Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Federalismo en países autoritarios: ¿hacia una descentralización sin partidos?
Author: García Santos, Jorge
Director: Borge, Rosa  
Tutor: Serrano, Ivan  
Abstract: Our research aims to answer the well-known Paradox of Brancati, this is, that the positive effects that the application of federalism has on the levels of ethnic conflict are counteracted by the action of the regional parties. The use of public resources by these parties would allow them to strengthen their position, may pose new challenges to the federal government and causing harmful effects on coexistence. Starting from a counterfactual, a system of authoritarian federalism in which the presence of regional parties is not assured, we seek to verify if the absence of these has any effect in reducing ethnic conflict in culturally diverse countries. In addition, we will also check some tools provided by the central executives in the systems of "centralized federalism", so that we can verify the effectiveness of these measures to improve coexistence. Through a comparative analysis between four similar countries, we will seek to answer our research question: Does the absence of regional parties favor the success of authoritarian countries in the application of decentralization policies?
Keywords: ethnic conflict
regional parties
Document type: info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Issue Date: 22-Jun-2018
Publication license:  
Appears in Collections:Trabajos finales de carrera, trabajos de investigación, etc.

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
jgarciasantoTFM0618memoria.pdfMemoria del TFM621,11 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail