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
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2. CATALUNYA, TERRA D'ACOLLIDA: STATELESS NATIONALIST PARTY DISCOURSES ON IMMIGRATION IN CATALONIA

This chapter aims to explore the interaction between minority nations and immigration through the examination of SNRP discourses in Catalonia. The starting concern is how elements of nationalism appear in the construction of a discourse on immigration. We argue that a party's stance towards immigration influences the nationalist discourse. We analyse the two SNRP in Catalonia on the basis of party documents and parliamentary debates and interviews with party representatives. A system of categories related to identity is proposed, and the findings confirm the hypothesis that those SNRP with positive stances towards immigration tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic. With this analysis we seek also to contribute to link two debates: the nationalist theories and the debate on political discourse towards immigrants.

1. Introduction

In 1987 the *Generalitat*¹ launched the institutional campaign 'Som sis Milions' (*We are six million*). It was aimed at expressing the idea that there are no differences between being born in Catalonia or being an immigrant (País 2009). Today Catalonia has more than 7.5 million inhabitants and most of this increase is due to the arrival of immigrants from third countries. Even if migration is not a new phenomenon in Catalonia, the diversity of origins and the rapid pace in which it has taken place during the last decades are new (Franco-Guillén 2011). Furthermore, the management of immigration coincides with the rise of substate nationalist movements seeking to advance self-government and their own nation-building projects (Whithol de Wenden & Zapata-Barrero 2011). This has been acknowledged by the different governments that have ruled the *Generalitat* since the beginning of the migratory process. Efforts have been made to manage what has been mostly described as 'a challenge'. From public policies to cross-sectional plans, including a National Agreement on Immigration (PNI, 2008) and a Law for the reception of immigrants, we can say that immigration has been

¹ Government of Catalonia

monitored by the Catalan government since its very inception (for an overview see Zapata-Barrero, 2012a). Furthermore, an awareness that certain discourses on immigration can lead to racist and xenophobic attitudes and thus threaten social cohesion has been present in many debates in the Catalan political arena. With the same conviction, most political parties have expressed the idea that defining an immigration policy is also deciding what kind of country Catalonia will be in the future. In this chapter we aim to explore this underlying idea, precisely through the examination of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties' (SNRP²) discourses on immigration.

The starting concern informing our focus is how elements of nationalism and national identity are reflected in the construction of a discourse on immigration. In particular, the objective is to explore SNRP discourses on immigration in Catalonia through the prism of one dimension of the territorial cleavage³: identity/culture. Our main argument is that SNRP with positive stances towards immigration tend to highlight the civic elements of the nation and downplay the ethnic ones. We start by presenting the theoretical framework, together with the methodology and justification of case studies. Next, we move on to the contextualization of the Catalan case and present our results. In the conclusion, we attempt to explain the differences, but especially the similarities that have been found between the two cases (CiU and ERC), and how this framework can also be a useful analytical tool to study other cases.

2. Theoretical framework: linking nationalist debate with political discourse on immigration

Several authors have claimed that immigration poses specific challenges to minority nations (Kymlicka 2001; Hepburn 2009b) as it raises a double fear: one from internal 'minorization', and the other from external cultural dominance or assimilation into the supra-national or state culture (Lipton 2012). In sum, it alters the equilibrium of power relations in two ways. On the one hand, immigration impacts the *external* relationship between the substate units and the state level, and on the other hand it impacts the *internal* relationship between the substate unit of government and its associated societal culture (Zapata-Barrero 2012b). Immigration entails an additional pressure in the process of distinct nation-building for minority nations (Zapata-Barrero 2009b) as immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation. This can involve the minority nation becoming a minority within its own territory. In fact, the management of migratory flows can be a tool for the majority nation to undermine national diversity, and according to Catalan politicians (P13:0491 for ERC and P85:60 for CiU), this has already been used by the Spanish state. These specific challenges have led authors to open different lines of research using a wide range of approaches and disciplines, from normative questions that arise from the interaction of two types of collective rights and claims to the different

2 In line with E. Hepburn's (Hepburn 2009b) discussion, we use SNRP to refer to the party family which places stress on territorial power relations.

3 Although identity is the main objective, the analysis of the data reveal references to the other dimensions pointed out by Eve Hepburn in this volume, that is territory and economy. We refer to them in another section.

policy responses and effects⁴ of multiple diversity⁵. Indeed, as it is already assumed by the current literature, the way that immigration is approached sheds light on the society's self-understanding.

