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
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THE SOUL OF SPAIN: Spanish Scholastic Psychology and the Making of Modern Subjectivity (1875–1931)

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The aim of this article is to provide an approach to the study of the relations between psychology and Roman Catholic Scholasticism in the making of Spain as a modern nation-state. The crucial period in this process—extending from the beginning of King Alfonso XII's reign in 1875 to the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931—is considered. Attention is focused on Ethics textbooks published by Spanish Scholastic authors throughout the period. Through these school manuals, young students were trained in the ideas of citizenship and social coexistence held by the Catholic Church. An analysis of these didactic, programmatic works shows the central role played by the theory of faculties and modern psychological technologies (psychopedagogy, psychopathology, psychotechnics) in the Scholastic outlook. Thus, an attempt is made to show that psychology was used by Spanish Scholasticism as a way of legitimating a reactionary view of Spain, which eventually led to the emergence of National-Catholicism as the official ideology of the Franco regime (1939–1975).

Keywords: psychological technologies, Catholic scholastic psychology, national psychology, Spain, ethnopsychology

The case of Spain provides an excellent historic-cultural context for analyzing the relationship between psychology, religious beliefs, and citizenship. Spain was, indeed, one of the last Western countries to follow a pattern of development conforming to the 19th-century model of modernity. One of the main reasons for this resistance was the prolonged survival of a monarchic, conservative framework, extending the classical idea of the empire, together with a hierarchical, immobilist social structure, well into the 19th century. This general framework found firm support in the deep and wide penetration of Catholic religious values into Spanish society.

From the last quarter of the 19th century, however, many social agents—politicians, intellectuals, academicians, journalists, businessmen, working-class movements, and so forth—demanded and undertook a transformation of the country along nation-state lines as envisioned by liberalism. Removed from their previous privileged positions, Catholic thinkers and institutions were forced to face and manage the apparent conflict between their basic values and beliefs, and the new scientific worldview that was becoming dominant in Spanish society (Callahan, 2000; Payne, 2006).

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The aim of this article is to establish a genealogical framework for examining the role played by psychological discourse in this process. An analysis will show how Scholastic psychologists faced the transformation of Spain into a modern nation-state in a crucial period of its history: the years between the restoration of the Bourbon parliamentary monarchy in 1875 and the proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic in 1931. The main sources for this analysis will be several significant manuals of Ethics from this period. As we shall show, these brief ethical treatises may be considered as strategic cultural contributions to the psycho-sociological making of a Catholic social utopia.

Spanish “Soul” or Spanish “Mind”? The Bases of a National Conflict

Psychological discourse elsewhere in Europe played a crucial role in the making of the liberal nation-state and the modernizing of concepts of social coexistence from the beginning of the 19th century. Particularly, the bourgeoisie—mostly composed of merchants, politicians, military officers, and intellectuals—was very much interested in establishing identification between “the people” and “the nation.” The use of ethnopsychological disciplinary terms such as “the will of the people,” “Volkgeist,” “Völkerpsychologie,” “collective psychology,” “character,” “mentality,” or “race,” while highlighting the peculiarity, authenticity, and historical political prominence of the popular masses and their natural environment, also made possible the claim for such an identification. This move should be seen as both contributing to the development of the bourgeoisie’s liberal project, and putting an end to the old regime—the classical monarchic and ecclesiastic totalitarianism, albeit other active fronts of identitarian¹ otherness throughout the 19th century (Napoleonic imperialism, territorial wars, colonial expansion, growth of working class internationalist consciousness, etc.) should also be borne in mind.

Collective psychological stereotypes (characterological, temperamental, etc.), and their ascription to specific territorial and geoclimatic domains existed, of course, earlier than the 19th century (Caro-Baroja, 1987; Jahoda, 1992). Never before, however, were these singularizing factors linked to instances of political action and decision-making. Before the 19th century, these were delegated instead, either by nature or by contract, to a unipersonal ruler. But the aim of the bourgeoisie was not to democratize power in order to hand it down to the people. The very notions of “will,” “Volkgeist,” or “collective psychology” entailed an ingredient of unconsciousness, ignorance, and infantilism that set precise limits to the self-consciousness of the popular masses and to their capacity to make decisions. In view of this characterization, and apparently past the time of monarchs, noblemen, and priests, liberal elites set themselves as the most suitable agents for managing identitarian technologies and making them serve a new social project: that of the liberal nation-state.

¹ By “identity” or “identitarian,” reference is made to those anthropological qualities and practices (symbols, acts, beliefs, behaviors, personality features, etc.), which in a particular time and place, are attributed to a community of subjects as characteristic, homogeneous and quite steady aspects belonging to it—irrespectively of whether or not the community in question is aware, accepts, or even identifies itself with such attribution (Leary & Tangney, 2003).

Thus, speaking of a formal or disciplinary psychology in this context requires that attention be paid first to the conditions and functions of psychology beyond the limits of a strictly internal history—that is, a history of psychological ideas and applications. As a matter of fact, if 19th-century “scientific psychology” was able to transcend university and laboratory boundaries, it was because of its success—among many other identitarian, experiential, and action options (Gergen & Davies, 1985)—in advancing theories and technologies of subjectivity that met modernity’s sociocultural demands (Be’jar, 1993; Blanco, 2003). And conversely, the conditions imposed on the discipline of psychology by the modern project—a project which, in line with the rise of liberalism, was generally defined by reference to such values as individualism, happiness, autonomy, or liberty (Rose, 1990a, 1990b)—cannot either be ignored. As a result of this two-way dialogue, the question is not any more that of a pure discipline of scientific psychology, but rather that of a wider “psychological culture” in which, while the sociocultural reality becomes “psychologized,” it is also psychology that becomes “culturalized” (Blanco, 2003). This is why, in Spain, modern “psychologies” (scientific, neo-scholastic, applied, etc.) cannot be dissociated from the foundational crisis of the liberal nation-state—frequently termed as “the problem of Spain,” nor vice versa.

In Spain, however, the so called “Ancien Re’gime” model (i.e., a hierarchical sociocultural structure entailing a rigid immobility of social relations) predominated for most of the century. The monarch-subject relation and the Catholic confession still prevailed as the form of the social structure, rather than an “imagined community” based on the idea of nation (Anderson, 1983). In fact, it was mainly religious slogans and rhetoric that inspired the uprising of the Spanish people against Napoleon’s army in 1808. When the French invaders were finally expelled and the absolutist King Fernando VII (1784–1833) was reinstated to the throne of the country, people welcomed him back with the cry of “Long live our chains!” (Álvarez-Junco, 2001).

In the Spanish tradition, indeed, reactionary thought was characterized by a strong rejection of foreign liberal political and economic ideas. Rooted in the imperial-catholic tradition, reactionarism gained new strength at the beginning of the 19th century, on the occasion of the Napoleonic invasion of the country, which became associated with the penetration of enlightened ideology. A faithful companion to the Spanish Empire, Catholicism nourished the popular rejection of free-thinking, upholding instead the principles of social cohesion, hierarchy, and coexistence on the grounds of God, the Crown, and the Roman-Catholic religion (Suárez-Cortina, 2006).

