that the reduction of hostility and local capacity building programs can increase the probability of peacebuilding success. In the case of South Sudan, a key barrier to such peacebuilding success is the virtually non-existent level of local state capabilities. The onset of violence in 2013 forced the Security Council to abandon most nation building activities in South Sudan. However, since then the security situation has significantly stabilized. Our results suggest that the mission may consider restarting nation building activities to help the South Sudanese state develop the necessary local capacity and ensure the long-term sustainability of state institutions. Furthermore, our study suggests that although international aid has the potential to expand the peacebuilding space, it should be operationalized in a way that does not preclude the development of local capacities. This shows how an effort to expand one dimension of the peacebuilding triangle may inadvertently negatively affect another.

Peacekeeping is often described as a highly imperfect tool, and it is easy to find examples of peacekeeping failures. Yet, peacekeeping remains an indispensable instrument for the international community to manage conflict and reduce human suffering. As peacekeeping has evolved over time to adapt to new challenges, so has the body of literature describing peacekeeping effectiveness. Doyle and Sambanis theorized that the probability of peacebuilding success is determined by the peacebuilding space, as defined by the peacebuilding triangle. Indeed, the shape of the peacebuilding space in South Sudan helps us understand how a high level of hostility and very low levels of state capability have reduced the ability of UNMISS to achieve peacebuilding success. The ever-expanding body of peacekeeping literature has guided the evolution of peacekeeping towards a more effective tool for international conflict management. Through this case study of UNMISS and our analysis of the South Sudanese peacebuilding space, this Master Thesis has tried to make a humble contribution to this critical subject within the field of international relations.

References

- African Union (2014) 'Final report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on south Sudan Addis Ababa 15 October 2014'. Available at: <https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/8329> (Accessed: 17 December 2021).
- Al Jazeera (2020) *More than 1,000 killed in six months in South Sudan, Al Jazeera*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/17/un-says-over-1000-killed-in-six-months-in-s-sudan> (Accessed: 4 January 2022).
- Al Jazeera (2021a) *Can there be a peaceful future for South Sudan? | Inside Story*. Youtube. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyWu3wSp3jE> (Accessed: 20 December 2021).
- Al Jazeera (2021b) *'Unimaginable' South Sudan violence could amount to war crimes, Al Jazeera*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/9/south-sudan-clashes-killed-dozens-displaced-thousands-amnesty> (Accessed: 10 December 2021).
- Autesserre, S. (2017) 'International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness', *International Studies Review*, 19(1), pp. 114–132.
- Bakare, O.E. (2015) *International Capacity in building Post-Conflict peace in Sudan: Applying Peacebuilding Triangle*. Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) - Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi (DAÜ). Available at: <http://i-rep.emu.edu.tr:8080/jspui/handle/11129/3039> (Accessed: 5 December 2021).
- BBC News (2014) *South Sudan President Salva Kiir hits out at UN, BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25826598> (Accessed: 26 December 2021).
- Beardsley, K. (2013) 'The UN at the peacemaking–peacebuilding nexus', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, pp. 369–386. doi:10.1177/0738894213491354.
- Beaubien, J. (2016) *U.N. Report Addresses Gang Rape Of Aid Workers In South Sudan, NPR*. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/08/23/491057541/gang-rape-of-aid-workers-in-south-sudan-is-a-turning-point> (Accessed: 18 December 2021).
- Bellamy, A.J. (2010) 'The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On', *Ethics & international affairs*, 24(2), pp. 143–169.
- Belloni, R. (2005) 'Peacebuilding at the local level: Refugee return to Prijedor', *International peacekeeping*, 12(3), pp. 434–447.
- Benjamin Takpiny (2021) *South Sudan misused oil revenues: Government official*. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-sudan-misused-oil-revenues-government-official/2287403> (Accessed: 19 January 2022).
- Boswell, A. (2021) *Conflict and crisis in south Sudan's equatoria*. Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/sr_493-conflict_and_crisis_in_south_sudans_equatoria.pdf (Accessed: 21 December 2021).
- Brahimi, L. (2000) 'Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations'. Available at: <https://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=GB2013202905>.
- Burton, J.W. (1990) '„Conflict Resolution', *Prevention. New York: St. Martin's Press* [Preprint]. Available at:

<http://wizwah.gmu.edu/johnwburton/files/original/1efa7cfc6161f59c6f0c7b53526e8e79.pdf>.