This premise has encouraged other scholars to explore how elements of nationalism have helped to construct public policy on immigration in Quebec and Flanders (Barker 2010; Barker 2012; Loobuyck and Jacobs 2011; Adam and Jacobs 2014; Iacovino 2014; Erk 2014). Most contributions examining immigration and minority nations have equated the minority nation to 'regional' authorities as the main actors representing the nation. Political parties have hardly been taken into account, and when this has occurred (Banting & Soroka 2012; Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011; Kymlicka 2001), SNRPs have not been examined separately (with some exceptions – see Hepburn 2009b). However, SNRPs, in their capacity as agents that articulate and aggregate interests (Diamond & Gunther 2001), also represent (or at least aim to represent) the (construction of the) nation, thus deserve special attention. As 'ethnic political entrepreneurs' (de Winter & Türsan 1998), SNRPs play a central role in the reconstruction of the regionalist 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) and its subsequent claims for changing the existing centre/periphery power arrangements. These parties highlight different components of substate identity in order to define the people as distinct and therefore pose the aforementioned claims. In this sense, immigration as a global phenomenon brings an important amount of diversity into communities, blurring to some extent the essence of nations depending on how they are defined by political actors. Hence, it poses a particular challenge to SNRPs in deciding whether or not, and how, to include non-nationals in their construction of a unified and distinct regional community (Hepburn 2011). As a result, SNRPs can take a more inclusive or xenophobic approach, which has direct consequences on social cohesion.

In order to explore the nationalist dimension that can be found in SNRPs' discourses on immigration, we draw on the well-known ethnic/civic distinction to classify these components. Most authors dealing with nationalism have departed from a classic distinction of these two main forms.⁶ Despite the fact that Smith (1971) proposed a broader classification, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is still today the most commonly used. In general, the civic form refers to the one characterized by using a subjective definition and insists on the free will of individuals in order to determine belonging. In contrast the ethnic form uses cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic criteria to determine a more objective membership (Lecours 2000). This distinction has also been used to assert that ethnic nationalism is illiberal, while the civic one is more liberal (see for example Ignatieff 1995). Some authors have noted that this is not always the case (Brubaker 1996), and that the categorization is not suited to account for how elements of culture intersect in the two forms (Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011). Furthermore, even if most minority nationalisms could be classified as ethnic, they are often more liberal than some statewide ones (Kymlicka 2001; Hepburn 2011; Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011).

4 See, among others, Kymlicka (2001), Baübock (2001) Labelle et al. (2012d) or Gagnon (Gagnon 2009).

5 Multiple diversity is proposed as a suitable terminology for contexts such as Spain (Zapata-Barrero 2013)

6 Which became famous after the publication of Anthony Smith's *Theories of Nationalism* (1971), having as precedents Meinecke's distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, and Kohn's work (Brubaker, 1999).

Language is a critical element within this context. As Bauböck (2001:333) suggested, ‘if a national linguistic minority were to become a minority within its own province, (...) this demographic shift would undermine its power to claim regional autonomy’. Indeed, Erk and Koning (2010) have shown how language diversity influences institutional change and decentralization. Most literature using the civic–ethnic classification tends to include language within the ethnic elements of nationalism. However, as Taras (1998) acknowledged, it is when languages are politicized that the struggle for national identity begins. He explores how language policies have sought to define or reinforce national identity in different cases such as Canada, Quebec, the former Soviet Republics or the United States. This highlights the idea that language should be included within the analysis of nationalist discourses not on the side of ethnic discourse, but as a transversal element. As we will argue, the *way* language is introduced in the discourse is what distinguishes ethnic from civic nationalism.

With regards to immigration, it is true that the civic elements of the nation, and especially the voluntary dimension, make it easier for SNRP to include diversity within their discourses. By contrast, certain ethnic identifiers, such as religion or common ancestry, might make it more difficult to include diversity within the nation. Scholars dealing with immigration and minority nations have already found out how issues such as language play a central role in the Catalan or Quebec identity (Labelle 2004; Gil Araujo 2007; Blad & Couton 2009; Erk 2014), and not in others such as Scotland (Hepburn 2011; Hepburn & Rosie 2014) and it is important to see how all of these elements are articulated. In this sense, ethnic elements have a potential for excluding newcomer⁷, as immigrants cannot be born in the receiving society, and they can hardly change their religion or their skin colour. Hence, we might expect that SNRP unwilling to include or accept immigrants will advance an ethnic understanding of their nation. In contrast, civic elements will be more inclusive for newcomers, as fully participating in the nation would ‘only’ entail living within its territorial borders and respecting civic values. In sum, through the following hypotheses, we suggest that the SNRPs’ stances on immigration determine the way their nationalist discourses are constructed.

In accordance with E. Hepburn’s conceptual chapter in chapter 3 of this volume, we divide parties’ stances on immigration into a dichotomy between positive and negative stances. In this sense, a *positive stance* refers to those parties accepting immigration and describing it as an opportunity for social cohesion or even for nation-building. Neutral statements describing immigration as a fact or a reality are also included in this stance. In contrast, a *negative stance* refers to parties which are clearly reluctant to accept the arrival of immigrants and describe it as a problem or threat to social cohesion and nation-building.

Hypothesis 1: SNRP with positive stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic

⁷ This was historically the case for the Basque Country and its main SNRP, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), in its foundation (Conversi 1997).

