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Title: A practical implementation attack on weak pseudorandom number generator designs for EPC Gen2 tags
Author: Melià-Seguí, Joan  
García Alfaro, Joaquín
Herrera-Joancomartí, Jordi  
Others: Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3)
Institut Mines-Télécom
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Keywords: RFID
EPC Gen2
Issue Date: 26-Nov-2010
Publisher: Wireless Personal Communications
Citation: Melià Seguí, J., García Alfaro, J. & Herrera-Joancomartí, J. (2011). A Practical Implementation Attack on Weak Pseudorandom Number Generator Designs for EPC Gen2 Tags. Wireless Personal Communications, 59(1), 27-42. doi: 10.1007/s11277-010-0187-1
Published in: Wireless Personal Communications, 2011, 59(1)
Project identifier: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CONSOLIDER CSD2007-00004 ARES
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/TSI2007-65406-C03-03 E-AEGIS
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Abstract: The Electronic Product Code Generation 2 (EPC Gen2) is an international standard that proposes the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the supply chain. It is designed to balance cost and functionality. As a consequence, security on board of EPC Gen2 tags is often minimal. It is, indeed, mainly based on the use of on board pseudorandomness, used to obscure the communication between readers and tags; and to acknowledge the proper execution of password-protected operations. In this paper, we present a practical implementation attack on a weak pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) designed specifically for EPC Gen2 tags. We show that it is feasible to eavesdrop a small amount of pseudorandom values by using standard EPC commands and using them to determine the PRNG configuration that allows to predict the complete output sequence.
Language: English
ISSN: 0929-6212MIAR
Appears in Collections:Articles cientÍfics

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