Cammaert, P.C. (2016) 'Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response'.

Chopra, J. and Hohe, T. (2004) '11 Participatory Peacebuilding', *Building sustainable peace*, p. 241.

de Coning, C. (2018) 'Adaptive peacebuilding', *International affairs*, 94(2), pp. 301–317.

Day, A. *et al.* (2019) 'Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)', *EPON Report* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/handle/11250/2647555>.

Di Salvatore, J. (2017) *Peacekeepers Against Ethnic and Criminal Violence: Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping*. Universiteit van Amsterdam [Host].

Di Salvatore, J. and Ruggeri, A. (2017) 'Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Doyle, M.W. (2007) 'The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, pp. 1–15. doi:10.1163/19426720-01301001.

Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000) 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *The American political science review*, 94(4), pp. 779–801.

Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2011) *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press.

DPPA (2020) 'UNMISS mission fact sheet 2020'.

DW (2019) *Can Sudan and South Sudan find friendship?*, *DW.COM*. Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com). Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/can-sudan-and-south-sudan-find-friendship/a-51255829> (Accessed: 21 December 2021).

Fisher, R.J. (2007) 'Assessing the Contingency Model of Third-Party Intervention in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation', *Journal of peace research*, 44(3), pp. 311–329.

Fund for Peace (2021) 'Fragile States Index 2021'. Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

Gilder, A. (2021) 'UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Local in (Re) building the Rule of Law', *Utrecht Law Review*, *Forthcoming* [Preprint]. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3860002.

Gowan, R. (2019) *The Politics of Action for Peacekeeping*, *United Nations University*. Available at: <https://cpr.unu.edu/publications/articles/the-politics-of-action-for-peacekeeping.html> (Accessed: 10 December 2021).

Hartwig, E. and Ong'ondi, T.G. (2014) 'How can development cooperation contribute to peaceful conflict resolution in South Sudan?', *Forging Two Nations Insights on Sudan and South Sudan*, p. 174.

Hazen, J.M. (2007) 'Can Peacekeepers Be Peacebuilders?', *International peacekeeping*, 14(3), pp. 323–338.

Hearn, S., Bujones, A.K. and Kugel, A. (2014) *The united nations 'peacebuilding architecture': Past, present and future*. Available at: https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un_peace_architecture.pdf (Accessed: 3 December 2021).