Alternative hypothesis: SNRP with negative stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as ethnic

Methodologically, we consider three main analytical dimensions or ‘categories’ of nationalist discourse: belonging, values and the function of language. The *first category* refers to the arguments used by political parties to determine national **belonging**. Within a civic nationalist discourse, stress will be put on the subjective willingness of its members to become part of the nation. Thus, any person living within its territorial borders and willing to belong to the nation becomes socially considered as a member of the nation. In contrast, an ethnic nationalist discourse will propose objective elements that are beyond the person’s will/ability to belong to the nation, such as common ancestry, history, religion or blood ties. The *second category* is the group of **values** that are shared by the members of the nation and that are identified to be key to social cohesion. While, civic nationalism will stress the importance of democratic values, and concretely that of equality of opportunities as well as universal human rights, ethnic nationalism will stress the importance of maintaining traditions and customs, and upholding traditional conservative values. Finally, as a *third category*, we propose the **function of language**. As we have suggested, disputing an assumption in the current debate on nationalism, we prefer to treat language transversally, across the civic/ethnic dichotomy. This is done by stressing its function within the integration process of immigrants. For instance, several authors have already noted how language, as a resource, can have the function of assuring equality of opportunities (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003). In this sense, it might well be that SNRP pose language as a matter of choice ‘linked to occasions of social mobility, as a main source of motivation’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2012b: 87). Concerning an ethnic nationalist discourse, language is an objective identity marker, and a precondition to be accepted within the national community (Lind, in Taras, 1998). Hence, SNRPs would present knowledge of the language as necessary for being accepted into the national community and to be considered as integrated. Table 13.1 summarizes the analytical framework.

Table 2.1. Analytical framework to confirm the hypothesis

Positive stance
on
immigration

Negative
stance on
immigration

Categories	Civic Nationalist Discourse	Ethnic Nationalist Discourse
Belonging	Stress the subjective willingness of the people to belong to a nation	Stress objective elements that are beyond the will/ability of the people
Values	Stress the importance of maintaining shared values relating to democracy (mainly equality of opportunities) and universal human rights, for social cohesion	Stress the importance of maintaining shared values relating to tradition, religion and customs for social cohesion
Function of Language	Social function of language. Language as a means to achieve equal opportunities. Instrumental dimension of language for social mobility	Language as an objective identity marker and as a pre-condition to be accepted in the national community

Source: Own elaboration.

It is difficult to establish the direction of a causal relationship between civic/ethnic nationalism and positive/negative stances towards immigration as they most likely affect each other. Despite this endogeneity and both questions being a matter of political choice, we argue that, as any nation is a construction or ‘imagined community’, it provides both civic (especially in developed democracies) and ethnic elements throughout its history and political context. Therefore, to the SNRP, it becomes a matter of decision-making, of choosing which of these elements of nationalism to adopt⁸ or dismiss, and thereby to make their nationalist discourses compatible with their stances towards immigration.

3. Case selection and methodology: SNRP in Catalonia

a) Selection of cases

The unit of analysis in this chapter is the discourse of SNRPs. Following Massetti’s (2009) definition, SNRPs have four characteristics. First, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections. Secondly, they field candidates only in a particular territory (region) of the state. Thirdly, the territorial limitation of their electoral activity is a

⁸ See Leith and Soule (2012: 149-50) for a reflection on this

consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of ‘their’ region. Fourthly, as stated by De Winter and Türsan (1998a: 204⁹), regionalist parties’ core mission is to achieve/protect/enhance ‘some kind of [territorial] self-government’. We agree that a party can be considered relevant when it is so in Sartori’s terms¹⁰ and when it survives at least one term of office. Two out of the six parties¹¹ represented in the Catalan Parliament accomplish the proposed criteria.

Table 2.2 Selection of cases and criteria

Criterion	Convergència i Unió (CiU ¹²)	Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC ¹³)
Ideology	Left-Right: Centre-right Centre-periphery: autonomist ¹⁴	Left-Right: Moderate left Centre-periphery: Secessionist
Party System relevance	Autonomous level: Two governing periods: 1980-03 and 2010 to date. Coalition potential from 2003-10. State level: Support to government formation (blackmail potential) in 1993 (PSOE) and 1996 (PP)	Autonomous level: Coalition potential from 2003-10. Governing in the area of immigration from 2003 to 2010. State level: Moderate blackmail potential from 2008-12.
Survival	Yes	Yes

Source: Own elaboration

b) Period of analysis

The analysis covers three legislative periods from 1999-2010 as summarized in Table 13.3. We begin in 2000 because it is a crucial year for the beginning of the institutionalization of

⁹ Quoted in Massetti (2009).

¹⁰ According to Sartori (2005) a political party is party-system relevant if it exhibits *blackmail potential* (the party’s existence affects the party competition and the direction of the competition) or *coalition potential* (the party can be needed for a feasible coalition majority).