In a similarly reactionary vein, the dominant theory of subjectivity—that is to say, the basic kind of theory of human nature, inner experience, and action prevailing in the period under consideration—was consistent with that advanced by Scholastic metaphysics and Aristotelian-Thomist anthropology. Because this theory was formally or, rather, disciplinarily based on intellectual, emotional, and volitional processes and functions in both individual and collective subjects, it may be said to have had an eminently psychological character—whether these processes and functions were defined in terms closer to a speculative-philosophical (post-Kantian or Scholastic) perspective or to a scientific-experimental one (bio-physiological or behavioral) is, in fact, irrelevant. Now, the

peculiarity of 19th-century psychological description of “subjectivity” is that it did not only entail a concern for human nature, experience and action *in general*, but it also carried *specific* identitarian implications for the processes and functions characteristic of particular subjects—infant, female, abnormal, delinquent, national, foreign, civilized, uncivilized, and so forth. In short, the physiological and spiritual insides of subjectivity carry and define peculiar ways (identities and activities) of being in the world. It goes without saying that this way of viewing subjectivity did not only describe it, but also resulted in hardly foreseeable or controllable prescriptive effects.

Now, subjectivity was approached by Scholastics from that philosophical perspective which, with no significant variations since the 13th century, viewed and assessed all new scientific and philosophical proposals under the light of Aristotelian-Thomist principles. From this viewpoint, everything had to be consistent with the existence of the one and only true God. Moreover, these principles led to affirmation of the existence of an individual and immortal soul, whose psychological functions were hierarchically structured, from the simplest and most basic level—the vegetative—to the highest, supposedly typical of human beings—the intellectual (Leinsle, 1994). At the end of the 19th century, these principles were strictly followed by Spanish Scholastic authors, who went even further in the way of orthodoxy than the Italian models they claimed to have taken as sources of inspiration (L. Taparelli, G. Prisco, M. Liberatore, and G. Sanseverino, among others; Coreth, Neidl, & Pfligersdorffer, 1994).

According to Spanish Scholastics, Spaniards had a “soul” which ought to be cultivated without disturbing the temporal order governing the earthly world. The secular order was considered to be an ephemeral, but also a fixed, unchanging order, which had been originally established by God and was now supervised by the Monarchy and the Church. In short, until well into the 19th century, the earthly world was viewed as a mere way station toward the divine kingdom of eternal life.

The introduction of liberal ideas and the subsequent free circulation of knowledge, goods, and social forces gradually transformed the “Ancien Re´gime” scheme. Promoted by the bourgeois class, these ideas enhanced the relevance of knowledge of individual and collective psychology, as well as the possibility for individuals of transforming the immediate social environment. At the same time, “modern” psycho-philosophical ideas were being developed, as the first news of the novel scientific approach to psychology began to reach the country. With these disciplinary foundations, a wide variety of alternative non-Scholastic individual and collective identities established their bases and acquired historical and social agency.

This strategy of the liberal bourgeoisie enabled it to legitimate scientifically the historical relevance of the common people. Spanish uniqueness, authenticity, and potential were believed to lie somewhere deep in the community’s ethnopsychological and psychohistorical roots (Castro, 2004, 2005). This original, popular subjectivity was identified with the idea of Spanish “nationality,” thus becoming the foundation of society, as well as the way through which new notions of state, social order, and progress were to be developed. In short, the emergence of modern psychology took place as a response to the need of theoretically reinforcing and technically managing a new kind of subject or subjectivity. What was not at all clear was where the authority resided for leading such a project.

The sociopolitical implantation of liberalism in Spain, however, was not exactly a resounding success. Nor was the incorporation of modern psychological ideas of subjectivity. Briefly stated, Condillac's sensationalism was received through the spiritualistic, eclectic outlook of Victor Cousin (1792–1867), a perspective first assumed by such Catholic authors as Juan José Arbolí (1795–1863) and Tomás García Luna (d. 1880). Similarly, the reception of Scottish Common Sense School ideas took place mainly in the Catalan area, with the Catholic priest Jaime Balmes (1810–1848) as one of its major exponents. Except for phrenological materialism and medical-biological approaches of authors like Mariano Cubí (1801–1875) and Pedro Mata (1811–1877), most Spanish proto-psychologists followed Scholasticism's substantialist way of thinking. Even such eminent liberal and positivist authors as Pedro Felipe Monlau (1808–1871), professor of philosophy at the Institute "San Isidro" in Madrid, accepted the need of a rational, metaphysical psychology as a complement to its empirical developments (Carpintero, 2004).

Actually, both "worldviews," the liberal-nationalist and the traditional-Catholic, coexisted more or less in harmony until after the middle of the 19th century. It was not until the Republican stage of the Six-Year Revolution (1868–1874) that the polarization between them began to become evident. Notwithstanding its brief duration, this was a period of intense critical and ideological activity, which found continuity in the proclamation of the Restoration of the monarchy (in 1874) and the Spanish Empire's loss of its last colonies (in 1898). This new period was defined by the "constitutionalist" construction of the Spanish state, a process which, from the Catholic point of view, represented a betrayal of the traditional models of subjectivity and social coexistence. Cardinal Ceferino González (1831–1894), for instance, one of the leading exponents of Spanish Catholicism at the end of the century, rejected one by one all the new rights acknowledged by the 1876 liberal Constitution: National sovereignty, universal suffrage, the inviolability of dwelling, freedom of the press, of assembly, and of religion. All these individual rights—particularly the liberty of religion—were to him illegitimate, since they were contrary to "natural law" and, consequently, to the dignity, rationality and morality of human being (González, 1873/1876).

As a result of sociopolitical encounters and conflicts between liberal and traditionalist perspectives, a widespread "psychologization" of the Spanish socio-cultural reality took place—that is, the definition of both the nature and structure of social coexistence in psychological terms, as well as the idea that the instruments for changing or maintaining such nature and structure should be also psychological. The last third of the 19th century abounded in intellectual and literary episodes contributing to such psychologization—and the consequent nationalization of collective being as well. Some distinctions will be in order, however. Like the socialists and the anarchists, Catholics also had shown an open hostility toward nationalism at the beginning of the 19th century. From the midcentury on, however, the identification made by liberals between the nation and the psychological peculiarities of the Spanish people (their mind, temperament, character, will, etc.) came to be widely accepted across the whole political and ideological spectrum.