- Hunt, C.T. (2020) 'Waiting for peace: A Review of UNMISS' Political Strategy in South Sudan', *The Political Practice of Peacekeeping: How Strategies for Peace Operations are Developed and Implemented* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/4412/SouthSudan.pdf>.
- Hutton, L. (2014) *Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate During a Civil War*.
- ICG (2021) 'South Sudan's Other War: Resolving the Insurgency in Equatoria'.
- IGAD (2010) *About us, IGAD*. Available at: <https://igad.int/about-us> (Accessed: 18 December 2021).
- IGAD (2015) *Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the republic of south Sudan*. Addis Ababa.
- IGAD (2018) 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)'. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- IMF (2019) 'World Economic Outlook Database 2019'.
- International Peace Institute (2020) 'Prioritization and Sequencing of Peacekeeping Mandates: The Case of UNMISS'.
- IPC (2020) 'South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group: IPC Acute Food Insecurity & Acute Malnutrition. October 2020 - July 2021'.
- Johnson, D.H. (1982) *Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer-Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf Valleys, C. 1860-1976*.
- Kahl, M. (2013) 'The challenge of increasing the security of the people in South Sudan', in Grawert, E. (ed.) *Forging Two Nations Insights on Sudan and South Sudan*. OSSREA, pp. 201–218.
- Keohane, R.O. and Martin, L.L. (1995) 'The Promise of Institutional Theory', *International security*, 20(1), pp. 39–51.
- Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (1973) 'Power and interdependence', *Survival*, 15(4), pp. 158–165.
- Kulang, T.T. and Chidiebere, C.O. (2020) 'South Sudan: Ethnicity and Statehood. Perceptions and the Way Forward', *Conflict Studies* [Preprint]. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chidiebere-Ogbonna/publication/340952732_South_Sudan_Ethnicity_and_Statehood_Perceptions_and_the_Way_Forward/links/5ea729ffa6fdccd79459cb2c/South-Sudan-Ethnicity-and-Statehood-Perceptions-and-the-Way-Forward.pdf.
- Lambourne, W. and Herro, A. (2008) 'Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: implications for non-UN interventions', *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 20(3), pp. 275–289.
- Martell, P. (2019) *First Raise a Flag: How South Sudan Won the Longest War But Lost the Peace*. Oxford University Press.
- Mayo, D.N.N. (1994) 'The British Southern Policy in Sudan: An Inquiry into the Closed District Ordinances (1914-1946)', *Northeast African Studies*, 1(2/3), pp. 165–185.
- McDoom, O. (2011) *South Sudan referendum: 99% vote for independence, Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-referendum/south-sudan-votes-for-independence-by-a->

landslide-idUSTRE7161KV20110208.

Miles, T. (2016) *Ethnic cleansing going on in South Sudan - U.N. commission*, Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/southsudan-un-idINKBN13Q4S1>.

Mutasa, C. and Virk, K. (2017) 'Building peace in South Sudan: Progress, problems and prospects'. Available at: <https://www.africportal.org/publications/building-peace-south-sudan-progress-problems-and-prospects-seminar-report/> (Accessed: 18 December 2021).

OCHA (2021a) 'Humanitarian Needs Overview South Sudan'. OCHA.

OCHA (2021b) 'OCHA - South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot'.

OHCHR (2021) *South Sudanese political elites illicitly diverting millions of US dollars, undermining core human rights and stability*. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=27519&LangID=E>.

Okeke, R.C. *et al.* (2021) 'Failure of States, Fragility of States, and the Prospects of Peace in South Sudan', *SAGE Open*, 11(2), p. 21582440211020483.

Pinaud, C. (2014) 'South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy', *African Affairs*, pp. 192–211. doi:10.1093/afraf/adu019.

Puechguirbal, N. (2010) 'Peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction', *Gender Matters in Global Politics. A feminist introduction to International Relations*. London: Routledge, pp. 161–175.

Rudnicová, K. (2018) 'African Solution to African Problems: AU and the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan', *Politeja - Pismo Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, 15(56), pp. 169–191.

Sandler, T. (2017) 'International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness', *The Journal of conflict resolution*, 61(9), pp. 1875–1897.

Smidt, H.M. (2020) 'United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence', *The Journal of conflict resolution*, 64(2-3), pp. 344–372.

Sooka, Y. (2016) 'Statement by Yasmin Sooka, Chair of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan at the 26th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council'. December.

Stalin Gebreselassie (2018) *DISARMAMENT PROCESS IN GREATER LAKES HAMPERED BY AVAILABILITY OF GUNS AND LACK OF TRUST*, UNMISS. Available at: <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/disarmament-process-greater-lakes-hampered-availability-guns-and-lack-trust>.

Steinert, J.I. and Grimm, S. (2015) 'Too good to be true? United Nations peacebuilding and the democratization of war-torn states', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 32(5), pp. 513–535.

Szasz, P.C. (1983) 'Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts', *Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.*, 13, p. 345.

T. Call, C. (2008) 'Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success', *Civil Wars*, 10(2), pp. 173–194.

Transparency International (2020) '2020 Corruptions Perceptions Index'. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl>.