¹¹ There are currently six political parties in the Catalan Parliament: Convergència i Unió (CiU), Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC), Partit Popular de Catalunya (PPC) Iniciativa per Catalunya – Verds (ICV) and Solidaritat Catalana (SI). Only CiU, ERC and SI respond to the definition of SNRP. However, SI is a new party that emerged in the 2010, with only four deputies, no party system relevance, and a survival still to be proved. Given that, it is not included in the sample.

¹² CiU is in fact a stable coalition of two parties: CDC (Convergència Democràtica per Catalunya) and UDC (Unió Democràtica per Catalunya) Web pages: www.ciu.cat/index.php?idioma=EN (last accessed, September 2012)

¹³ Web page: <http://www.esquerra.cat/language/english>

¹⁴ Interestingly, while CDC defines itself as ‘sovereignist’ (referring to its autonomist goals), it contains some sectors that seek independence from Spain, UDC rather defines itself as ‘catalanist’ and almost rejects independence. This only holds for the period of analysis. Currently, CDC is embracing an apparently independentist position. This article was written before the anticipated elections in Catalonia on 25 November 2012, in which the president of the Generalitat and CDC, Artur Mas, has promised a Referendum for independence. One can assume that CDC is currently an independentist party.

immigration in Spain and Catalonia. For the case of Catalonia, the levels of immigration started increasing in 1999 (2.33 per cent) until 2010, when it represented 15 per cent of the total population. As Zapata-Barrero (2003) notes, immigration emerged as an administrative and technical issue in the 1990s, and as a political and social issue in 2000 (see also Zapata-Barrero 2012a; Zapata-Barrero 2012c).

Table 2.3 Period of analysis

Legislative period	Governing party(ies)	President
1999-2003	CiU	Jordi Pujol (CiU)
2003-6	PSC, ERC, ICV	Pasqual Maragall (PSC)
2006-10	PSC, ERC, ICV	José Montilla (PSC)

Source: Own elaboration

c) Sources of information

The analysis has been conducted through a Qualitative Document Analysis on the basis of primary and secondary sources of information. First, we have collected the manifestos and party programmes issued during the time period. Manifestos are definitive statements of party positions remaining the best-known documents produced by political parties (Cooke 2000). Second, the main parliamentary debates have been taken into account. These often reflect in a deeper way the party stances in immigration, especially when debates on concrete conflicts emerge. Finally, semi-structured interviews have been carried out among party representatives (those in charge of immigration issues at the parliamentary and party levels) with the objective of confirming the findings. This information has been organized in a hermeneutic unit, consisting of 96 documents¹⁵.

¹⁵ All quotations have been translated from Catalan to English by the authors. Hermeneutic Unit shall be facilitated upon request. Citations are done using the Primary document number and starting line. For example, a quotation in line 113 of the first document of the Hermeneutic unit is cited as follows: (P1:113)

Table 2.4 Sources of information

Type	Source
Primary	Party Manifestos (eight)
	Party Political Programmes (eight)
	Parliamentary Debates (74)
	Interview – Party Representatives (four)

Source: Own elaboration

4. Contextualization

As Hepburn noted in her conceptual chapter, SNRP discourses on immigration are more related to the centre-periphery cleavage rather than to the left-right axis. This cleavage includes not only identity, but also the territorial and economic dimension where, as we will see, a distinct discourse is also found. In this section we review this political context as well as the debates that were held during the period of analysis while we relate to some of the hypotheses suggested by Hepburn in her conceptual chapter.

Concerning the *territorial* dimension, the demographic importance of immigration in Catalonia was highlighted in most parliamentary discourses. In this sense, all politicians tended to highlight that Catalonia is a *Land of welcome* (Terra d'acollida¹⁶). This expression, which frequently appears in parliamentary debates and manifestos (P9: 09888) summarizes the idea that Catalonia is a land that has received immigrants throughout its history. Indeed, without immigration, the country would currently have around 2.5 million inhabitants, compared to the current 7.5 million¹⁷. This idea has been present during all the legislative periods, and contrasts with Hepburn's hypothesis, according to which we should expect a negative stance towards immigration. As it is developed in the following section, both CiU and ERC have shown a rather positive stance towards immigration, frequently highlighting this aspect of 'Land of welcome'. A second issue that emerged and persisted across time is the relationship with the central government. Immigration belongs to the Spanish government as an exclusive competence¹⁸, although the *Generalitat* started designing public policy in the early 1990s (see chapter 6 by Arrighi de Casanova in this volume). As a result, whilst the

¹⁶ 'Acollida' expresses a concept encompassing different aspects of welcome, reception and hosting.

¹⁷ Immigration has contributed 75 per cent to Catalonia's recent demographic growth, with the main countries of origin being Morocco (16 per cent), Romania (eight per cent) and Ecuador (six per cent). For an overview of the demographic evolution of immigration in Catalonia, see Franco-Guillén (2011).