As early as 1842, for instance, Jaime Balmes, the great champion of the Catholic cause, used the terms “nation” and “people” in his antiliberal writings without apparent contradiction:

The soul gets oppressed with anxious sorrow at the mere thought that the day might come when that religious unity identifying itself with our habits, uses, customs, and laws, may disappear from among us It is the great, generous ideas deeply rooted among the people that can save a nation, freeing it from interested tutelages and granting it true independence; it is the feelings engraved in the heart by the action of time, by the influence of robust institutions, by long-established habits and customs; it is the unity of religious thought that turns a people into one man. (Balmes, 1842, pp. 108–109)

The Acceptance of the Idea of Nation

The acceptance by Catholics of the idea of Nation, however, did not entail an agreement with the most problematic ethnopsychological assumptions of liberal nationalism on the organization of the principle of authority, social structure, and the collective ends of that psychology of the people. For the most part, conservative Catholics did acknowledge the ethnopsychological peculiarities of Spaniards, but at the same time they subordinated Spanish psycho-historical and psycho-social agency to Catholic dogma and its management by the Monarchy and, above all, by the Church. Thus, as late as 1916, popular will and its democratic consequences were defined by the Jesuit scholastic pedagogue Ramón Ruiz Amado (1861–1934) as “whatever pleases the majority (i.e., half plus one); so that any idiot or criminal can cast his vote in the balance . . . and turn an iniquity or an absurdity into a law” (Ruiz, 1916a/1928).

Although Ruiz Amado’s opinion was perfectly compatible with non-Scholastic stances, it does show that orthodox Catholicism went always hand in hand with a conservative, antiliberal ideology. Spanish Scholasticism was indeed intolerant of any liberal inclination of its adepts. Important priests like Fernando de Castro (1814–1874)—preacher (who later abandoned the Church) to Queen Isabel II—and many a combative defender of the Catholic imperial tradition, like historian, philologist and literary critic Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo (1856–1912), who moved gradually away from his earlier apologetic work to increasingly rigorous historiographic achievements—were severely reproached for their approach to more heterodox positions. At least in the last quarter of the 19th century, for Spanish Catholic thinkers there was no real alternative to orthodox Catholicism and reactionary viewpoints (Aguirre, 1986). By the beginning of the new century, however, the situation had changed considerably.

These are the core issues accounting for the emergence, within Catholicism, of a new, specific literary genre at the end of the 19th century. It was probably inaugurated by Balmes’s *Protestantism compared with Catholicism in its relations with European civilization* (1842), to which we have already referred. But it was during the Restoration period after 1874 that writings in defense of Catholicism began to proliferate. Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo’s *Spanish Science* (1879), Félix Sarda y Salvany’s *Liberalism is a Sin* (1884), Damiaín Isern’s *On the National Disaster and its Causes* (1899), Juan Manuel Ortíz y Lara’s *Opposed Theories of the State and its Ends, Depending on Whether They Come From the*

Concept of Evolution or the Concept of Creation (1899), and even Antonio Ca'novas del Castillo's *Discourse on the Nation* (1882), are but a few noteworthy examples.

However, there is another type of publication that is particularly appropriate for analyzing the use of psychological discourse by Spanish Catholics as they faced the inevitable changes affecting ideas of subjectivity and of social coexistence: The manuals of Ethics published during the Restoration period by secondary education Scholastic teachers to instruct students in the uses, customs, and ends of human society.

It may be worthwhile to remark, in this connection, that the disciplinary relations between Ethics and Psychology were at the time very close indeed. In Spain, a country with a strong philosophical, even Scholastic influence in the organization of academic disciplines, Ethics formed an integral part—together with Psychology and Logic—of the traditional triad of philosophical knowledge. As will be seen later, this classical structure was actualized anew from the middle of the 19th century with the creation of a chair of Philosophy for secondary education and the publication of textbooks associated to it. Apart from this traditional and formal relation, however, new connections between psychology and ethics were also established throughout the century. From the mid-19th century on, all kinds of collective psychologies, including of course Wilhelm Wundt's *Vo'ölkerpsychologie* (Wundt, 1917, 1926), subjected the uses and customs of human societies to rigorous examination. The interesting thing about the manuals of Ethics, however, is that they spread their didactic and systematic discourse among the Spanish population throughout the whole period under study (1875–1931). This circumstance makes it possible to reveal the basic programmatic and thematic continuities and discontinuities guiding the Scholastic construction of the subject and social coexistence.

Furthermore, these textbooks provide a good illustration of the lack of interest shown by Spanish Scholasticism in analyzing and acknowledging the country's social reality at the end of the 19th century. Leaving aside a few early exceptional cases, like those of Jaime Balmes, or the reactionary essayist and diplomat Juan Donoso Corte's (1809–1853), most Catholic authors remained largely aloof from the so called social problem—that is to say, the situation of deprivation and misery suffered by most part of the Spanish population (Abella'n, 1989). At least until the appearance in 1900 of the long essay *Del Desastre Nacional y sus causas* [On the National Disaster and its Causes], by the Catholic conservative politician Damia'n Isern (1852–1914), most reactionary Scholastic literature at the last quarter of the 19th century had a programmatic, preservationist, even utopian character, in the face of Spanish sociocultural reality. Actually, any hint at a critical analysis was mainly addressed against utopian proposals coming from different philosophical and ideological quarters, or even against reformist attempts at changing that unfortunate sociocultural reality.

Moving now beyond the level of discourse, the actual activity displayed by Spanish Scholasticism in order to underpin its model of citizenship went through the traditional institutional channels, that is, the pulpit and the school. For if Scholasticism succeeded in spreading its model of citizenship in large sectors of the population until as late as 1900, it was mainly through the control exerted on most basic levels of education—schools run by religious orders being countless

even until the very end of Franco's era. And—what is perhaps even more important, on account of its influence on the lower, basically rural, illiterate classes—through the action of the local parishes (Álvarez-Junco, 2001; Blanco & Castro, 2005).

It is in these strategic socio-institutional settings that, almost up to 1900, specific practices for the shaping of a Scholastic model of citizenship can be found. With the turn of the century Catholic intellectuals, while largely taking for granted liberal denunciation of the miserable condition of the lower classes, became very much involved in other sociopolitical strategies of social intervention and action. Not only did they increase their presence in institutions specifically created by the State for facing these problems (like the Instituto de Reformas Sociales [Institute for Social Reforms], founded in 1903, or the Instituto Nacional de Previsión [National Institute of Insurance], created in 1908, where they worked hand in hand with liberals), but also launched their own formal channels for dealing with the problems of the lower classes by promoting unions of Catholic workers, working-class oriented publications, and literature specifically devoted to raise awareness and further action on these issues.

Be it as it may, it is the basic programmatic discourse inspiring, nourishing, or at least evincing the kind of ideal social project that Scholastics were de facto advancing with their internal cultural practices and strategies that will concern us here. While the manuals of Ethics have provided the main sources for our central argument, we used other relevant sources as well in the analysis of the strategy displayed by Spanish Scholastic authors dealing with the nation-state issue.