UN (2008) ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, *International peacekeeping*, 15(5), pp. 742–799.

UN (2015) ‘Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people’.

UN (2018) ‘Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations’.

UN (2021a) ‘Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Country, Mission, and Personnel Type’.

UN (2021b) ‘Peacekeeping Operations Factsheet’. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping_missions_fact_sheet_245_october_2021_en.pdf.

UN (2021c) *South Sudan: ‘Headwinds’ warning from UN mission chief over peace accord*, *UN News*. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108032> (Accessed: 21 December 2021).

UNDP (2020) ‘2020 Human Development Report’.

UNESCO (2018) *South Sudan, UNESCO*. Available at: <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/ss> (Accessed: 9 January 2022).

UNGA (2020) ‘Budget performance of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020’, *A/75/627* [Preprint].

UN General Assembly (2021) ‘Budget for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 (A/75/762)’.

UNHCR (2021) ‘South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan - 2021 Mid Year Report’. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional_SSD_RRP_2021_MY_Report.pdf.

United Nations (1945) *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. United Nations Publications.

UNMISS (2020) *UNMISS protection site in Juba re-designated as a conventional displacement camp*, *UNMISS*. Available at: <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-protection-site-juba-re-designated-conventional-displacement-camp> (Accessed: 27 December 2021).

UNMISS (2021a) *Facts and figures*, *UNMISS*. Available at: <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/facts-and-figures> (Accessed: 22 December 2021).

UNMISS (2021b) ‘UNMISS: Quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians’, *Human Rights Division* [Preprint].

UNSC (2011) ‘Security Council Resolution 1996’, *S/RES/1996 (2011)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2013) ‘Security Council Resolution 2132’, *S/RES/2132 (2013)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2014) ‘Security Council Resolution 2187’, *S/RES/2187 (2014)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2015) ‘Security Council Resolution 2241’, *S/RES/2241 (2015)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2016) ‘Security Council Resolution 2304’, *S/RES/2304 (2016)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2019) ‘Security Council Resolution 2459’, *S/RES/2459 (2019)* [Preprint].

UNSC (2021) ‘Situation in South Sudan - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1015)’.

- Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, M.V. (2019) *International Relations Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Walsh, D., Dahir, A.L. and Marks, S. (2021) ‘Sudan’s Military Seizes Power, Casting Democratic Transition Into Chaos’, *The New York Times*, 25 October. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/world/africa/sudan-military-coup.html> (Accessed: 20 December 2021).
- Walter, B.F., Howard, L.M. and Page Fortna, V. (2021) ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, *British journal of political science*, 51(4), pp. 1705–1722.
- Ward, C., Swails, B. and McWhinnie, S. (2021) ‘“Biblical” flooding in South Sudan displaces hundreds of thousands’, *CNN*, 6 December. Available at: <https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/12/06/flooding-in-sudan-clarissa-ward-pkg-tsr-vpx.cnn> (Accessed: 20 December 2021).
- Washburne, S.L. (2013) ‘Post-War Governance and the Impact of International Aid in South Sudan’, *Forging Two Nations: Insights on Sudan and South Sudan*, pp. 188–200.
- WFP (2021a) ‘WFP South Sudan Country Brief, July 2021’.
- WFP (2021b) ‘WFP South Sudan - Situation Report #297’.
- Wimmer, A. (2013) ‘States of war: How the Nation-State made modern conflict’, *Foreign Affairs* [Preprint].
- Woodward, S.L. (2007) ‘Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions’, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, pp. 143–170. doi:10.1080/17502970701302789.
- World Bank (2019) ‘Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$) - South Sudan’. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=SS&most_recent_value_desc=true.
- World Peace Foundation (2017) ‘UNMISS Short Mission Brief’.
- Zambakari, C. (2013) ‘Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political Drivers of Violence and the Challenge of Democratic Nation-Building’, *Forging Two Nations: Insights on Sudan and South Sudan*, pp. 98–111.