¹⁸ According to art. 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution, Immigration is a reserved matter to the Spanish government. The Constitutional Court's ruling on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy recognized the practice carried out by the Catalan Government, consisting in managing immigration through its devolved competences such as Education, Health and other social services.

management of flows and naturalization has remained a competence of the central government, reception and integration policies have fallen into the hands of the autonomous government of Catalonia. In this context, debates took the form of general claims¹⁹ and complaints about the lack of competences to manage immigration, and accusations that the central state had not used its competences to manage immigration efficiently. CiU and especially ERC have opposed the central government's policymaking on immigration. As J.M. Cleries (CiU) summarized in 2004:

The Government of the State has failed to properly manage migration flows and border control, denying at the same time the right of Catalonia to intervene in these policies. The impediments (...) make the existence of a Catalan own policy on immigration a political priority that has been continuously claimed by CiU (P29:4100).

According to the interviewees, the relationship with the state was conflictive or tense, especially when the Spanish government (led by the Popular Party) started sending irregular migrants caught in Ceuta and Melilla to Catalonia (P13:0492). This was interpreted by both parties as a threat to Catalonia.

...the great majority was people sent from Madrid. All of them were illegals. It was the government of the PP who was sending them. And this has happened a lot of times. You can't say it is an official policy, because no one has dared to... but it was an informal policy... (P85: 60)

This aspect relates to the hypothesis according to which the level of control over immigration determines parties' stances on this issue. Although the answer is not clear-cut, as Catalonia holds *de facto* powers on immigration, both parties have revolved around this questions several times, highlighting a discontent with the Spanish government's way of managing immigration.

With regard to the economic dimension of the territorial cleavage, the objective of social cohesion has appeared in all of the debates on immigration. First, in order to prevent the rise of racism and xenophobia, all of the parties in the Catalan Parliament have agreed to an informal pact to avoid the use of immigration for electoral purposes. In this sense, the creation of the parliamentary Committee on Immigration in 1999 (P11) contained common references to racism and xenophobia by both ERC and CiU. The agreement that immigration, with its potential of challenging social cohesion, cannot be treated in a populist way was commonly accepted by the parties over the years (P18: 1866). It is in this area where both CiU and ERC, together with the rest of the left-wing political forces in the Catalan Parliament, have had more similar discourses. Second, in the realm of economic and social integration, the demographic deficit and the growth of the economy makes Catalonia - in the view of both political parties - an attractive country to potential newcomers. Both parties viewed the need to establish mechanisms of reception and integration of newcomers in the labour market from the very beginning of the period of analysis. The fight against illegal immigration was also seen as an important issue but in this case, ERC links it to its negative effects on the individual in question as irregular immigrants can only look for jobs in the

19 Both CiU and ERC have continuously posed claims for the decentralization of powers on immigration at all levels. In fact, even in the realm of naturalization, both SNRP agreed, through the signature of the PNI, that the average years for naturalization should decrease, suggesting at least the intention to influence the central government.

black economy, which leads to an increased precariousness of labour conditions and therefore a challenge to social cohesion. Third, immigration has also been described as an opportunity for economic growth and development in the context of globalization. As the former president of ERC, J. L. Carod-Rovira, stated in 2000: ‘We have an enormous potential, splendid opportunities and we only have to take advantage (...) the weight of the tourist sector, our condition as a country receiving foreigners, our internal diversity could allow us to enforce the Language industry’ (P10:4013). However, after the economic crisis, CiU revealed a concern for resources, suggesting that no more immigrants should be accepted as the labour market is currently unable to absorb them (P85:39).

Finally, with regard to the concrete debates held in the Catalan Parliament, during the first period of analysis (6th Legislative period, 1999-2003), the main debates on immigration related to the Law for the approval of measures to support Catalan returnees. The rest of the parliamentary debates dealt with questions related to socioeconomic issues, and the constitution of the first Parliamentary Committee on Immigration. We should also mention an initiative of ERC to approve a Bill of Reception, which was refused by the Parliament. The 7th legislative period (2003-6) did not include the approval of any immigration-related laws. However, the different questions held in the plenary sessions led to important debates such as the creation of the EBE (Educative Welcome Space), relations with the Spanish state, and the linguistic integration of immigrants. Special attention has been paid to debates on the approval of the new Statute of Autonomy (2006). Finally, the 8th Legislative period (2006-10) was probably the most intense with regard to the debates on immigration. In addition to the approval of the Law on Reception, some questions related to the National Pact for Immigration (PNI) emerged. Finally, the economic crisis and integration shaped most of the questions posed in the plenary debates.