Subjectivity in Scholastic Ethics: Between God, the Family, and the Church

In 1854, an important law for secondary education was promulgated (the so-called “Moyano Law”). As a result, a group of new philosophical subjects receiving the common title of “Psychology, Logic and Ethics” was introduced in the schools curriculum. Except for a few notable exceptions (like those of the positivist Pedro Felipe Monlau, and the Kantian José María Rey Heredia), most early manuals of philosophy belonged to the Scholastic orbit (Castro, Castro, & Casla, 1998; Fey, 1975). Among these, Jaime Balmes's (1847) and Juan Manuel Ortí y Lara's (1853) books are particularly noticeable for the many editions they went through. Later contributions were those of the Dominican Cardinal Ceferino González (1873), the Catholic propagandist Manuel Polo y Peyrolón (1880), and the Basque professor of philosophy Luis María Eleizalde e Yzaguirre (1886). They were all explicitly based in Aristotelian-Thomist concepts and inspired by contemporary Italian neo-Scholastic authors.

This was the philosophical perspective shaping the psychological and ethical approach of Spanish Scholasticism for more than 50 years (1875–1931). During this period, the earlier, pioneering manuals were repeatedly reissued, even plagiarized, well into the early years of the 20th century. Their basic structure remained more or less the same: A “General Ethics,” devoted to the great principles of divine and human morality (human ends, natural law, norms, human acts), led into a “Special Ethics,” dealing with the application of these principles to individual and collective human behavior (man's rights and duties toward God,

toward himself, toward his fellow men; property; the state; civil society; etc.). What is of concern here, however, is the underlying psychological reasoning making the articulation of subjectivity and of social coexistence possible.

In this connection, two crucial psychological elements were important. One was the use of individual psychology as disciplinary foundation for ethical principles and norms. Within the Scholastic tradition, the intellectual appetitive faculty constituting the link between will and reason (according to the classical three-part structure of faculties) was considered to be central and specific to human beings. This was the faculty naturally implanted by God in human soul in order to provide it with free will. Two basic psychological activities were in turn dependent on free will: The control of passions—a minor activity, but nonetheless necessary for the mastering of oneself—and the exercise of rationality in search of the specific and ultimate ends of human beings. This latter question was basic in Scholastic thought, and it was particularly addressed against the Kantian doctrine of the categorical imperative. For Scholastic authors, human reason was subordinated to the search of happiness and the access to divine grace, whereas for Kant it was an autonomous instrument—an end in itself. This made of Kantian “autonomous morality,” according to Ceferino González (1873/1876) and other Spanish Scholastics, an ethical approach much to the liking of “revolutionary agents.”

The second psychological element to be considered has to do with the model for social coexistence. For the Scholastic model of subjectivity had profound psycho-social or sociocultural implications and pointed to a model of citizenship and social coexistence which was fundamentally different from that advanced by liberal ethnopsychology. Two main aspects must be considered here.

In the first place, when analyzing the origins and foundations of human societies, Catholicism fought liberalism in two different fronts: (1) The front formed by those organic, continuistic, and reductionist assumptions of such authors as Spencer or Haeckel; and (2) the front constituted by psychosocial principles, based either in freely chosen association (Rousseau), or in empathy, suggestion, or emotion (Durkheim, Le´vy-Bruhl). Actually, Catholicism accepted these latter aspects. Ceferino González, for instance, referred to the “social character” of human beings as an immediate, determinant cause for the emergence of civil and political societies. For human beings possess “an instinct or natural tendency to benevolence; furthermore, a spontaneous inclination to communicate one’s inner affections, feelings and thoughts to other fellow human beings, as well as learn things concerning others, and even take a part in them” (González, 1873/1876, p. 518).

From the Catholic perspective, however, these were but secondary aspects of the true, natural origins of society, which were found to lie in patriarchal family. As a matter of fact, the conception of “human nature” held by Catholic authors reproduced the divine archetype applied to individual psychology. This conception assumed the male gender as its ideal, moreover, so that it was Man’s will and reason that provided the foundation for the principle of authority. From this principle emerged the minimal unit of social order and linkage—the family; and then its historical development and social complexity as well (through the tribe, the town, the state, etc., as was also held by the positivists). Ceferino González wrote, for instance:

Thus, the natural, ordinary, spontaneous-like origins of sovereignty lie in paternal authority as represented by that particular family which, either by reason of generation, or by some physical, intellectual or moral superiority, becomes the nucleus of other families. This authority grows naturally, extends itself, and becomes consolidated, as the society which is governed by it also grows, and the relations between its members are developed and become increasingly complex. (González, 1873/1876, p. 525)

But, in the second place, not only the origins, but also the ends of society, may be said to be prefigured in individual human nature. Against the idea of progress, typical of liberalism, which sought to address undesirable social imperfections, Catholic thinkers opposed an immobilistic, hierarchical, disciplinarian view of human collectivities, which they contrasted to the perfect, heavenly, social order. They envisioned a final recompense for human actions, which unlike the material progress held by Kantians, Epicureans, utilitarians, and pantheists, was rather located in “a kingdom not of this world.” Immobility and hierarchy, on the other hand, led to a certain homogeneity in norms, customs, and mentalities, thus making unacceptable the relativist stance of positivist anthropology and history, with their common interest in the differences between the various human groups. For these differences did not negate human free will, which was still able to tell good from evil. So there were objective, universal domains implanted by God in the world for all human societies.

To sum up, Scholastic manuals of Ethics published at the end of the 19th century provide a good illustration of the use of psychological arguments to define an immobilistic, hierarchical, patriarchal social model under the tutelage of traditional Catholicism. In these arguments, neither the psychological peculiarity of Spanish people, nor the idea of nationality usually associated with it, played any significant role. It was rather the term “patriotism” (defined as one’s willingness to sacrifice for the common good) that was used, albeit conceived only as a means to reach higher, ultramundane ends. In this connection, Scholastic ethics accepted the separation between the Church and the State or civil society, as long as the latter’s values, duties, and obligations were subordinated to the former. The study of folk and national psychologies were still seen as instruments at the service of the liberal social utopia.

As the new century progressed, Catholic thought became increasingly interested in scientific psychology and sociology. Under the impulse given by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical letters and Cardinal Mercier’s work in Leuven, Scholastic discourse underwent a drastic process of modernization and renewal (Pérez-Delgado, Mestre, & Carpintero, 1987). In Spain, this significant change of direction was reflected in the translation of a number of general treatises by the new Scholastic authorities (Farges, 1913; Frobes, 1933; Geysler, 1927; Lindworsky, 1935; Mercier, 1927), as well as the publication of specific psychological essays (such as Francisco Barbens’s on *Morality in the Street, The Cinematograph and the Theater*, 1914a; or Tomás Carreras Artau’s *Current Problems of Ethnic and Collective Psychology*, 1929) and didactic works (like those of Federico Dalmau, 1912; Marcelino Arnaiz, 1914; or Fernando M. Palme’s, 1928).

The influence of hitherto neglected scientific and psychosociological issues was also noticeable in early 20th century Scholastic manuals of Ethics, where

headings on “the nation” and “nationalism” began to appear. They were still brief, ambiguous notes, however (Dalmaú, 1912; González, 1929), mostly fluctuating between an incipient local nationalism—based in the maintenance of traditional customs—and an open criticism of the ethnopsychological and democratic principles of liberal nationalism.