5. Testing the hypothesis: SNRP with positive stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic

a) General discourses on immigration in Catalonia

Immigration as a phenomenon has been mainly qualified as a ‘challenge’ by both the CiU and ERC, but also, and especially by ERC, as an opportunity to construct a project and take advantage of diversity (P10:4013). In fact, immigration is presented in both parties’ manifestos as a fact beyond the debate on whether it is desirable or not, and the discourses have been oriented towards its management, including illegal immigration. Rather than rejecting illegal immigrants, both parties have highlighted the need to manage several problems that this phenomenon raises, such as the black market economy. Furthermore, ERC goes a step forward, urging the regularization of illegal immigrants (P9:07957). In sum, we consider CiU and ERC to have had a rather positive stance towards immigration, and that this has remained equal and consistent during all the periods of study. In addition to the constant references to Catalonia as a *Land of Welcome*, the signature of the PNI (2008) by most political forces in the Catalan Parliament, has helped to construct a shared discourse on immigration. It incorporates immigration as a part of the Catalan identity and history:

Catalonia can be defined as a diverse society built largely through the settlement of persons from elsewhere. This process, produced in a global context and which has intensified in recent years, creates different needs, as well being a new opportunity to define the country that we will be in the future (PNI, 2008: 15).

This shared discourse on immigration does not really start at, but culminates with the signature of the PNI. The consensus on different ideas, such as the image of Catalonia as having a history of immigration, the aforementioned agreement on not using immigration as an electoral tool, and the fact that both parties have been in charge of governing migration²⁰ have helped the convergence of these positions. This is similar to the party consensus on immigration, and its positive association with nationalism, in Scotland (see Hepburn & Rosie, 2014 for more details). It should be noted that the general positive position towards immigration is shared by most parties in the Catalan Parliament with the exception of the PPC (right-wing regional branch of the Spanish Popular Party), which again mirrors the situation in Scotland, with the right-wing Scottish Conservatives adopting a less enthusiastic approach. In this sense, both PSC and ICV have also highlighted some of the arguments related to the history of Catalonia as a land of welcome, although their discourse is generally more related to the left-right axis rather than the centre-periphery one.


This review of the Catalan parties' stances on immigration is in line with Hepburn's hypotheses related to party polarization. In this sense, despite the relative importance of the anti-immigrant party *Plataforma per Catalunya* at the local level²¹, its absence at the Catalan autonomic level, together with the fact that both CiU and ERC have failed to develop a negative stance towards immigration, confirm Hepburn's hypotheses according to which these two factors will lead to a positive stance among other parties (with the exception of the PP). With regards to party ideology, against the initial expectation, CiU as a centre-right party has maintained a positive stance towards immigration. Hence, the hypothesis only holds for the ERC.

With regards to nationalist discourse, SNRP discourses on immigration reveal that a nationalist discourse on culture and identity appears in 69 per cent of the sample. Figure 13.1 shows the results for the three categories (belonging, values and function of language) that have been explored.

20 Both CiU (since the early 1990s) and ERC (2003-10) interviewees have acknowledged that the fact of being in government forced the party to take in-depth reflections on immigration.

21 In the 2011 municipal elections, the party obtained modest results, involving coalition potential in important municipalities such as l'Hospitalet de Llobregat, the second most populated city next to Barcelona, el Vendrell, situated to the south of Barcelona, and Vic, geographically at the heart of Catalonia, and symbolically the first city that introduced PxC in its city council and where its leader holds a seat.

Figure 2.1 Civic and Ethnic nationalist discourse on immigration (1999-2010)




Source: Own elaboration

As we can see, there is a higher proportion of civic nationalist discourse both in CiU and ERC, especially with regard to civic values. The table also shows how the civic function of language is more significant within SNRP discourses than ethnic discourses. CiU has a higher rate in the category of values, as the party has a special concern for the maintenance of traditions.

b) Belonging

The examination of Catalan SNRP discourses on immigration reveals a clear civic discourse with regard to belonging. Both parties have made references to the subjective willingness of the people to belong to the Catalan nation.

Figure 2.2 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on belonging (1999-2010)



Source: Own elaboration

While in sum CiU and ERC referred to a civic discourse on belonging 31 times, only two ethnic references were found for the case of CiU and none for the case of ERC. Most discourses were found in the third period of analysis (2006-10), which is due to the elaboration of the Reception Law during this time.


Both CiU (P21: 6235) and ERC (P40:0529) have largely repeated the sentence made famous by the first president of the Generalitat after the Francoist period, Jordi Pujol (CiU) 'És català qui viu i treballa a Catalunya i ho vol ser'²². This contains the essence of what has been defined as civic nationalism, expressing the voluntary incorporation of people to the nation, based on a concrete territory (Catalonia). This has been repeated in the majority of discourses of all the SNRP analyzed. Moreover, interviewees have highlighted this subjective willingness to be part of the nation. For example, an ERC representative makes it clear 'when someone is living here, brings his children to school, chooses Catalonia as his place of residence, listen, then it's up to him to stop being an immigrant when he wants... (...) when he voluntarily decides to be a part of the country' (P84:12). Finally, voluntariness has been highlighted by both parties in debates related to reception and integration, where CiU (P102: 0915) and ERC stressed the fact that all steps that an immigrant can take to become integrated depend exclusively on his or her willingness to do so. As an ERC representative mentioned during the Reception Law debate: 'It is about...a totally voluntary process. This is our model: voluntary ascription in a common space of society that invites, that asks new Catalans to integrate in the society' (P67: 2380). Finally, of the two references to ethnic nationalism, these were related to the reception of Catalan returnees, as these are considered by CiU as members of the nation as long as they have Catalan ancestors (P23: 1348). Although ERC had a positive stance towards facilitating the return of descendants of Catalans abroad, its representative put an emphasis on the (unjust) circumstances of exile. No other objective conditions for belonging were found in the sample.

c) Values

References to values are the most prominent within SNRP discourses on immigration, appearing in 56 per cent of the documents analysed in this chapter. Most of CiU and ERC nationalist discourses on the category of values were civic.

²² 'Anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wishes to be so, is Catalan'. This sentence was generated by the Assamblea Catalana, in 1971, taken from the texts of the socialist Rafael Campalans.

Figure 2.3 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on values (1999-2010)



Source: Own elaboration

Both parties stressed the importance of maintaining civic values in order to secure social cohesion across the three legislative periods, although CiU did make 25 per cent of the party's total discourse on values ethnic statements.

While it is clear that for both parties civic (common and shared) values are very important, in many cases, this concept remains vague. CiU often speak about 'common traditions and civic values' (P67: 1979), ERC uses forms such as 'values on liberties and rights', and most statements are reduced to these broad ideas. For example, a CiU deputy was calling on the integration of immigrants in these terms: '... also we have to facilitate their incorporation into a society with its own identity, and we are proud of it. Not only because it is a Catalan identity, but also because it is linked to peace, living together²³, civicness and loving each other' (P29: 4554). In the few cases where both parties have been more concrete, civic values refer to democratic values, gender equality, equality of opportunities, living together, respect for universal rights and laicism. This is clearly in line with the PNI, which refers to respect for universal human rights in its section 'Integration into a common public culture'. Attention has been paid to religion, as CiU, containing a Christian Democrat party, could have referred to Christianity as one of the main values²⁴. Although CiU recognizes the importance of the Catholic Church and its contribution to the cultural heritage in Catalonia, it does so while highlighting increasing religious diversity in Catalonia, hence proposing a defence of religious pluralism (see manifestos 1999 and 2010) and a secular society²⁵. In a similar vein, ERC defends religious diversity with an emphasis of state laicism. With regards to the ethnic

²³ Living together is a translation of the concept 'convivència', whose meaning relates to peaceful coexistence.

²⁴ Indeed, one of the main representatives of catholic conservative nationalism, Josep Torras i Bages, made famous the sentence « Catalunya serà cristiana, o no serà » (Catalonia will be christian, or will not be).

²⁵ In line with the discussion on the relationship between nationalist discourse and stances towards immigration, we see how an element such as the prominence of religion in CiU falls outside the discourse when tackling immigration.

nationalist discourse, CiU has sometimes put a special emphasis on the maintenance of Catalan traditions and costumes, but without specifying the meaning of these traditions. For example, as a deputy put it during one debate:


In the realm of culture, we have to remove our complexes for once and for all. Not everything is a matter of money, even if it is very important. Catalonia has forged a culture over centuries and we have to be able to defend and preserve it. It is true that we are a result of the mixture of many people coming from different places, and cultural origins. Nobody denies that. It is the reality. In this sense, our country is like a delta which is shaped by the sediments it receives. But it is the main river's current that feeds the delta and channels the different sediments. (P35:1109)

Other references in this category have tended to highlight those behaviours that are unacceptable in Catalan society. Without mentioning any immigrant or religious groups, both CiU (P18: 2483) and ERC (P68: 3456) have referred to gender equality and the unacceptability of using a burka in public buildings, the latter being based on arguments of liberal democracy and gender equality. This unacceptability is therefore justified through its incompatibility with certain civic values.

d) Function of language

The role of language is key to understanding the Catalan SNRP discourses on immigration, and most discourses related to nation-building. Indeed, it has been identified by both ERC and CiU as the main identity marker of the Catalan nation. When speaking about reception, language courses are always included as part of the first right to be granted to newcomers. References to the function of language have been present in the three terms of office (especially in the second and third periods, 2003-10). Overall, both CiU and ERC have made efforts to portray language as a tool for ensuring equality of opportunities.

Figure 2.4 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on the Function of Language (1999-2010)



Source: Own elaboration

As we can see from the graph above, a predominantly civic nationalist discourse has been articulated by CiU and ERC during the three terms of office. In this direction, ERC has put

more effort into highlighting the role of the Catalan language in civic terms, though an ethnic nationalist discourse has also emerged within both parties.