In short, Scholastic manuals of Ethics contributed to the psychologization of Spanish social reality, but did so from a very different perspective than that of liberal positivism. Their theoretical and political immobilism became a problem once science, civilization, and modernity began to appear as unquestionable goals of social change in Spain. The difficulties of Scholasticism in adjusting itself to this new context, however, can be best examined through psychological technologies, rather than through psychological theories. It is indeed in the applied realm that the particular interventionist measures taken by Catholicism for challenging the liberal sociocultural project (while promoting its own) are best revealed.

Psychological Technologies for Reconstructing a Nation

Consistent with the ethnopsychological definition of social reality, psychology was also seen as a key technology for intervention in the so-called “social question” and the development of liberal state reforms. In fact, the emergence of the three major fields of applied psychology was strongly linked to the construction of Western model of social coexistence. These fields were basic tools for managing the functions of a modern fragmented subjectivity: educational psychology and pedology (as the study of the normal development of the child was termed at the time), as a means of providing cohesiveness and homogeneity to collective identity; pathological and criminal psychology, as a means of controlling social abnormality or deviance; and industrial psychology and psychotechnics, as a means of implementing and managing the population’s productive resources (Blanco & Castro, 2005; Castro & Lafuente, 2007a, 2007b).

In Spain, Catholic thinkers at the turn of the century fought also on these various fronts in order to safeguard their conservative and hierarchical view of social coexistence. The manuals of Ethics appearing in the new century show how Scholastic authors attempted intervening in social reality—a context of much greater complexity than that of theoretical principles and debates.

Psychology and Education: Pedagogy and Pedology as Strategic Domains

Of all psychological technologies, those connected with the pedagogical field were, for the Scholastics, the most important. This is perhaps the reason why they changed the least throughout the period studied. These technologies constituted a safeguard, at the most basic level, of the Catholic conception of the subject and social order. In 1854, when secondary education became regulated by the “Moyano Law,” Scholastic educators realized that they were losing control of education, particularly in primary and secondary levels. This meant also losing control of the pedagogical formation of subjects well adjusted to the Catholic social project. In spite of the many concessions made to the Church, the limited freedom of religion proclaimed in the 1876 Constitution was experienced by Catholics as an outrage aggravating the problem (Lannon, 1987). The manuals of

Ethics published in the early years of the Restoration period by Ceferino González, Juan Manuel Ortíz y Lara (1826–1904), Luis María Eleizalde e Yzaguirre (d. 1897), and Manuel Polo y Peyrolón (1846–1918), all include petitions requesting that the Church be granted the exclusive right to supervise the educational and moral contents of schoolbooks.

The manuals of Ethics, however, did not detail the Catholic pedagogic agenda. They restricted themselves to defining its basic issues: The family as the natural setting for children to learn how to control their passions (a result of a repressive self-care policy); and the cultivation of reason and will as a fundamental way of achieving moral virtue and reaching God. Relative contempt for excessive cultivation of the intellect, the sciences, and the arts is also apparent in these early textbooks. They contained Faustian warnings of human reason doomed to dissatisfaction if every mystery of the universe is expected to be solved. But these warnings also carried antirevolutionary implications, for too well-informed individuals might be willing to obtain things beyond the reach of their social status. And for Scholastics, social order was eternal and therefore more important than the temporal and material progress of human collectivities: This was a message that the education of the people ought to make very clear.

After 1900, the handbooks showed an increasing concern for the advance of liberal pedagogy. State interference in private teaching activities (private teaching being, in the great majority of cases, in the hands of religious orders) was also seen as cause for worry. The manuals of the priest Feliciano González Ruiz (1929) and the Catholic pedagogue Ramón Ruiz Amado (1916a/1928) went even as far as to request a complete withdrawal of the State from the educational scene. Clearly, it was pedagogical procedures, as well as the resulting idea of subjectivity, that were at stake. Strict control, passive memorization, and compliance with dogma, were some of the features characteristic of Catholic teaching. Forced to defend their educational practices against the accusation of formalism, some Catholic authors like Ruiz Amado resorted to scientific psychology, in an effort to renew and legitimate Scholastic methods (Ruiz Amado, 1908 & 1916b).

Inner acts tend to manifest themselves in outer acts [he wrote]; these in turn favor the development or intensification of inner acts. This is why external acts of penance help to promote inner repentance, why acts of a liturgical character favor inner devotion, and so forth . . . This has been already scientifically established by modern Psychology. (Ruiz, 1916a/1928, p. 46).

The Catholic view, however, was to confront the liberal aims of actively educating “character,” integrating and expanding all psychological powers (including emotion and affection), favoring the harmonious adjustment of the subject to the natural and social environment, and taking into account the child’s individual personality. These pedagogical and developmental bases were in perfect agreement with the model of multifunctional, versatile subjectivity of liberal nationalism. By the second decade of the new century, the social success of this model was already apparent. This is why those Spanish authors following Cardinal Mercier’s modernizing impulse, like the jurist Jerónimo Montes (1865–1932), the Franciscan psycho-pedagogue Francisco de Barbens (1875–1920), or the philosopher and priest Juan Zaragueta (1883–1974), came to accept many of its essential characteristics.

Particularly illustrative is Juan Zaragueta's work, *The Study of the Child for National Culture* (1919), where individual variability, the education of character, and even the nationalizing project, are recurrent issues.

Can it now be realized the inestimable transcendence that promoting a science of the child may have for national culture? Its capital achievement would be a classification of children on the basis of a comparative study of their respective characters. Characters of an average type, shared by most individuals in a people, will constitute the normal degree of childhood; exceptional or abnormal, lower-valued characters, on account of the insufficiency, perversion or instability of their tendencies, will be considered as *infranormal*; finally, exceptional characters whose spiritual vigour, elevation and consistency force us to acknowledge them as higher-valued, will occupy the peak of the race, and be labeled as *supranormal*. In each of these levels, further divisions will have to be made according to the differences in aptitude and the qualities determining and specifying them (Zaragueta 1919, p. 19).

The change of perspective noticeable in this passage from Zaragueta did not imply a substantial shift in Scholastic principles. The ideas of character and variability, also used in works of psychotechnics, were seen as consistent with the natural order and social stability. Similarly, *national culture* was a semantic field becoming emptied of citizenship-related meanings as it began to be colonized with Catholic values in the manuals. A characteristically 19th-century view of the popular masses may also be seen to underlie Zaragueta's passage: a sort of ignorant, submissive, passive, harmless "raw material," on which needed to be molded into the proper variations of subjectivity. Actually, the liberal conception was not very different. *Fin de siècle* Catholics and liberals only disagreed as to the pedagogical means and goals of intervention, and the procedures to be applied to the people in order to obtain a definite type of collective mentality. As the new century advanced, however, the collective psychological qualities attributed to such "raw material" proved to be more active and disturbing than expected. Actually, it was with this abnormality or otherness in mind that other psychological technologies, separate from pedagogical ones, were to emerge.

Psychology and Pathology: The Responsibility of Criminals and Degenerates

In the early years of the Restoration, violations of social norms were approached by Scholastic manuals of Ethics in a very general, abstract manner. The appetitive/affective roots of human nature were psychological structures accounting for such irregular behavior. These roots could affect human intellect and will in different degrees, but they did not preclude free will. Evidence was provided by the appearance of subjective consequences (such as reflective guilt or bad conscience), which were defined in sinful terms. It was therefore possible to impute illicit acts to human agents. Individuals were thus responsible for what they did. According to Catholics, this psychological process objectively demonstrated and justified the imposition of penalties and punishments, including even the death penalty. Crime was an alteration of the moral and material world designed by God, while penalties and punishments were the means to restore the original harmony. Other functions of punishment, such as reeducating and rehabilitating

criminals, or protecting society, were only secondary aspects. Of course, these “secondary” functions were the measures raised by positive and liberal laws for fighting crime and dealing with social pathology. In fact, in some end-of-the-century manuals (like those of Polo y Peyrolón or Eleizalde e Yzaguirre), hardly any reference is included to these questions. When they deal with crime or madness, they do so in a purely descriptive manner, as issues to be approached with legal or theological principles.

With the new century, the increasing complexity of social questions became apparent. Ethical ideas were believed to be too abstract and detached from social reality, and so in need of revision in the light of the realities of poverty, marginality and delinquency. Ever since the so-called *fin-de-siècle* crisis, the degeneration and decadence of nations had become a favorite topic of scientific discussion, which resulted in a pathologization of collective phenomena.

But, as in other psycho-sociological cases, the sociopathological discourse was late to reach Spanish Scholastic quarters (Jiménez, 2005). It was not until the second decade of the century that it began to be incorporated in works like *A Psycho-genetic Theory of Will*, by J. Zaragüeta (1914); *The Brain, the Nerves and Their Mutual Relations*, by F. Barbens (1912); or the translation of A. Farges’s book *The Brain, the Soul and its Faculties* (1913). Most of these works were issued as a response to the concern generated by the pathological symptoms observed in individuals and collectivities. Scholastic authors began to consider whether responsibility and will could be totally eliminated from human behavior by the action of those organic and environmental factors stressed by positivists. The question was thus raised as to whether the intellectual appetite might be subject to deterministic and reductionist explanations. In 19th-century manuals, the intellectual appetite was thought to be a purely spiritual psychological domain, but in the 20th century this assumption was already subject to some reconsideration. R. Ruiz Amado (1916a/1928), for instance, introduced the notion of “quantitative morality” as a means to include both extenuating circumstances, lessening the seriousness of crime, and lower degrees of morality, as found in children and uneducated people. In addition, Scholastic authors became more and more concerned about psychotherapeutic technologies, and introduced new organic considerations. F. Barbens pointed out, for instance:

Psychotherapy is the treatment of illnesses by psychological means and procedures; that is, by persuasion, emotion, suggestion, entertainment, isolation, education, divine faith and human faith, and all that is specifically addressed to human thought, imagination, appetite and emotion. We are very far distant from such exclusivist positions as refuses to apply physical together with psychological means; quite on the contrary, it is our belief that they are mutually helpful. (Barbens, 1914b, p. 62)

Perhaps more relevant in this connection is the contribution of Federico Dalmaú y Gratacós (1874–1926), a Catalan disciple of Cardinal Mercier, whose work openly explored the organic dimensions of psychological processes (Dalmaú, 1912; Llavona & Bandrés, 1999). The devastating implications of physiological determinism for the Scholastic social project are particularly evident in Dalmaú’s *Ethics*, where the influence on the will of both inherited and environmentally induced organic alterations was explicitly acknowledged.

Moral responsibility for criminal behavior was thus called into question. This resulted in the impossibility of assigning agency to the individual subject and, therefore, of maintaining the earlier, 19th-century logic and metaphysics of punishment. As we have seen, from the Scholastic point of view, only with mundane and ultramundane punishment for immoral behavior could order, in a world governed by free will, be sufficiently guaranteed.

Dalmaú discussed all these issues in an unprecedented fashion. His Scholastic perspective was explicitly opposed to the assumptions of positivist anthropology. Significantly, like Ruiz Amado, Dalmaú was willing to acknowledge different degrees of organic influence in the realm of will. As a matter of fact, his reasoning was consistent with the role assigned to passion by traditional Scholasticism, according to which criminal and concupiscent human acts were influenced by animal feelings. This notwithstanding, no Scholastic approach would ever admit the total annihilation of will by organic causes.

A peculiar consequence of this strong notion of responsibility was the discussion maintained by Scholastics with socialist and anarchist authors on property right and social equality. "Responsibility" situated the analysis of the "social question" in the metaphysical domain of moral psychology, rather than in the deterministic domain of physiological psychology. This is important, for physiological reductionism was a pseudoscientific political strategy adopted by early Spanish progressive ideology. A good example of this may be found in the liberal positivist Luis Simarro (1851–1921), the first Professor of Experimental Psychology in a Spanish university (appointed in 1902), who wrote on neural disorders caused by hunger and fatigue as an explanation of the "abnormal" fact of anarchists and workers aiming at greater egalitarian and social justice goals (Simarro, 1889).

In the new century, Scholastic ethics maintained its opposition to this kind of reductionism. Among other things, this opposition justified the taking of a punitive stance against social deviation. Unlike earlier, 19th-century Scholasticism, however, the new authors did take into account the preventive technologies developed by liberalism, which brought about a reorientation of attention toward psychosocial and practical discourses that had gone, until then, largely unnoticed. The old individualistic faculty psychology was thus somewhat revised, while ideas close to crowd psychology (like "neurasthenia," or "emotional contagion," for instance) began to appear in handbooks. Similarly, while 19th-century Scholastics had opposed moral philosophy to Sociology ("an odd, half-Latin word of Comte's and Littré's," containing both positivist reductionism and socialist aspirations, according to Polo y Peyrolón [1880]), from the first decade of the 20th century references to a "Catholic sociology" began to appear, and were included in the new manuals (González Ruiz, 1929). It was not a mere rhetorical strategy. In Ruiz Amado's *Ethics* (1916a/1928), or in Barbens's *Morality in the Street, the Cinematograph and the Theater* (1914a), there was a genuine psychosociological concern about the evil influence exerted by liberal press on the vices of the masses. The diffusion of psychological ideas focusing on the physical and mental structure of criminals, as well as the lack of warnings about the moral responsibility for their acts, was indeed a cause for worry. Once again, the Scholastic effort to adjust itself to the changing sociocultural conditions of modernity is clearly revealed. Catholic authors were well aware that, in addition to the school

and the family, the battle for establishing the model of subjectivity and social coexistence was to be fought also in the new fields opened up by current social reality.