The two SNRP stress the fact that newcomers must learn Catalan, given the language is a part of the country's identity. As suggested in the analytical framework, we expected both parties to link this need to learn Catalan to ensure equal opportunities. CiU has put an emphasis on offering language courses to newcomers, as a tool for ensuring that they have access to all available rights and resources, and as a first step for integration. ERC goes a step further, and puts special emphasis on promoting the learning of immigrants' languages of origin in order to respect diversity and not be a tool for 'negatively globalizing, pan-statist or pan-religious policies' (P9:11049). Its 2003 manifesto summarizes these two ideas: 'Knowing the language of the reception country is a basic right of immigrants, which must be guaranteed as other rights such as health or education are guaranteed. This is because knowing Catalan has a basic role in the integration process. (...) learning Catalan not only an element of integration, but an unavoidable tool for ensuring equality of opportunities. At the same time, we also consider unavoidable the respect and reinforcement of teaching immigrants' languages of origin' (P9: 10907).

Despite this emphasis on language as the means for ensuring equality of opportunities (civic discourse), Catalan has been portrayed not only as the main identity marker of the nation by CiU and ERC, but also as a precondition for becoming incorporated into the society, which we identified as part of an ethnic discourse. This discourse has emerged in certain debates, such as the Reception Law (P67: 1801) and the failed proposal on a Charter of Reception in the first legislative period under study (P25: 4637). These ideas have always been surrounded by other civic aspects of the nation. CiU's deputy on the debate on the Reception law exemplifies this idea:

Catalonia is a *land of welcome* and this is a national characteristic. The proof is that we give in the innermost of our being, of our being as a country, that is our language and our culture, which is the country's *own* language. And you have not said it. You talk a lot of official languages, but ... there is also the *own* language and it is legally recognized. And therefore we do not want the Catalan language to be for a few. And those coming from outside ... –not you-, our language is also theirs, because we want them to be part of this People. We do not want ghettos, we want one community. Because you talk a lot about individual liberties and each one is each one. Don't we have a right to be a community too? (P67:1801).

Although overall, both parties put their emphasis on learning Catalan as a basic tool for ensuring integration and equality of opportunities, it is true that the key role that language plays in the Catalan identity facilitates the emergence of traces of a rather ethnic discourse. In sum, learning Catalan is a right that enables immigrants to fully enjoy other rights and have access to equal opportunities, but to both parties is also a duty.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter we have analysed the Catalan SNRP nationalist discourses on immigration. We hypothesized that those SNRP with a positive stance towards immigration would tend to portray a civic nationalist discourse. We divided this discourse into three main dimensions

(belonging, values and role of language) and used it as a framework to explore all manifestos, programmes and parliamentary debates produced from 1999 to 2010 by CiU and ERC.

After reflecting a positive stance towards immigration, we have shown how both parties have developed an overall civic nationalist discourse, thus confirming our hypothesis. This can be summarized as follows:

a) Subjective willingness is important to be considered a member of the Catalan society. In this sense, all parties share the belief that ‘Anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wishes to be so, is Catalan’ and that Catalonia is a land of welcome. These ideas have been present during all the periods of analysis, which explains the introductory paragraph of the National Agreement on Immigration.

b) At the level of social values, both CiU and ERC believe that Catalonia’s social cohesion is built on a set of shared values consisting of respect for pluralism and diversity, equality of opportunities, universal rights and living together. These shared values collectively coincide with the CiU and ERC’s open position towards immigration and the consensus achieved for the signature of the National Agreement and the approval of the Reception law, which at the same time corroborates Hepburn’s hypothesis on party polarization. On some occasions CiU has expressed a rather ethnic discourse on values; this is because CiU gives a lot of importance to traditions and costumes.

c) Finally, language is the main identity marker in Catalonia, where its knowledge is a right (and a duty) and a tool for ensuring equal access to rights and opportunities and therefore becoming fully integrated into the Catalan community. Less clearly than the two former categories, language lies between the purely civic and the purely ethnic nationalist discourse. In this sense, the fact that the Catalan language is the key identity marker of the Catalan nation makes the CiU (and ERC in four cases) view it not only as a tool for ensuring equality of opportunities, but also as a requisite for becoming integrated in certain cases. Further research should explore the willingness of newcomers to learn Catalan language in order to explore whether this affects ERC and CiU’s stances, as suggested in the conceptual chapter.

Despite the fact that some ethnic traces of the nationalist discourse (especially in the case of CiU) have been found for the last two categories, we have enough evidence to confirm our hypothesis according to which SNRP with a positive stance towards immigration tend to articulate a civic nationalist discourse.

This chapter has sought to shed light not only on the Catalan case itself, but also the exploration of nationalist discourses in the context of immigration more generally. As we have seen, there are many elements that are important in the context of minority nations that would not be captured with a framework based exclusively on positive and negative stances. Therefore, we consider that this framework could be replicated in the context of other minority nations such as Quebec, Scotland or Flanders, helping us to further explore the link between minority nations, immigration and political parties.

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