This new psychosociological orientation was not an attempt to merely proselytize. Clearly, the new Scholastics were attempting to carry out a reformist project which, in many ways, was similar to the liberal project—although the Scholastics were more sensitive to the darker aspects of the social question (poverty, hunger, labor injustice, etc.). In Dalmau's *Ethics*, for instance, a whole appendix was devoted to them. In another Scholastic twentieth-century handbook (González Ruiz, 1929), the national question was defined in terms of “atrophy,” “hypertrophy,” “organs of the social body,” and the like—the same kind of rhetoric of morbidity and degeneration as the liberals used. The Scholastics even resorted to a typical liberal psychohistorical formula in order to provide orientation for a solution of the “national problem”: An adequate adjustment between the customs of the people and the structure of authority, as was supposedly achieved during the Catholic Kings' mythical reign in the 15th century (González, 1929; Montes, 1911).

In short, notwithstanding a reluctance to admit the inherited and environmental causes of marginality, clear symptoms of a moderate and gradual change were noticeable in the Neo-Scholastic reformist program. An attempt was made at reinterpreting the ethnopsychological and national myths popularized by liberalism, as well as using modern psychological technologies to enforce ideas of individual and collective normality, and to impose a Catholic sociocultural agenda. As will be seen, it was probably work technologies that could be best adapted to such overall program.

Psychology and Work: The Psychotechnical Sanctification of Work

After being expelled from Paradise, Adam and Eve were required to work for survival (“By the sweat of your face you will eat bread,” *Genesis* 3:19). This came to be a key ingredient of Christian dogma. While in Protestant countries the condemning aspects of this Biblical myth were in some way softened—work even becoming a way to glorify God—in Catholic (particularly Hispanic) countries, the older interpretation was preserved. Until well into the 18th century, the practice of manual trades was popularly associated with a lack of social distinction. Although by the end of the 19th century, Spanish traditional Scholasticism did not follow to the letter this historically received view any more, some traces of it could still be found in its conception of social structure and dynamics.

In fact, manuals by such authors C. González, J. M. Ortíz y Lara, Eleizalde e Yzaguirre, or Polo y Peyrolón, insisted upon the human need for work. But work was not an end in itself. To begin with, it was through work that everyone came to occupy an assigned, specific place in the established social order. Second, absolute respect was shown to holiday time, time dedicated to liturgical practices and to the glory of God. In addition to these features, *fin-de siècle* Scholastic ethics took a paternalistic view of the structure of production. This view was based, on the one hand, on the moral bonds developed between patrons (or masters) and workers (or servants), and, on the other hand, on an image of work

as highly routinized and unskilled labor, which the manuals associated with the masses or common people.

This position was clearly committed to the preservation of the traditional, rural *status quo*, rather than to adaptation to the rapidly changing world brought about by capitalist and socialist ideas. These ideas were discussed and rejected by Scholastic authors, particularly in connection with the fundamental issue of private property in its traditional conception. As shown in Ceferino González's work, the Scholastics justified private property on psychological grounds. According to them, all creations resulting from an individual's work were products of his or her own "strength and faculties, as natural manifestations of the individual's personality" (González, 1873/1876). Possessions were, therefore, personal goods; that is, they belonged to the individual, as they came from his or her own work. Thus, Scholastic authors were forced to fight simultaneously on two different fronts: against socialism, they had to defend the possessions of the wealthy; while against liberalism, they were bound to criticize the inordinate accumulation of wealth.

Catholic worries in this respect had already been clearly expressed by Jaime Balmes as early as 1842:

The accumulation of riches resulting from the speed of industrial and commercial change tends to favor a system exploiting the sweat and life of all, for the benefit of a few; but this tendency is counterweighted by the leveling ideas, swarming in so many heads, more or less openly criticizing current work management, as well as product distribution, and even property. Huge masses suffering poverty and deprived of moral instruction and education will be willing to support the realization of criminal and foolish projects, as soon as a disastrous combination of circumstances makes this possible. There is no need to confirm with facts the sad assertions just made; everyday experience provides more than enough confirmation. (Balmes, 1842–1844, pp. 434 – 435)

Sixty years after Balmes's words, the complexity of social reality was to put an end to the traditional view of property and production. In spite of initial doubts of rural traditionalists, conservative sectors of society became finally aware of the rapid growth of capitalism, industrialism, and urban development. In this new context, premodern systems of production, as well as those conceptions of subjectivity linked to them, were doomed to extinction. The type of subjectivity grounded by Scholasticism was oriented toward a subject assuming, acknowledging and adjusting itself to an idea of social order that was made at the image and likeness of the eternal and perfect social order. This is the reason why not much attention was initially given to the psycho-sociological structuring of time, activities and productive practices. Only with the new century and the dramatic rise of industrial society would these practices attract the attention of Scholastic authors. They felt now forced to open up their idea of subjectivity to those psychological categories making it possible to manage properly working activities in the real world. In fact, these new categories proved to be effective for preserving the idea of social order that, always in likeness of the eternal order, was demanded by Catholic scholastic dogma.

In fact, from the beginning of the 20th century, it was conservative governments that promulgated the highest number of work-regulating laws; by contrast,

liberal governments attempted to respond to the “social question” through the modernization and nationalization of education, that is, by extending its public and free character (González Hernández, 2002). In addition to educational technologies, however, Spanish liberals imported psychological technologies for the construction of new types of functions of the modern self: those related to efficiency, productivity, and the generation of economic wealth. The creation, between 1915 and 1922, of a number of psychotechnical institutions in Barcelona and Madrid dedicated to professional guidance, was a salient result (Carpintero, 2004; Saíz & Saíz, 1998). Although with some crucial differences as to the “ordering” of productive forces, the value of work, which was so typical of liberal ideology—in particular in the version advanced by industrial and capitalist economy—was basically assumed also by Spanish social Catholicism.

Unlike what happened with other technologies and dimensions of modern subjectivity, Scholastic and, in general, conservative thought willingly incorporated psychotechnics in its analyses and recommended proposals regarding social question. It is certainly revealing, for instance, that during General Primo de Rivera’s extremely conservative dictatorial regime (proclaimed in 1923), many progressive scientific and intellectual activities were censured while, at the same time, a whole network of psychological institutes was extended throughout the country (Carpintero, 2004; Saíz & Saíz, 1998).

This is the context of the psychotechnical, pedagogical work carried out by the Jesuit Scholastic priest Fernando María Palme’s (1879–1963) at the Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Pedagogical Department of the ‘Colegio Máximo de San Ignacio de Sarriá’, in Barcelona (respectively created in 1925 and 1927) (Peralta, 1994; Saíz & Saíz, 1999). Palme’s’s psychological manual, moreover, overcame the regime’s measures of academic control and censorship. For in its attempt to control ideology at all levels, the dictatorial regime called for a national competition of textbooks in order to select those suited for use in secondary schools. (It should be kept in mind that it was in these textbooks that the children of social elites were educated—i.e., those agents naturally destined to fill the key places in the sociocultural network of the Spanish State). It is thus that Palme’s’s became an official manual of the dictatorship period. Like so many other Scholastic psychological works appearing in the second decade of the 20th century, a fundamental place was assigned in Palme’s’s manual to the topics of character, temperament, and individual differences; that is, precisely the issues providing the theoretical bases for the development of psychotechnical tools.

Particularly interesting for the purposes of analyzing the relationships between psychotechnics and the Scholastic model of subjectivity and social coexistence, is the manual of *Ethics* (1929) by Feliciano González Ruiz (b. 1872). Although faithfully following the classical agenda of other end-of-the-century handbooks, González Ruiz’s work also included a significant, enthusiastic, and unprecedented reference to Psychotechnics, which was presented as a specific area within experimental psychology for the purpose of unveiling the subject’s abilities in order to fit him into modern work settings. Furthermore, from Psychotechnics, González Ruiz went as far as reformulating some of the theological and anthropological precepts of Catholicism.

Thus, for González Ruiz, a “vocation” was a human tendency determining the individual’s interest in specific productive and creative activities. Personal

vocations were part of God's plan for humanity, preexisting the divine command in *Genesis* to work for the necessities of life. A vocation was a human possession, therefore, from the beginning of time. To this notion of "vocation," González Ruiz added another psychotechnical category: "aptitude." Whereas traditional Scholasticism held that human beings share a common psychological nature and structure, the notion of "aptitude" opened up new psychological territory (including temperament, character, etc.) for conceptualizing and naturalizing the various productive functions (intellectual, industrial, directive, etc.); a new domain which was perfectly consistent with the existence of immutable order and rigid social hierarchy.

Thanks to this kind of psychotechnical reasoning, the Scholastic perspective could finally incorporate such liberal ideas as "division of labor and specialization" and "scientific management of society." In a 1938 discourse on *Moral Factors in our Social Reform*, the Neo-Scholastic author Juan Zaragueta pointed out:

As stated above, division of labor is simply based on the existence of limits in the exercise of human activity. It is complemented by the existence of differences, in either quality or degree, in human ability. These abilities, combined with also different inclinations, are exercised in an environment of inexhaustible variety, thus increasing the coefficient of cultural differences in both dimensions. Hence, a new social problem: the so-called "professional guidance and formation" problem, whose aim is having every social function held by those who may best serve them, thus profiting to the maximum from social "vocations" . . . (Zaragueta, 1938, pp. 15–16)

This kind of reasoning tended to reduce the political-ideological character of the discussion of public education and "class struggle." After all, "character," "vocation," and "aptitude" were natural means employed by God to assign individuals a place in social order. In short, unlike positivistic pedagogic and psychopathological approaches, psychotechnics did not threaten Scholastic fundamental principles of order and authority. They even strengthened and adjusted them to the productive logic of modernity. Thus, from playing only a subsidiary role among the means of reaching everlasting life, personal effort (together with the awareness and practice of one's own vocation and aptitudes) became one of human being's fundamental duties. Furthermore, in an obvious rapprochement to the idea of progress, aptitudes were considered as a means of increasing one's own happiness in both present and future life (González Ruiz, 1929). As stated by Zaragueta, aptitude was "the premonition of vocation and the seeds of social performance of tomorrow's human being" (Zaragueta, 1919, 24).

As in other countries (Tortosa, 1998), in Spain psychotechnics became an instrument for organizing social functions. Actually, the liberal and even the fascist and communist viewpoints on the regulation possibilities of psychotechnics were not so different from one another. But the interesting thing in the case of Spanish Scholastic psychotechnics is that it was connected closely with the ideas of obedience and perfect order that were so characteristic of the Scholastic worldview.

National-Catholicism as Psychosociological Sense-Horizon

During the over half-a-century long Restoration period, together with its dictatorial epilogue, Spanish Catholicism came to assume the psychologization of the social project promoted by liberalism. Taking handbooks of Ethics as a basic point of view, this article has attempted to show how Catholic thought tried to maintain the foundations of dogma while adjusting its model of the subject and social coexistence to the idea of State as developed in Western modernity. In this process, the three key concepts of “nation,” “order,” and “progress” underwent a strict, reactionary interpretation. The “Spanish soul” or “mind” was thus taken over by this narrow version of Catholicism; and the three major psychological technologies (pedagogy, psychopathology, and psychotechnics), became tools for legitimating a highly structured, hierarchical, paternalist social structure.

As was shown, at the end of the 19th century Scholasticism was still entrenched in the old abstract, individualist model of faculty psychology. Beyond the Aristotelian-Thomist schema, this allowed opposing moral philosophy to sociology and to the idea of a national psychology. Against the laicism promoted by liberal nationalism, moral philosophy claimed itself as the proper framework for formulating objective norms of behavior and social coexistence. Human beings have a psychological structure, which renders them capable of discerning good and evil. Individual psychology became a sort of transmission belt between God and human rights and duties. For over half a century, too, Catholic thought stuck to memorization- and punishment-based technologies (as opposed to liberal pedagogy and positive criminology, hygiene, and psychopathology) as a means of guaranteeing reflection of the divine order in social status quo. By the first third of the 20th century, however, a significant acceptance of differentialist and characterological stances had taken place—a necessary first step to acknowledging the disciplinary potential of psychotechnics.

As the new century advanced, the relations between the people, the customs, and national sovereignty became gradually stabilized and accepted by all kinds of ideologies. The strategy then used by Scholastic authors consisted in merging these domains with Catholic dogma, thus reinterpreting the ethnopsychological and psychohistorical myths of liberal nationalism. During General Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship (1923–1930), this model came to be known as “National-Catholicism,” a neologism implying the idea that Roman Catholicism was essential to the Spanish nationality (Díaz-Salazar, 1981), and also connoting such key notions as “imperialism,” technocracy,” “centralism,” and others (Fox, 1997; Juliá, 2004).

In National-Catholicism, the old reactionary thought reappeared, which emphasized the glorious past of the Spanish empire, the grounding of the structure of social coexistence in religious values, and an open rejection of liberal ideas—particularly concerning free-thinking and democratic equality. However, the adding of the “national” dimension to this expression was not trivial. For it entailed the inclusion in the Scholastic discourse of one characteristic value liberalism had succeeded in instilling in society since the beginning of the 20th century: that of the identification of the common people with a particular way of being and coexisting. Naturally, National-Catholicism placed the Catholic faith right at the basis of this peculiar structure. Similarly, it renovated the Catholic idea

of a perfect order on the basis of the new strategies designed by liberals for optimizing the productive structure. Every subject could thus fulfill its rightful function within the social whole, which, at the end of the 1930s and in the absence of a King, was auspicated by a “Caudillo” established literally “by the grace of God” (Casanova, 2001; Lafuente, Loredo, & Ferrández, 2005).

After General Franco’s victory in the Civil War (1936–1939), the principles of this National-Catholicism achieved wide diffusion thanks to the implementation of a public education system making them the mark of the new regime’s official culture. The pedagogic implantation of this culture was a tremendous success, and many traces of National-Catholicism are still clearly perceptible in current Spanish society. Today, 33 years after the dictator’s death, a number of fundamental issues about the subject and social coexistence must still be dealt with by the Spanish democratic system bearing this circumstance in mind.

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